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Abstract
Human body movements are especially effective in eliciting imitative responses. This 
thesis aims to establish why this is the case, and fundamentally, what this suggests about 
the mechanisms mediating imitation. Chapter 1 outlines theories which can account for 
this imitative bias, and highlights issues upon which these theories can be distinguished.
Chapter 2 establishes whether the finding that responses are executed faster in response to 
stimuli o f  the same action type reflects an automatic tendency to imitate observed actions. 
On the basis o f evidence to support this hypothesis, Chapters 3 and 4 use this reaction 
time measure to investigate imitation mechanisms.
Chapter 3 addresses whether the human imitative bias emerges through top-down 
modulation o f imitation mechanisms, on the basis o f knowledge about whether stimuli 
are o f human origin, or through perceptual properties o f stimuli. These experiments 
suggest that automatic imitation effects are larger with human stimuli than robotic 
stimuli, but are unaffected by beliefs about stimulus identity, indicating that the imitative 
bias is driven by perceptual properties o f stimuli.
Chapter 4 asks why the perceptual properties o f  human stimuli are especially effective in 
eliciting imitative responses. On the basis o f  evidence suggesting that training can 
modulate imitation o f  robotic stimuli, this chapter supports the hypothesis that the 
imitative bias results from greater opportunity for associative learning with human 
stimuli.
Chapter 5 investigates whether visuotactile integration can be modulated through 
training, in a similar way to visuomotor integration. By recording event-related brain 
potentials in response to tactile stimulation following visuotactile training, Chapter 5 
indicates that visuotactile integration is modulated following training, but there are some 
differences in the influences o f training with human and non-human visual stimuli.
In summary, the results o f the experiments reported in this thesis support the hypothesis 
that the human imitative bias emerges because o f perceptual properties o f human stimuli 
and greater opportunity to form associations between these stimuli and matching 
responses. These findings are consistent with the Associative Sequence Learning model 
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A common reaction to observing someone wave is to wave back. The action which is 
executed is said to match the action which is observed because it is visually similar from 
a third party perspective. Imitation is the term used to refer to behaviour o f this type 
which matches a previously observed action, and which is causally related to having 
observed that action.
Many processes are required for effective imitation, including vision, motor control and 
working memory. However, the process which distinguishes imitation from other action 
and perception is translation o f the visual representation o f an action into a matching 
motor representation. The visual representation o f action enters the brain as a retinal 
pattern o f stimulation, and this representation must be translated into motor commands 
which will produce that retinal pattern o f stimulation from a third party perspective. 
Patterns o f stimulation on the retina and muscle commands would appear to be in 
incommensurable codes, therefore effective imitation requires resolution o f the 
‘correspondence problem’ (e.g. Alissandrakis, Nehaniv, & Dautenhahn, 2002). This 
problem is especially evident for perceptually opaque actions (Heyes & Ray, 2000), that 
is, those actions where the visual feedback generated when executing the action oneself 
differs from the visual feedback generated when observing another individual executing 
that action. For example, when observing someone else touching their ear, the hand can 
be seen moving upwards towards the ear until it makes contact. In contrast, when 
touching ones own ear, in many postures the visual feedback generated is non-existent. 
Understanding imitation and supporting mechanisms therefore importantly requires 
addressing how the correspondence problem is solved.
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This chapter will begin in section 1.2 by considering various types o f research into 
imitation, and the specific methods which are appropriate for investigation o f  how we 
solve the correspondence problem. It will examine two theories which address the 
correspondence problem, with evidence currently distinguishing these theories. Section
1.3 introduces the specific issue under investigation in this thesis, namely why human 
actions may be especially effective in eliciting imitative responses. Several hypotheses 
will be proposed, along with consideration o f the questions which will be addressed in 
order to distinguish these hypotheses in empirical chapters 2 to 4. Section 1.5 
summarises the research and hypotheses under investigation in this thesis, along with 
ways in which they will be tested in subsequent empirical chapters.
1.2 Imitation
Imitative behaviour is investigated by many researchers with different purposes. For 
example, comparative psychologists are pre-occupied with whether animals are capable 
o f imitation (e.g. Voelkl & Huber, 2000; Custance, Whiten, & Bard, 1995). 
Developmental psychologists investigate the age at which children begin to imitate (e.g. 
Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), whether certain forms o f imitation indicate understanding o f 
goals in children (e.g. Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Gattis, 2000), and whether imitative 
abilities in early life predict other sociocognitive abilities later in life (e.g. Charman, 
2003; Charman et al., 2003; Charman & Baird, 2002). Those investigating ‘observational 
learning’ address whether observing another performing an action can accelerate learning 
o f that action (e.g. Bird & Heyes, 2005; Kelly & Burton, 2001) and those investigating 
links between imitation and empathy have examined whether imitative behaviour differs 
between more and less empathic individuals (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).
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Investigating mechanisms responsible for solving the correspondence problem may be 
informed through use o f automatic imitation paradigms. Automatic imitation refers to the 
finding that participants are faster, or more likely, to perform responses which match 
observed actions, than to perform responses which do not match, even if they are not 
explicitly instructed to imitate or are even given alternative tasks. Research into 
intentional imitation must necessarily address social processes which may influence the 
motivation o f observers to imitate, in addition to mechanisms which solve the 
correspondence problem. Investigating imitation which occurs when the participant is 
not intentionally copying an action can decrease the influence o f these social processes. 
Given that this thesis is concerned with investigating mechanisms which solve the 
correspondence problem, this review and subsequent empirical chapters will focus on 
automatic imitation.
Section 1.2.1 will review recent evidence o f automatic imitation and section 1.2.2 will 
address possible neurological substrates. Section 1.2.3 will consider theories o f imitation 
which address the correspondence problem, and section 1.2.4 will examine evidence 
currently distinguishing these theories.
1.2.1 Behavioural studies
Recent research suggests that observing an action automatically activates motor 
representations o f that action, even without the intention to imitate. For example, 
Chartrand & Bargh (1999) found that when participants interacted with a confederate 
who was consistently rubbing his face or shaking his foot, the participants were more 
likely to rub their own face or shake their own foot, respectively. However, when asked
17
if  the confederates displayed any particular mannerisms, participants seemed unaware o f 
these gestures.
Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed (2000) similarly found some evidence o f automatic 
imitation, using a priming paradigm where emotional face stimuli were imitated but did 
not appear to be consciously perceived. Happy, angry or neutral faces were presented for 
30ms, directly followed by a neutral face mask. Despite self-report measures suggesting 
that participants did not consciously perceive these stimuli, muscles around the mouth 
were more active when observing happy, rather than angry, face primes, and muscles 
around the brow were more active when observing angry, rather than happy, face primes.
However, participants in the studies o f  Chartrand & Bargh (1999) and Dimberg et al. 
(2000) may have understood that their task required imitation even i f  during post-test 
questioning, there was no conscious recall o f the stimuli presented. Post-test questioning 
is not an ideal measure o f conscious perception o f stimuli (Shanks & St.John, 1994), and 
although participants were not explicitly instructed to imitate observed actions, there was 
no explicitly defined task. With no explicitly defined task, participants may have 
formulated their own task to imitate observed stimuli.
Stimulus-response compatibility procedures may be better suited to investigation o f 
automatic imitation than the procedures employed by Chartrand & Bargh (1999) and 
Dimberg et al. (2000), because there is an explicitly defined task. Brass, Bekkering, & 
Prinz (2001) conducted a simple reaction time (RT) study requiring participants to 
execute a pre-specified action (move their index finger up or down) as soon as they 
detected an index finger begin to move up or down in the observed video display. The
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observed action therefore indicated to participants at what time they should respond, but 
not which response was appropriate. The authors found a compatibility effect such that 
pre-specified actions (e.g. moving their index finger upwards) were executed faster in 
response to observation o f compatible (upwards), rather than incompatible (downwards), 
finger actions. Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard (2005) found a similar compatibility 
effect with opening and closing hand actions. Such stimulus-response compatibility 
paradigms are thought to indicate automatic imitation because the intention o f 
participants is to perform an action o f a certain type regardless o f the observed action 
type, but despite this intention, participants are faster to imitate than to counter-imitate 
observed actions.
Kerzel & Bekkering (2000) observed a similar automatic imitation effect in a choice RT 
procedure when the response had not been prepared in advance. Participants reading 
words printed on a computer screen (e.g. ‘ba’), responded faster if a model behind these 
words was also mouthing the same word (‘ba’), rather than a different word (‘da’). In a 
similar procedure, Stiirmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz (2000) required participants to 
observe the fingers o f a human hand either spreading apart (opening) or grasping 
(closing), and were required to execute one o f these two actions whenever they detected 
the stimulus hand change colour (e.g. close their hand when the hand turned blue and 
open their hand when it turned red). When the task-irrelevant stimulus action type (e.g. 
opening) was the same as that which should be executed (opening), responses were faster 
than if the task-irrelevant stimulus action type was different to that which should be 
executed (closing).
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Sturmer et al. (2000) showed that terminal postures are as effective as moving action 
stimuli in eliciting automatic imitation; stills o f  fully closed and opened hand stimuli 
evoked imitation effects which were equivalent to those elicited by closing and opening 
hand movements. Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti (2002) and Vogt, Taylor, & 
Hopkins (2003) obtained similar evidence o f automatic imitation with stimulus pictures 
o f hands grasping bars at one o f  two orientations.
1.2.2 Neurological evidence
In the last ten years, many studies using electrophysio logical and imaging techniques 
have found that areas o f the cortex which are activated when executing actions are also 
activated when observing actions. These cortical areas reveal candidate neural 
mechanisms o f  imitation. Although this thesis is not primarily concerned with the neural 
mechanisms o f imitation, the studies investigating these mechanisms can often contribute 
to the understanding o f the corresponding psychological processes. The following 
section will examine the evidence relating to these candidate neural mechanisms o f  
imitation.
The most widely-cited evidence o f cortical areas involved when both observing and 
executing action comes from research investigating ‘mirror neurons’ in the monkey 
premotor cortex (Ferrari, Maiolini, Addessi, Fogassi, & Visalberghi, 2005; Ferrari, 
Gallese, Rizzolatti, & Fogassi, 2003; Keysers et al., 2003; Kohler et al., 2002; Umilta et 
al., 2001; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & 
Fogassi, 1996; di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992) and parietal 
lobule (Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese, Fogassi, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Fogassi,
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Gallese, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1998). These neurons have been found to fire both when 
the monkey performs an action and when it observes the experimenter performing the 
same action. For example, a neuron may fire when the monkey executes a precision grip 
and also when it observes the experimenter executing a precision grip.
Various methodologies suggest that there are also areas in the human cortex which are 
activated when both observing and executing action. These areas are thought to be 
homologous to those in which mirror neurons have been found in the monkey. For 
example, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Iacoboni et al. (1999) 
found that both observing and executing finger actions activated the left premotor cortex 
and right superior parietal lobule. Other fMRI and positron emission tomography (PET) 
studies have found premotor and parietal activation when observing hands grasping 
objects (Grezes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003; Hamzei et al., 2003), hands 
manipulating objects (Chaminade, MeltzofF, & Decety, 2002; Decety, Chaminade, 
Grezes, & Meltzofl^ 2002), pantomimes o f hand actions with objects (Grezes, Costes, & 
Decety, 1999; Grezes, Costes, & Decety, 1998; Decety et al., 1997) and speech-related 
and biting actions (Buccino et al., 2004). Electroencephalography (EEG) and 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) methods also provide converging evidence that motor 
processes operate when observing hand actions (Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2004; 
Babiloni et al., 2002; Nishitani & Hari, 2000; Cochin, Barthelemy, Roux, & Martineu, 
1999; Hari et al., 1998), facial expressions (Nishitani & Hari, 2002) and whole body 
movements (Cochin, Barthelemy, Lejeune, Roux, & Martineau, 1998).
Buccino et al. (2001) found evidence in an fMRI study that premotor activation may be 
action specific, finding that mouth, hand and foot action observation activate the
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premotor cortex somatotopically. The somatotopy was congruent with the motor 
organisation o f the region (Penfield & Rasmussen, 1952), that is, the activation was most 
ventral for mouth actions and most dorsal for foot actions. Wheaton, Thompson, 
Syngeniotis, Abbott, & Puce (2004) likewise found somatotopic organisation in premotor 
and parietal cortex when observing face, hand and leg actions.
However, imaging studies can only demonstrate that overlapping brain regions are 
activated when observing and executing certain actions. Observing and executing actions 
could activate different neuronal populations, not distinguished with fMRI and PET 
resolution. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) provides more reliable evidence o f 
the similarity o f motor areas activated when observing and executing action. Fadiga, 
Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti (1995) delivered TMS over the motor cortex while 
participants observed an experimenter performing actions. TMS-induced motor-evoked 
potentials (MEPs) in the hand muscles were larger when participants observed hand 
actions which would rely upon these muscles rather than arm actions which would not 
rely upon these muscles. In contrast, MEPs in the arm muscles were equal when 
participants observed hand and arm actions, which would both rely upon these muscles. 
Other studies have similarly found that TMS-induced MEPs are facilitated only, or to a 
greater extent, in the muscles being used in the observed actions (Watkins, Strafella, & 
Paus, 2003; Aziz-Zadeh, Maeda, Zaidel, Mazziota, & Iacoboni, 2002; Maeda, Kleiner- 
Fisman, & Pascual-Leone, 2002; Strafella & Paus, 2000). In addition, Gangitano, 
Mottaghy, & Pascual-Leone (2001; 2004) provide converging evidence o f the specificity 
o f evoked motor representations, finding that MEPs reflect the time course o f  the 
observed action. When performing a grasping action, activation o f the first dorsal 
interosseus muscle in the index finger increases as the distance between the fingers
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becomes greater. Gangitano and colleagues found that this temporal pattern was also 
observed when participants observed grasping actions.
The studies described in this section therefore suggest that some cortical areas are 
implicated both when executing and observing action. These areas are candidate neural 
mechanisms o f imitation.
1.2.3 Theories of imitation
Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 have surveyed evidence that humans are able to solve the 
correspondence problem, and that we can do so automatically; observing an action 
appears to automatically activate motor representations o f  that action. However, the 
surveyed studies do not directly address the correspondence problem, that is, they do not 
explain how we acquire the information concerning which motor representations o f 
action correspond to which visual representations. The following section will consider 
two theories o f imitation which address the correspondence problem.
Meltzoff & Moore’s Active Intermodal Mapping (AIM) theory o f imitation (e.g. Rao, 
Shon, & Meltzoff, in press; Meltzoff & Decety, 2003; Meltzoff & Moore, 1997) was 
developed in order to explain their finding that newborn infants can imitate facial 
gestures. Meltzoff & Moore hypothesise that there is an innate module for imitation, and 
that this module contains supramodal representations o f the locations o f body parts in 
relation to one another (‘organ relations’). Once infants are able to move, they can learn 
the relationship between these organ relations and the motor commands which achieve 
them. Given that organ relations are specified supramodally, moving in utero can even
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allow infants to learn these relationships before they are bom, through proprioceptive 
activation o f organ relations. Innate supramodal representation o f organ relations and 
opportunity for moving in utero will allow a newborn to imitate because an observed 
action will be converted into organ relations, and the infant has learnt how to achieve 
these organ relations with his own actions.
Although the AIM model is formulated to explain infant imitation, Meltzoff & Moore 
(1997) consider adult imitation to be performed via a similar mechanism. They suggest 
that the only major developmental change, which may occur within the first few weeks o f 
life, is that the means o f achieving an observed organ relation will be matched in addition 
to the organ relation itself. This transition is possible because o f learnt relationships 
between organ relations and the actions which achieve them.
Meltzoff & Moore therefore consider that the correspondence problem is solved through 
innate specification o f supramodal representations o f organ relations. However, the AIM 
model is currently underspecified concerning what precisely is represented in these 
supramodal codes. This underspecification leads to some incomplete logic within the 
model. For example, Meltzoff & Moore do not specify why viewed actions are 
automatically represented as supramodal organ relations. It is therefore unclear how 
learning the relationship between organ relations and the movements which achieve these 
organ relations can lead to effective imitation o f the precise movements which achieve 
organ relations; there is no reason to assume that such learning can allow visual 
representations o f action to be encoded in terms o f precise movements instead o f organ 
relations.
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In contrast to the AIM model, the Associative Sequence Learning (ASL) model o f 
imitation (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Heyes, 2003; Heyes, 2001; Heyes & Ray, 2000) 
proposes that the ability to imitate is not innate, but develops through learning 
bidirectional ‘vertical’ associations between visual and motor representations o f action. 
These associations can form whenever opportunities are presented for associative 
learning. For the purposes o f this thesis, it will be considered that an opportunity for 
associative learning is present whenever there is temporal contiguity between two events 
(Hebb, 1949), and also contingency, that is, a predictive relationship between two events 
(e.g. Kamin, 1969; Rescorla, 1968).
Opportunities to associate visual and motor representations o f the same action are 
abundant during development. For ‘perceptually-transparent’ actions such as hand and 
arm actions, the opportunities for associative learning can be provided through self- 
observation. For example, if observing ones hand opening whilst simultaneously 
executing the motor commands to open ones hand, the visual and motor representations 
o f an opening hand may become associated. For ‘perceptually-opaque’ actions, such as 
face and whole body actions, the visual input received upon execution differs from that 
received upon observation o f another performing that action. However, the environment 
still provides plenty o f opportunities for relevant associative learning with perceptually- 
opaque actions. First, within our environment are many reflective surfaces and mirrors, 
allowing indirect observation o f action. Second, adults frequently imitate younger 
humans (Papousek & Papousek, 1989; Field, Guy, & Umbel, 1985). Third, events in the 
environment may lead to similar reactions in oneself and others at the same time, for 
example, if something unpleasant is present in the environment most will produce a facial 
reaction o f disgust. One can therefore observe a disgusted face at the same time as
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producing one. Fourth, vertical associations can be established indirectly through 
common associations with other representations o f  action. For example, verbal 
representations o f action may mediate visual and motor associations; one may often hear 
the word ‘frown’ when frowning oneself and also when observing someone else frown. 
Through common associations with the word ‘frown’, associations may form between the 
visual and motor representations o f a frown.
The ASL model proposes that novel action sequences can be imitated through additional 
processes which are not unique to imitation (Heyes & Ray, 2000). This ‘novel’ imitation 
is possible because an observed action can be broken down into constituent movement 
primitives which are familiar. The sequence o f these primitives is learned through 
processes which operate whenever a subject learns a sequence o f visual stimuli (forming 
‘horizontal’ associations). When this visual sequence is learned, it is possible to imitate 
this novel sequence through pre-existing vertical associations between visual and motor 
representations o f the familiar movement primitives.
Keysers & Perrett (2004) have proposed a neuro physio logical version o f the ASL model, 
describing how learning between visual and motor representations o f action may be 
instantiated in the brain. They suggest that associative links may form between visual 
representations o f action in the superior temporal sulcus (STS), and motor representations 
in inferior parietal and premotor cortices. There is evidence that STS is reciprocally 
connected with the inferior parietal lobule, which in turn has strong reciprocal 
connections with premotor cortex. Through these links, parietal and premotor neurons, 
which once only fired during execution o f  action, may also come to fire when observing 
action.
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1.2.4 Evidence distinguishing theories of imitation
It may be possible to distinguish AIM and ASL models o f imitation in several ways. For 
example, some authors have proposed that AIM and ASL models make different 
predictions concerning the effector specificity o f action representation in mechanisms 
mediating imitation (Bird & Heyes, 2005) and whether actions can be learned through 
observation without awareness o f learning (Bird, 2003). However, the issue which will 
be explored in this thesis concerns whether imitation mechanisms are innate (AIM) or 
acquired through experience (ASL). In the remainder o f this section, I therefore review 
studies bearing on the question o f whether the capacity to imitate is innate or learned. 
Several features o f imitation could distinguish between nativist and empiricist 
hypotheses. The three features which will be discussed here are presence o f imitation in 
non-human animals, presence o f imitation in infants and effects o f training and expertise 
on imitation.
1.2.4.1 Non-human animals
If species which are close genetic relatives to humans can imitate, this could provide 
evidence to support the nativist hypothesis. Although there is no evidence o f imitation in 
macaque monkeys where mirror neurons were discovered, studies have found evidence o f 
imitation in chimpanzees (Custance et al., 1995), capuchin monkeys (Custance, Whiten, 
& Fredman, 1999) and marmosets (Voelkl & Huber, 2000; Bugnyar & Huber, 1997).
However, evidence o f imitation in other primates would provide strong support for a 
nativist position only if the primates lack the opportunity for imitation-relevant learning
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or if more distant relatives, who also have similar experiences, do not possess similar 
imitative abilities. There is no evidence suggesting that primates lack the opportunity for 
imitation-relevant learning. In addition, there is evidence o f  imitation in birds (Campbell, 
Heyes, & Goldsmith, 1999; Akins & Zentall, 1998; Lefebvre, Templeton, Brown, & 
Koelle, 1997; Akins & Zentall, 1996). It is therefore difficult to argue that other primates 
imitate because they are close genetic relatives to humans, possessing similar innate 
mechanisms. Common imitation-relevant experience may have provided both humans 
and other primates with the ability to imitate.
1.2.4.2 Early development
Nativist and empiricist hypotheses make different predictions concerning whether 
experiences during life are sufficient to explain imitative abilities. I f  there is strong 
evidence to suggest that newborn infants can imitate, when they have had little 
opportunity to form visuomotor links through experience, this would suggest that 
imitation and supporting mechanisms may be innate. However, if newborns cannot 
imitate, imitation may be learned.
Meltzoff & Moore first reported in 1977 that if an infant aged 12-21 days old observes a 
caregiver protruding their tongue or opening their mouth, they will be more likely to 
subsequently protrude their tongue or open their mouth, respectively, rather than produce 
the alternative action. These authors later found that even newborn infants (mean age = 
32 hours) exhibited imitative facial gestures similar to older infants (Meltzoff & Moore, 
1983; 1989) and several other studies have provided support for the claim that neonates 
imitate (Heimann, 1989; Heimann, Nelson, & Schaller, 1989; Kaitz, Meschulach-Sarfaty,
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Auerbach, & Eidelman, 1988; Reissland, 1988; Vinter, 1986; Kugiumutzakis, 1985; Field 
et al., 1983; Field, Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982). Meltzoff & Moore (1997) 
claim that these studies have demonstrated that infants imitate a wide range o f gestures 
within the first two months o f life. These include tongue protrusion, lip protrusion, 
mouth opening, hand gestures, head movements, eye blinking, cheek and brow motions, 
and components o f emotional expressions.
However, despite the large number o f studies claiming to demonstrate evidence for 
neonatal imitation, the effect has not always been replicated. It fact, there may only be 
good evidence for neonatal imitation o f tongue protrusion (Anisfeld et al., 2001; 
Ullstadius, 1998; Anisfeld, 1996; Anisfeld, 1991) and even this may result from simple 
arousal (Jones, 1996; 2006). Anisfeld (1991; 1996) discussed evidence that tongue 
protrusion is the only gesture which is reliably imitated in infants. He notes that previous 
data do not really provide evidence for imitation o f other actions; studies have simply 
looked for two-way interactions between observed and executed action type, where 
tongue protrusion was one o f the actions. A two-way interaction has been interpreted as 
evidence o f imitation o f both actions, but imitation o f only tongue protrusion could have 
created these two-way interactions. Jones (1996; 2006) hypothesised that even imitation 
o f tongue protrusion may in fact result from arousal, suggesting that infant imitation may 
be supported by different mechanisms to adult imitation. Tongue protrusion acts appear 
more interesting to infants than other actions (Jones, 1996), and infants will protrude their 
tongue to other arousing stimuli such as music (Jones, 2006) and flashing lights (Jones, 
1996).
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Providing further support for the hypothesis that neonatal imitation is driven by arousal 
and therefore supported by different mechanisms to adult imitation, there is a 
developmental gap at approximately three months in which tongue protrusion imitation, 
which is present in younger infants, ceases to be evident (Heimann et al., 1989). This 
could result from a sudden lack o f  motivation to imitate, but it is more likely to indicate 
that the structures supporting imitation in neonates differ from those supporting imitation 
in adults (see Johnson & Morton, 1991; Morton & Johnson, 1991). Using neonatal 
imitation as support for a nativist hypothesis o f  adult imitation mechanisms would 
therefore require additional demonstration that neonatal imitation displays similar 
characteristics to adult imitation.
A study investigating correlations in imitative ability between monozygotic and dizygotic 
two-year-old twins suggests a modest genetic contribution towards imitation; correlations 
in imitative ability were found to be greater amongst monozygotic twin pairs than 
amongst dizygotic twin pairs (McEwen et al., in press). However, the authors note that 
this impact is likely to be due to genetic influences on perception, attention and 
motivation, so cannot be used as evidence o f a direct genetic influence on imitation 
mechanisms. Notably, the authors also found that environmental influences may be 
larger than genetic influences; correlations in imitative abilities in dizygotic twin pairs 
were more than half those correlations in monozygotic twin pairs.
1.2.4.3 Training and expertise
The empiricist ASL model would predict a large influence o f training and expertise on 
imitation, because it is ‘training’ which has provided us with those imitative abilities
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which we possess. In contrast, the nativist AIM model should predict little influence. 
Although the operation o f innate mechanisms could, in principle, by modified by 
experience, Pinker (1997) argues that experience-based alteration o f innate mechanisms 
would usually be maladaptive, and therefore that natural selection is likely to have acted 
to prevent such modification. In a similar vein, Cosmides & Tooby (1994) suggest that 
innate mechanisms are ‘buffered against most naturally occurring variations in the 
physical and social environment’ (p.69), and Lorenz (1965) states that inherited aspects 
o f behaviour can be identified as the ‘least changeable’ (p.35). This reasoning is 
consistent with evidence that mechanisms which are widely thought to be innate are 
found to remain constant in the face o f differing experience. For example, Zago & 
Lacquaniti (2005) found that expectations that objects fall at a rate determined by gravity 
could not be modified when presenting participants with different spatiotemporal 
parameters.
Evidence from several behavioural studies shows that, as the ASL model predicts, 
familiar actions are imitated more successfully than novel actions (Tessari & Rumiati, 
2004; Rumiati & Tessari, 2002). Participants made fewer errors when imitating actions 
such as combing the hair or brushing the teeth, compared with control novel actions, 
where similar movement components were executed on a different part o f the body (e.g. 
on the arm). In a follow-up investigation, the authors found that when participants 
practised imitating novel actions, they were subsequently imitated with the same 
accuracy as previously familiar actions (Tessari, Bosanac, & Rumiati, 2006).
These experiments indicate an influence o f experience on imitation, but they do not 
discriminate between sources o f variation in motor experience, perceptual experience and
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correlated visuomotor experience. Familiar actions will have been observed more often 
than novel actions, they will have been performed more often, and they will have been 
performed more often whilst concurrently observing the same actions. The ASL model 
predicts that it is correlated visuomotor experience which is important for the 
development o f imitation. To use effects o f experience as support for the ASL model 
therefore requires distinguishing effects o f  motor and perceptual experience, from those 
o f correlated visuomotor experience.
A training study conducted by Heyes et al. (2005) controlled for levels o f perceptual and 
motor experience, and observed effects o f correlated visual and motor experience. 
During a training phase, Heyes et al. (2005) required half o f  their participants to open 
their hand whenever they detected a stimulus hand begin to open, and to close their hand 
whenever they detected a stimulus hand begin to close. These participants therefore 
performed responses which were compatible with the stimuli. The other half o f 
participants were required to make responses which were incompatible with stimuli, that 
is, to open their hand whenever the stimulus hand closed and to close their hand 
whenever the stimulus hand opened. Therefore, the two groups performed both
responses equally often, and observed both stimuli equally often. However, the 
relationship between the stimuli and responses differed between the two groups. In a 
subsequent test session, participants in the compatible training group showed an 
automatic imitation effect; in a simple RT task, participants were faster to execute a pre­
specified action (e.g. opening the hand) when it was compatible with the observed action 
(opening) rather than incompatible (closing). In contrast, those participants who received 
incompatible training did not show an automatic imitation effect. This result suggests 
that training can influence imitation o f a stimulus, and that these influences o f training are
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likely to result from associative learning about the relationship between visual stimuli and 
motor responses.
Functional imaging studies support the hypothesis that training and experience can 
influence the operation o f imitation mechanisms; activation in parietal and premotor 
cortex which arises when observing an action is influenced by expertise in performing the 
observed action. Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard (2005) 
conducted an fMRI study with expert ballet and capoeira dancers to investigate 
influences o f experience on activation o f  motor cortices when observing action. The 
authors found that when participants (e.g. ballet dancers) were observing dance actions 
which they had been trained to perform (ballet movements), there was greater activation 
in premotor and parietal cortices than when observing actions which they had not been 
trained to perform (capoeira movements). Cross, Hamilton, & Grafton (2006) observed 
similar effects o f  expertise in dancers, finding that observing actions which dancers rated 
that they could perform well elicited greater left premotor and parietal activation, 
compared with observing actions which they rated that they performed badly. Haslinger 
et al. (2005) found similar effects o f expertise in pianists. When pianists observed a 
subject play the piano, there was greater activation in premotor and parietal cortices, 
relative to when controls observed a subject play the piano, and relative to when pianists 
observed serial fmger-thumb opposition movements.
In line with the behavioural findings o f Rumiati & Tessari (Tessari et al., 2006; Tessari & 
Rumiati, 2004; Rumiati & Tessari, 2002), Grezes et al. (1998) also found that highly 
familiar actions activate premotor cortex to a greater extent than less familiar actions. 
Furthermore, effects o f experience have been found in premotor and parietal cortices
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when observing tool use. Ferrari, Rozzi, & Fogassi (2005) found that neurons in the 
monkey premotor cortex discharge when the monkey observes an experimenter use a 
stick or a pair or pliers, but only following training where it observes such tool use whilst 
performing actions itself. Jarvelainen, Schurmann, & Hari (2004) even found that 
amount o f experience with chopsticks in humans, according to self-report, correlated with 
the degree o f primary motor cortex activation when observing their use.
In summary, the studies reviewed in this section indicate that training and expertise can 
have a significant impact on imitative capabilities and imitation mechanisms. However, 
only one study has explicitly dissociated correlated visuomotor experience from motor 
experience and perceptual experience (Heyes et al., 2005). Therefore, alongside the 
inconclusive findings from research with non-human animals (section 1.2.4.1) and human 
neonates (section 1.2.4.2), it is apparent that there is currently very little evidence which 
favours the AIM model over the ASL model, or vice versa.
1.3 Human imitative bias
Evidence is accumulating that naturally occurring movements o f the human body are 
especially effective in eliciting motor activation and explicit imitative responses. This 
‘human imitative bias’ may provide a tool for investigating theories o f imitation. Section
1.3.1 reviews evidence o f a human imitative bias, and section 1.3.2 discusses potential 
explanations for the bias.
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1.3.1 Evidence
There is some developmental evidence that human action stimuli are more effective in 
eliciting imitative responses than robotic stimuli, even when robotic stimuli are closely 
matched in many respects to their human counterparts. Legerstee (1991) presented five 
to eight week old infants with human or mechanical mouth opening movements and 
tongue protrusions. The infants subsequently reproduced mouth and tongue movements 
following human demonstration, but not following mechanical demonstration. Abravanel 
& DeJong (1991) similarly presented five and 12 week old infants with similar 
movements made by human and mechanical models and found successful reproduction o f 
tongue movements performed by a human model, but not by a mechanical model.
Differences in imitation o f human and robotic movement have also been observed in 
adults. In an interference paradigm, Castiello, Lusher, Mari, Edwards, & Humphreys 
(2002) found that observing human, but not robotic, movements influenced subsequent 
performance o f similar reaching and grasping movements. Movement dynamics differ as 
a function o f  the size o f an object to be grasped. When participants grasped objects, the 
movement dynamics were influenced by the size o f an object which an observed human 
model had previously grasped, but not the size o f an object which an observed robotic 
model had previously grasped. Castiello (2003) similarly found that a distractor object 
which was present when a human model grasped a target object and influenced the 
human model’s movement dynamics also influenced the movement dynamics o f  an 
observing participant who subsequently grasped the same target object in the absence o f 
the distractor object. In contrast, the presence o f a distractor object when a robotic model
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grasped a target object did not influence movement dynamics o f the observing 
participant.
Using an automatic imitation paradigm o f a different kind, Kilner, Paulignan, & 
Blakemore (2003) and Oztop, Frankline, & Chaminade (2004) found a stronger tendency 
to imitate human than robotic movements. Participants in both studies were required to 
perform sinusoidal arm movements in one direction (e.g. vertical) whilst simultaneously 
observing human or robotic arm movements in a congruent (vertical) or incongruent 
direction (horizontal). Participants displayed more variance in the pathway o f 
movements when concurrently observing human movements in an incongruent direction, 
compared with a congruent direction. However, this automatic imitation effect was 
found to be smaller (Oztop et al., 2004), or not present (Kilner et al., 2003), when 
concurrently observing robotic movements. This was despite manufacturing the robotic 
model to appear human, with a head, trunk, arms and legs.
An fMRI study has supported the idea that human movement stimuli are more readily 
imitated than robotic movement stimuli, by finding that, relative to robotic movement, 
observing human movement generates more activation o f cortical areas thought to 
mediate imitation. Tai, Scherfler, Brooks, Sawamoto, & Castiello (2004) instructed 
participants to observe a human or robot model, as it either grasped an object or remained 
static. The authors found greater left premotor activation when observing human 
movement than when observing a static control, but did not find greater activation when 
observing robotic movement relative to a static control.
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Other imaging studies have suggested that observing natural human movement may 
activate motor representations o f movement more than observing unnatural human 
movement or animal movement. Stevens, Fonlupt, Shiffrar, & Decety (2000) compared 
motor cortical activation when participants observed natural human movements and 
impossible human movements. Participants were presented with two images; one o f an 
arm on one side o f a leg and one o f the arm on the other side. If the images were 
presented at one speed, the arm appeared to move through the leg (impossible), and if the 
images were presented at another speed, the arm appeared to move round the leg 
(possible). They found that activation in primary motor cortex and the superior parietal 
gyrus was greater when participants observed possible movement than when they 
observed impossible movement. In addition, Buccino et al. (2004) found greater 
activation in premotor and parietal cortices when participants observed human biting 
actions, compared with biting actions made by dogs or monkeys.
In summary, these studies indicate that human movement stimuli evoke imitative 
responses and activate cortical areas thought to mediate imitation to a greater extent than 
non-human movement stimuli.
1.3.2 Explaining the human imitative bias
The human imitative bias may result from either top-down or bottom-up influences on the 
operation o f imitation mechanisms. There may be top-down modulation o f the operation 
o f these mechanisms, on the basis o f knowledge about whether an observed stimulus is or 
is not human. This hypothesis is consistent with both AIM and ASL models o f imitation. 
Alternatively or additionally, the human bias may be driven by perceptual properties o f
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the stimuli. The bottom-up modulation account is also consistent with both AIM and 
ASL models, but the two models make different predictions concerning whether the bias 
can be modulated.
The AIM model o f imitation would suggest that any stimulus-driven difference in 
imitation o f human and non-human stimuli is innate. Many researchers, including 
Meltzoff the author o f the AIM model, have proposed that imitation mechanisms 
evolved to facilitate higher sociocognitive functions such as theory o f mind (e.g. Kilner et 
al., 2003; Meltzoff & Decety, 2003; Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Because humans have 
mental states and non-humans are less likely to, imitation mechanisms may have evolved 
such that they will preferentially process human input. It is possible that a mechanism 
evolved such that this modulation would be performed top-down; a mechanism could 
have evolved whereby higher-level mechanisms involved in social inferences modulate 
operation o f imitation mechanisms on the basis o f  knowledge about whether a stimulus is 
human or not. It is also possible that instead, this modulation is a result o f the specific 
perceptual properties o f the stimuli. The AIM model may therefore predict that the 
imitation module is tuned through evolution to only allow access to stimuli with human 
perceptual properties.
However, greater imitation o f stimuli with human properties is also consistent with the 
ASL model o f imitation. Opportunities for forming associations between human stimuli 
and matching responses are presumably far greater than those for forming associations 
between non-human stimuli and matching responses; we will perform actions whilst also 
observing compatible human actions quite frequently (see section 1.2.3), whereas we will 
not often perform actions whilst observing compatible non-human movements. If
38
imitative abilities develop through associative learning, then the preference for human 
stimuli may result from greater opportunity for associative learning with these stimuli.
The experiments in Chapter 3 investigate whether the human imitative bias results from 
top-down or bottom-up influences on operation o f imitation mechanisms. The 
experiments use a stimulus-response compatibility paradigm, on the assumption that this 
paradigm reflects automatic imitation (an assumption tested in Chapter 2). They present 
participants with stimuli which are either human or robotic, and differentially inform 
participants that stimuli are human or robotic. If the top-down hypothesis is correct, then 
automatic imitation effects should be larger with stimuli believed to be human than 
stimuli believed to be robotic, regardless o f actual identity. However, if the imitative 
preference for human stimuli is created through perceptual properties o f the stimuli, 
automatic imitation effects should be larger with genuinely human stimuli than genuinely 
robotic stimuli, regardless o f beliefs about identity.
On the basis o f  evidence in Chapter 3 that the human imitative bias is driven by 
perceptual properties o f the stimuli, Chapter 4 attempts to distinguish the AIM and ASL 
predictions concerning this bias. The experiments in this chapter therefore assess the 
effects o f executing actions which are either compatible or incompatible with movement 
o f  robotic stimuli, on automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli and the human imitative bias. 
If imitative abilities and the human imitative bias are innate (AIM), then this training 
should not modulate automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli, and hence, the human 
imitative bias. However, if imitative abilities are formed through associative learning 
(ASL), then automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli should be modulated following
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training which provides opportunities for associative learning, and hence the human bias 
should also be modulated.
1.4 Summary
Human body movements are especially effective in eliciting motor activation and explicit 
imitative responses. Theories have been outlined concerning why this is the case. The 
human imitative bias may emerge because o f top-down modulation o f imitation 
mechanisms on the basis o f  knowledge about whether observed stimuli are or are not 
human. Alternatively, the imitative bias may be driven by perceptual properties o f  the 
stimuli. Both o f these views are consistent with AIM and ASL theories o f  imitation. 
However, if the bias is driven by perceptual properties o f the stimuli, then the ASL model 
would predict that imitation o f stimuli and hence, the bias, is modifiable, but the AIM 
model would predict that it is not. This thesis aims to distinguish these hypotheses 
concerning the human imitative bias on the basis o f 1) whether beliefs about stimulus 
identity or perceptual properties drive automatic imitation o f stimuli and 2) whether 
opportunities for associative learning with non-human (robotic) stimuli influence 
imitation o f them and the human imitative bias. The thesis also investigates whether 
opportunities for associative learning can modulate visuotactile integration with human 
and non-human stimuli.
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Chapter 2: Configural action compatibility or orthogonal spatial 
compatibility?
Action compatibility effects are a type o f stimulus-response compatibility effect whereby 
responses to human action stimuli are faster when they involve execution o f  a matching 
action than when they involve execution o f a non-matching action (e.g. Heyes et al., 
2005; Vogt et al., 2003; Craighero et a l, 2002; Brass et al., 2001; Brass, Bekkering, 
Wohlschlager, & Prinz, 2000; Kerzel & Bekkering, 2000; Sturmer et al., 2000). Types o f 
action and notions o f whether they do or do not match are defined using intuitive ordinary 
language categories (e.g. opening the hand, lifting a finger). For example, opening and 
closing hand actions are executed faster when they are compatible with an observed 
stimulus action than when they are incompatible, and this compatibility effect is present 
even when the identity o f the stimulus action (opening or closing) is task-irrelevant and 
the response has been prepared in advance (Heyes et al., 2005).
For action compatibility effects to be relevant to the study o f imitation, the effects should 
be driven by automatic activation o f matching motor representations when observing 
actions. That is, compatible actions should be executed faster than incompatible actions 
because the correct action representation is activated through observation and therefore 
incorrect action representations do not need to be suppressed before the correct response 
can be executed. It is likely that these compatibility effects are generated through such 
processes, given the body o f neurological evidence which suggests that observing an 
action automatically elicits activation in motor cortical areas involved in performance o f 
an imitative response (see Chapter 1). If action compatibility effects are driven by these 
processes, the paradigm seems an ideal candidate for investigating imitation in this thesis,
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because mechanisms which solve the correspondence problem can be investigated in the 
absence o f other social processes which may mediate intentional imitation (see Chapter 
1).
However, the possibility has recently been raised that action compatibility effects may 
reflect spatial compatibility rather than action compatibility (e.g. Berthenthal, Longo, & 
Kosobud, 2006; Brass et al., 2001). Spatial compatibility is a form o f stimulus-response 
compatibility which refers to the finding that actions are executed faster in response to 
stimuli which are in a similar relative spatial location to the response hand (see Umilta & 
Nicoletti, 1990; Fitts & Deininger, 1954) or which appear to move towards the response 
hand (Bosbach, Prinz, & Kerzel, 2004; Proctor, van Zandt, Lu, & Weeks, 1993; 
Michaels, 1988). When participants are instructed to press a key on the left o f their body, 
egocentrically defined, in response to a red light and a key on the right in response to a 
green light, they are faster to execute these responses when the stimuli are presented on 
the same, rather than the opposite, side o f their body as the required response (Umilta & 
Nicoletti, 1990). Bosbach et al. (2004) also found that the movement direction o f stimuli 
can produce spatial compatibility effects. The authors required participants to press keys 
on the left and right o f their body in response to whether a moving sine-wave grating 
displayed broad or narrow stripes. Responses were faster when the response-irrelevant 
direction o f motion was towards the correct response key rather than towards the 
incorrect key.
On some level, action compatibility effects must be mediated by spatial compatibility, 
because actions will match if the spatial features o f the actions match. However, spatial 
information can be encoded in many different coordinates (e.g. Palmer, 1989; Corballis,
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1988; Hinton & Parsons, 1981), and compatibility between stimuli and responses on only 
certain spatial coordinates is likely to mediate action compatibility. Three types o f spatial 
coordinate will be outlined here, along with discussion o f whether compatibility on these 
coordinates is likely to mediate action compatibility.
First, allocentric spatial codes specify where a stimulus or response is located with 
reference to an object. For example, Hommel & Lippa (1995) found that responses on 
one side o f space (e.g. left o f the body, egocentrically defined) are faster to stimuli which 
are spatially compatible with the required response according to location on a reference 
stimulus (left o f  the stimulus) rather than to stimuli which are spatially incompatible 
(right o f the stimulus). These allocentric spatial codes are unlikely to mediate action 
compatibility effects o f the type usually investigated; the actions tend to be intransitive, 
so there are few candidate stimuli which could serve as reference frames for the 
movements. For example, two studies have observed action compatibility effects with 
opening and closing hand movements (e.g. Heyes et al., 2005; Sturmer et al., 2000), 
where the movement is not directed towards an object and there are no other clearly 
visible objects in the room.
Second, egocentric spatial codes specify where a stimulus or response is located with 
reference to a certain body part. The stimulus or response can be encoded as left, right, 
up or down relative to many body parts, for example, the head or the torso (e.g. Buneo & 
Andersen, in press; Pellijeff, Bonilha, Morgan, McKenzie, & Jackson, in press; Gross & 
Graziano, 1995). These egocentric spatial codes may mediate action compatibility; an 
action may be more compatible with an observed action if both actions move in the same 
direction relative to the torso, head or other effectors. However, it seems unlikely that
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imitation and action compatibility are entirely mediated by these simple egocentric spatial 
codes. We are able to imitate when we are oriented differently to an observed party. If 
someone points their left foot out to their left side when facing us, we are able to 
subsequently point our left foot out to our left side despite our leg moving in a direction 
which is opposite to that which is observed. In fact, Wapner & Cirillo (1968) found that 
by adulthood, when the experimenter is facing participants, participants are more likely to 
subsequently move effectors which are anatomically corresponding rather than simple 
spatially egocentrically corresponding. 80-85% o f the time, when the experimenter 
touched his left or right ear with his left or right hand, and said ‘do as I do’, participants 
would touch the anatomically matching ear with the anatomically matching hand, despite 
these responses being spatially incompatible with those observed on simple egocentric 
dimensions.
A third type o f spatial code may explain our ability to imitate in such situations. There is 
evidence that the spatial properties o f stimuli and responses can also be processed 
configurally. These codes can specify whether effectors are moving apart from each 
other or towards each other, therefore effectively specifying how bodies change shape. 
Simple spatial information concerning whether something moves to the left or right of 
our body may be lost in these codes because evidence suggests that configural 
representations can be rotation-invariant (cf. face processing, Yovel & Kanwisher, 2005; 
Rhodes et al., 2004; Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Perrett et al., 
1985). Specifically, there is evidence that STS representations o f observed actions may 
be configural. For example, Thompson, Clarke, Stewart, & Puce (2005) found that STS 
activation was equivalent when observing an upright or inverted walker (cf. Grossman & 
Blake, 2001). Perrett and colleagues have also found that the firing rate o f many neurons
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in STS does not distinguish viewpoint (e.g. Jellema & Perrett, 2006; Oram & Perrett, 
1996; Perrett et al., 1991; Perrett et al., 1989; Perrett et al., 1985), or left from right arm 
movement (Jellema, Baker, Wicker, & Perrett, 2000). In addition, single-cell research 
with monkeys and imaging studies with humans have suggested that premotor cortical 
representations o f action (part o f the proposed candidate neurological mechanism o f 
imitation in Chapter 1) are spatially configural; activation levels differentiate types o f 
grip performed (e.g. precision) and not whether the action was on the right or left relative 
to other effectors (e.g. Johansen-Berg et al., 2002; Schluter, Krams, Rushworth, & 
Passingham, 2001; Schluter, Rushworth, Passingham, & Mills, 1998; Gallese et al., 1996; 
Rizzolatti et al., 1996).
The first widely cited study which investigated action compatibility confounded simple 
egocentric spatial compatibility with configural spatial compatibility, and therefore did 
not determine whether configural spatial compatibility contributed toward the effects. In 
a choice RT procedure, Sturmer et al. (2000) required participants to open or close their 
hands whenever they detected a video stimulus hand change colour (e.g. open their hand 
when it turned red and close their hand when it turned blue). Participants were faster to 
perform a required response (e.g. opening their hand) when the task irrelevant stimulus, a 
configural action type, was compatible with the required response (opening) than when it 
was incompatible (closing). However, both stimulus and response actions were arranged 
along a horizontal axis. This arrangement meant that stimuli were compatible with 
responses on both configural and simple egocentric spatial dimensions; when both 
stimulus and response hands opened the fingers moved upwards, and when they closed 
the fingers moved downwards (see Figure 1A). Compatibility effects may have been 
generated either through compatibility o f configural action types (e.g. opening
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movement) or through compatibility o f  egocentric movement directions (e.g. upwards 
movement).
Figure 1: The stimulus and response movement direction in Sturmer et al. (2000) (A) and Heyes 
et al. (2005) (B). When participants opened their hand, their fingers moved upwards and when 
they closed their hand, their fingers moved downwards. In the experiments o f Stunner et al. 
(2000). this was also the case when the stimulus hand opened and closed. In contrast, in the 
experiments o f Heyes et al. (2005). when the stimulus hand opened, the fingers moved to the 
right, and when the stimulus hand closed the fingers moved to the left.
More recent investigations o f action compatibility have attempted to dissociate simple 
egocentric and configural compatibility between observed and executed actions. In a 
simple RT procedure, Brass et al. (2001) found that participants were faster to execute a 
pre-specified index finger action (e.g. lifting movement, moving upwards) in response to 
an action compatible movement o f a stimulus index finger (lifting movement, moving 
upwards), rather than an action incompatible movement (tapping movement, moving 
downwards). They performed an additional experiment to investigate whether simple 
egocentric or configural spatial codes were mediating compatibility effects. They flipped
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the stimulus hand in a horizontal plane such that configural lifting finger actions moved 
downwards in the stimulus display, and tapping finger actions moved upwards. In this 
experiment, responses which were compatible with the stimulus on configural spatial 
codes were incompatible on simple egocentric spatial codes. In spite o f this, the results 
showed a compatibility effect generated by configural spatial codes; finger actions (e.g. 
lifting) were executed faster when the observed configural action type was compatible 
with the required action (lifting) than when it was incompatible (tapping). However, 
compatibility effects were larger when movements were arranged such that responses 
which were compatible with the stimulus on configural spatial codes were also 
compatible on simple egocentric spatial codes, suggesting that both simple egocentric and 
configural spatial codes may contribute towards action compatibility.
Heyes et al. (2005) attempted to dissociate configural and simple egocentric spatial 
compatibility by removing simple egocentric compatibility rather than arranging the two 
types o f compatibility in opposition. Removing simple egocentric compatibility is 
preferable to arranging the two types o f  compatibility in opposition for two reasons. 
First, if there are differences in compatibility effects between two conditions, one can 
conclude that the differences are driven by levels o f configural compatibility rather than 
levels o f simple egocentric compatibility. Second, because something configurally 
compatible is not necessarily simple egocentrically incompatible, the paradigm can be 
more sensitive to configural compatibility.
Heyes et al. (2005) required responses to be made along a spatial axis which was 
orthogonal to that o f the stimulus hand, that is, responses were made along a horizontal 
axis and stimulus movements were arranged along a vertical axis (see Figure 1B). In a
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simple RT paradigm, participants were required to open or close their hand whenever 
they detected a stimulus hand start to open or close. Participants were faster to execute 
an action (e.g. to open their hand, fingers move upwards) in response to configurally 
compatible (opening, fingers move to the right) rather than incompatible stimulus 
movements (closing, fingers move to the left). Heyes et al. (2005) viewed it as unlikely 
that compatibility on simple egocentric spatial codes was creating observed compatibility 
effects because stimulus and response movements were arranged along orthogonal simple 
egocentric dimensions. They therefore assert that configural compatibility was driving 
the compatibility effects.
However, several studies have reported orthogonal simple egocentric spatial 
compatibility. Typically, ‘up-right/down-left’ advantages have been found; participants 
are faster to execute responses to stimuli when the stimulus-response relationships consist 
o f  up-right/down-left mappings rather than down-right/up-left mappings (e.g. Lippa & 
Adam, 2001; Proctor & Pick, 1999; Lippa, 1996; Hommel & Lippa, 1995; Bauer & 
Miller, 1982). For example, Lippa (1996) found that participants were faster to execute 
key presses in response to ‘X’ stimuli presented on a computer screen if key presses to 
the right were required in response to stimuli presented above fixation (up) and key 
presses to the left were required in response to stimuli presented below fixation (down), 
than if right key presses were required in response to down stimuli and left key presses 
were required in response to up stimuli.
There is no consensus concerning the processes which mediate orthogonal spatial 
compatibility effects (e.g. Cho & Proctor, 2005; Cho & Proctor, 2004; Cho & Proctor, 
2003; Lippa & Adam, 2001; Adam, Boon, Paas, & Umilta, 1998; Hommel & Lippa,
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1995). Some propose that the effects result from salience o f spatial dimensions; up and 
right are more salient than down and left (Just & Carpenter, 1975), and effects are driven 
by compatibility in salience (e.g. Cho & Proctor, 2005). Others have proposed that the 
effects result from properties o f the motor system. Lippa & Adam (2001) suggest that the 
response dimension is mentally rotated such that it matches the stimulus dimension, and 
the direction o f rotation is determined by the direction which would result in the most 
comfortable end-state if the effector were actually rotated.
Orthogonal spatial compatibility is unlikely to mediate action compatibility for two 
reasons. First, there is no evidence, either behavioural or neurological, that observing an 
action moving to the right is more likely to activate motor representations o f upward, 
rather than downward actions, and that observing an action moving to the left is more 
likely to activate motor representations o f downward, rather than upward, actions. 
Second, there is not an intuitive sense o f match between upward and rightward actions 
and downward and leftward actions. This is reflected by definitions o f  match in the 
action compatibility and imitation literature; match is usually defined in configural spatial 
terms (e.g. opening the hand, opening the mouth), and a match in ‘salience’, if  this is 
what drives orthogonal spatial compatibility effects, would not tend to be classed as an 
imitative match. However, without greater understanding o f what drives orthogonal 
spatial compatibility and explicit exploration o f whether observing actions activates 
motor representations o f orthogonally spatially compatible actions, it is not possible to 
rule out the possibility that orthogonal spatial compatibility can mediate action 
compatibility.
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The experiments reported in this chapter used the methods employed by Heyes et al. 
(2005) to investigate whether the compatibility effects which they observed with opening 
and closing hand actions are a result o f orthogonal spatial compatibility or configural 
action compatibility. These experiments had two purposes. First, they would allow 
further investigation o f whether action compatibility can, in principle, be mediated by 
configural codes o f action, allowing greater understanding o f representations o f action in 
mechanisms mediating imitation. Second, addressing whether these specific effects 
reflect configural compatibility or orthogonal spatial compatibility could establish 
whether the paradigm is appropriate for investigating the mechanisms which mediate 
imitation in subsequent experiments in this thesis. Although it is not possible to rule out 
the possibility that orthogonal spatial compatibility mediates action compatibility, it is 
more likely that configural spatial compatibility mediates action compatibility. That is, 
observing an action has previously been found to activate motor representations o f 
configurally matching actions (e.g. Brass et al., 2001; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et 
al., 1996; Wapner & Cirillo, 1968), and there is an intuitive sense o f match between the 
actions, reflected by the definitions o f match used in the action compatibility and 
imitation literature and participants producing configurally compatible actions when told 
to ‘do as I do’ (Wapner & Cirillo, 1968).
Like Heyes et al. (2005), Experiments 1 and 2 required participants to open or close their 
hand in a horizontal axis, in response to opening and closing stimulus hand movements 
arranged along a vertical axis. To dissociate contributions o f simple egocentric and 
configural compatibility, compatibility effects were compared when stimulus configural 
action types (opening or closing) moved in different simple egocentric directions. That 
is, stimulus movements were either arranged similarly to those in the studies o f Heyes et
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al. (2005), such that fingers moved to the right when opening and to the left when 
closing, or they were flipped in a vertical axis such that fingers moved to the left when 
opening and to the right when closing. If compatibility effects are driven by orthogonal 
spatial compatibility, then compatibility effects would be expected to be similar when 
simple egocentric spatial properties are the same as those in Heyes et al. (2005) but to 
reverse when simple egocentric spatial properties reverse. In contrast, if the effects result 
from configural action compatibility, then compatibility effects would be expected to be 
similar to those in Heyes et al. (2005) regardless o f simple egocentric spatial properties.
2.1 Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 participants were required to respond to an anatomically right stimulus 
hand either viewed from the front (thumb on left when upright), as in the experiments 
reported by Heyes et al. (2005), or viewed from the rear (thumb on right if upright). 
When a stimulus hand viewed from the front opened, the fingers moved to the right o f the 
participant’s midline, and when it closed, the fingers moved to the left. The converse was 
true when a hand was viewed from the rear; when it opened, the fingers moved to the left, 
and when it closed, the fingers moved to the right.
If compatibility effects observed by Heyes et al. (2005) were due to orthogonal spatial 
compatibility, then in the present experiment one would expect that effect to be replicated 
in the front view condition, and to be reversed in the rear view condition. One would 
expect actions (e.g. opening the hand) to be executed faster in response to configurally 
compatible (opening), rather than incompatible (closing), stimulus actions in the front 
view condition, and to be executed faster in response to configurally incompatible, rather
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than compatible, stimulus actions in the rear view condition. In contrast, if the effect 
observed by Heyes et al. (2005) was driven by configural action compatibility, then one 
would expect that effect to be replicated in both front and rear conditions in Experiment 
1. Actions (e.g. opening the hand) should be executed faster in response to configurally 
compatible (opening), rather than incompatible (closing), stimulus actions in both front 
and rear view conditions.
2.1.1 Method
Participants
Seventeen consenting, healthy volunteers with an average age o f 25.2 years, six male, 
participated in Experiment 1, and were paid a small honorarium for their participation. 
The data from one participant was removed from the analysis because less than 90% o f 
their data was remaining following the employment o f various exclusion criteria (see 
below).
All participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were 
naive with respect to the purpose o f the experiment. These criteria were also met in all 
subsequent experiments in this thesis.
Stimuli
All stimuli were presented on a computer screen (60Hz, 400mm, 96DPI), in colour on a 
black background, and viewing was unrestrained at a distance o f  approximately 600mm.
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The stimuli can be seen in Figure 2. Each imperative stimulus was an anatomically right 
hand either opening or closing, viewed from either the angle at which one normally views 
ones own hands (front, thumb on the left) or the opposite angle (rear, thumb on the right). 
Both movements began with the fingers closed and pointing upwards in parallel with the 
thumb (warning stimulus). The warning stimulus occupied approximately 6.5° o f visual 
angle horizontally and 17.0° vertically. In the opening movement, the fingers and thumb 
splayed, and, in the closing movement, they rolled into a fist. The last frame o f the 
opening stimulus movement occupied approximately 14.3° o f visual angle horizontally 
and 17.1° vertically, whereas the last frame o f the closing stimulus movement occupied 
approximately 6.6° horizontally and 12.6° vertically. Each movement consisted o f 12 
frames and lasted for 480ms. The hands appeared approximately life-sized.
Open Close Open Close
A Front view B Rear view
Figure 2: The stimuli used in Experiment 1. A Front View, B Rear View. Within each stimulus 
type, the top image is the warning stimulus and the two images below are the last frame o f the 
hand opening video (left) and the last frame of the hand closing video (right).
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Data recording and analysis
For both open and close responses, response onset was measured by recording the 
electromyogram (EMG) from the first dorsal interosseus muscle using disposable 
Ag/AgCl surface electrodes. Signals were amplified, high-pass filtered at 20Hz, mains- 
hum filtered at 50Hz and digitised at 2.5kHz. They were rectified and smoothed using a 
dual-pass Butterworth filter, with a cut-off frequency o f 50Hz. Signals were not low-pass 
filtered. To define a baseline, EMG activity was registered for 100ms when the 
participant was not moving at the beginning o f each trial. A window o f 20ms was then 
shifted progressively over the raw data in 1 ms steps. Response onset was defined by the 
beginning o f the first 20ms window after the imperative stimulus in which the standard 
deviation for that window, and for the following 20ms epoch, was greater than 2.75 times 
the standard deviation o f the baseline. This criterion was chosen during initial calibration 
o f the equipment as the most effective in discriminating false positives from misses and 
was also used by Heyes et al. (2005). Whether the criterion correctly defined movement 
onset in the present experiment was verified by sight for every trial performed by each 
participant. Stimulus onset marked the beginning, and EMG onset marked the end, o f the 
RT interval. Errors were recorded manually.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a dimly lit room. The participant’s right forearm 
lay in a horizontal position across his/her body, parallel with the stimulus monitor. It was 
supported from elbow to wrist by an armrest, and the participant’s hand was free to move. 
The wrist was rotated so that the fingers moved upwards during opening responses, and
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downwards during closing responses. Therefore, given that stimulus movements were 
presented in the lateral plane (left-right), response movement direction was orthogonal to 
stimulus movement direction (see Figure 1). After making each response, participants 
were required to return their hand to a neutral starting position.
In each block o f the simple RT task, participants were required to make a pre-specified 
response (to open or to close their right hand) as soon as the stimulus hand began to 
move. There were two blocks in which closing was the required response and two in 
which opening was the required response, and participants were instructed about the 
required response in each block at its outset. The two blocks requiring the same response 
type were completed in immediate succession. Participants were instructed to refrain 
from moving their hand in catch trials, when the stimulus hand did not move.
All trials began with presentation o f the warning stimulus. In stimulus trials, this was 
replaced 800, 1600 or 2400ms later by onset o f the opening or closing stimulus, which 
was o f 480ms duration. After the imperative stimulus movement, the screen went black 
for 3000ms before the warning stimulus for the next trial appeared. In catch trials, the 
warning stimulus remained on the screen for 2880ms before the 3000ms inter-trial 
interval. Each block presented, in random order, 60 stimulus trials and 12 catch trials. 
There were five stimulus trials o f  each type, defined by combination o f the stimulus 
(opening and closing), stimulus hand view (front or rear) and stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA, 800, 1600, 2400ms) variables.
Before testing commenced in each block, participants completed 12 practice trials (five 
open stimulus, five close stimulus and two catch trials) with the response to be used in
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that block. The order in which responses were tested was counterbalanced (open first or 
close first).
2.1.2 Results and discussion
Participants initiated movement in 0.52% o f catch trials. These data were not analysed 
further. Practice trials, incorrect response types (0.39%) and all RTs smaller than 100ms 
and greater than 1000ms (0.13%) were excluded from the analysis. There were no 
response omissions. On each trial, the configural action type o f the stimulus was either 
the same as (compatible) or different from (incompatible) the pre-specified response. 
The RT data, shown in Figure 3, were subjected to analysis o f  variance (ANOVA) in 
which action compatibility (compatible and incompatible) and stimulus hand view (front 
or rear) were within-subject variables.
□  C o m p a tib le  
■  Incom patib le20ms 15ms
Front R ear
View
Figure 3: Experiment 1. Mean RT on action compatible (open bars) and incompatible (shaded 
bars) trials when the stimulus hand was viewed from the front or rear. Vertical bars indicate the 
standard error o f the mean and numbers indicate the magnitude o f the compatibility effect.
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This analysis revealed a significant main effect o f action compatibility (F(l ,15) = 25.5, p 
< 0.001). On average, responding was 17ms faster when the stimulus and response action 
types were compatible (M = 321.8ms, SEM = 14.1ms) than when they were incompatible 
(M = 339.0ms, SEM = 16.5ms). This action compatibility effect was significant both 
when the stimulus hand was viewed from the front (F( 1,15) = 19.1, p < 0.001) and when 
it was viewed from the rear (F( 1,15) = 19.0, p < 0.001). Although the compatibility 
effect was numerically greater when participants viewed the stimulus from the front than 
from the rear, this difference was not reliable (F( 1,15) = 1.3, p = 0.3).
The results o f  Experiment 1 provide evidence that compatibility effects with opening and 
closing hand movements are not due solely to orthogonal spatial compatibility. In this 
experiment, compatibility effects were influenced by configural action type rather than 
movement direction, that is, responses (e.g. opening the hand) were faster when they 
were compatible with the configural stimulus action type (opening) than when they were 
incompatible (closing), regardless o f stimulus movement direction (leftward or 
rightward) when opening and closing. If effects were entirely generated by orthogonal 
spatial compatibility, then one would have expected that effects would reverse when 
stimulus movement direction reverses.
2.2 Experiment 2
The results o f  Experiment 1 suggest that it is unlikely that orthogonal spatial 
compatibility has solely driven compatibility effects with opening and closing hand 
movements, and therefore that effects are at least somewhat determined by configural 
action compatibility. However, a contribution o f orthogonal spatial compatibility
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towards observed compatibility effects cannot be ruled out. Orthogonal spatial 
compatibility and action compatibility were not entirely independent in Experiment 1; 
front and rear view stimuli did not have identical configural spatial features. Given that 
front and rear view stimuli did not have identical configural features, the rear view 
stimuli may have evoked greater action compatibility than the front view stimuli and 
therefore orthogonal spatial compatibility generated with the front view stimuli may not 
have been detected. It is plausible that the rear view stimuli evoked greater action 
compatibility than the front view stimuli because more fingers could be seen moving in 
the opening rear, rather than front view, stimulus (see Figure 2).
Experiment 2 therefore compared compatibility effects between stimuli where orthogonal 
spatial compatibility and configural action compatibility were entirely independent. It 
used a different anatomically right hand stimulus to that used in Experiment 1 and created 
stimuli with opposite simple egocentric spatial features by flipping them in a vertical 
axis. In addition, Experiment 2 provided a further test o f whether orthogonal spatial 
compatibility mediates compatibility effects by comparing effects when participants 
made responses in left and right hemispace. Three studies have suggested that orthogonal 
spatial compatibility effects are different in right and left hemispace. Weeks, Proctor, & 
Beyak (1995) required participants to move a toggle switch to the left or right in response 
to stimuli appearing above (up) or below (down) fixation. When the toggle switch was 
located in right hemispace, participants were faster with up-right/down-left stimulus- 
response mappings, whereas when responses were made in left hemispace the up­
right/down-left advantage observed in right hemispace reversed to a non-significant up- 
left/down-right advantage. Cho & Proctor (2004) replicated these findings o f an up­
right/down-left advantage in right hemispace, but extended them by also finding this
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advantage at the body midline, and finding a significant up-left/down-right advantage in 
left hemispace. Cho & Proctor (2005) found similar interactions as a function o f 
response hemispace.
This design allowed Experiment 2 to address whether there is any contribution o f 
orthogonal spatial compatibility to compatibility effects observed with opening and 
closing hand movements. If  up-right/down-left compatibility is contributing towards 
compatibility effects in both hemispaces, one would always expect larger compatibility 
effects when responding to the right, rather than left, hand stimulus. However, if 
orthogonal spatial compatibility differs as a function o f response hemispace, one may 
expect larger compatibility effects when responding to the left, rather than right, hand 
stimulus in right hemispace and when responding to the right, rather than left, hand 
stimulus in left hemispace. In contrast, if compatibility effects reflect only configural 
action compatibility, compatibility effects should be equal when responding to left and 
right stimuli, both in right and left hemispaces.
2.2.1 Method
Participants
Seventeen new, consenting, healthy volunteers with an average age of 24.6 years, four 
male, participated in Experiment 2, and were paid a small honorarium for their 
participation. The data from one participant was removed from the analysis because less 




Stimuli were presented using the same apparatus as in Experiment 1. Each imperative 
stimulus was a right or a left hand either opening or closing, filmed from the angle at 
which one normally views ones own hands (see Figure 4). The left hand stimulus was 
created by flipping the right hand stimulus in a vertical axis. The warning stimulus 
occupied approximately 10.7° o f visual angle horizontally and 16.4° vertically. The last 
frame o f the opening stimulus movement occupied approximately 20.2° o f visual angle 
horizontally and 16.7° vertically, whereas the last frame of the closing stimulus 
movement occupied approximately 10.6° horizontally and 15.1° vertically. As in
Experiment 1, each movement consisted of 12 frames and lasted for 480ms.
Data recording and analysis were performed using the same method as in Experiment 1.
Open Close Open Close
A Right hand B Left hand
Figure 4: The stimuli used in Experiment 2, A Right hand, B Left hand. Within each stimulus 
type, the top image is the warning stimulus and the two images below are the last frame o f the 
hand opening video (left) and the last frame o f the hand closing video (right).
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Procedure
The procedure was the same as that o f Experiment 1 except as follows. First, the 
stimulus view variable (front or rear) in Experiment 1 was replaced with a stimulus 
identity variable (left or right hand). Second, responses were made in both left and right 
hemispaces. Given that participants were sitting with their response arm across their 
body, it was considered more comfortable that responses in left hemispace were made 
with the right hand (as in previous experiments), and responses in right hemispace were 
made with the left hand. This was not considered a likely confound for investigation o f 
response hemispace because Cho & Proctor (2004) found that orthogonal spatial 
compatibility effects were not influenced by response hand. This experiment therefore 
contained twice as many blocks as Experiment 1; participants responded with their right 
hand in half the blocks, and their left hand in the other half. This resulted in four blocks 
in which closing was the required response and four in which opening was the required 
response. Participants completed all blocks with one response hand before completing 
the blocks with the other response hand. The order in which response hands were used 
(left first or right first) was counterbalanced.
2.2.2 Results and discussion
Participants initiated movement in 3.1% of catch trials. These data were not analysed 
further. Practice trials, incorrect response types (0.07%) and response omissions (0.20%) 
were excluded from the analysis. There were no RTs smaller than 100ms or greater than 
1000ms. The RT data, shown in Figure 5, were subjected to ANOVA in which action
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compatibility (compatible and incompatible), stimulus hand identity (left or right) and 
response hemispace (left or right) were within-subject variables.
This analysis revealed a significant main effect o f action compatibility (F(l,15) = 10.7, p 
= 0.005). On average, responding was 22ms faster when the stimulus and response action 
type were compatible (M = 362.8ms, SEM = 17.2 ms) than when they were incompatible 
(M = 385.2ms, SEM = 22.5ms). There was also a compatibility x response hemispace 
interaction, such that the compatibility effect was greater when participants responded in 
right hemispace (with the left hand) (29ms), than when they responded in left hemispace 
(with the right hand) (16ms) (F( 1,15) = 5.8, p < 0.03). There was no evidence o f a 
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Figure 5: Experiment 2. Mean RT on action compatible (open bars) and incompatible (shaded 
bars) trials as a function of stimulus hand identity (left or right) and response hemispace (left or 
right). Vertical bars indicate the standard error o f the mean and numbers indicate the magnitude 
of the compatibility effect
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There was a trend towards a compatibility x response hemispace x stimulus hand 
interaction; in right hemispace (responding with the left hand) the compatibility effect 
was greater with a right stimulus hand than with a left stimulus hand, and in left 
hemispace (responding with the right hand) the compatibility effect was greater with a 
left stimulus hand than with a right stimulus hand (see Figure 5). This interaction was not 
reliable (F(l,15) = 2.1, p = 0.2) but, owing to its theoretical significance, analyses were 
conducted to check whether there was a compatibility x stimulus hand interaction in 
either hemispace. These analyses demonstrated no evidence o f such an interaction when 
participants responded in left hemispace (F < 1) or in right hemispace (F (l,15) = 3.0, p = 
0 . 1).
Therefore, Experiment 2 provides evidence consistent with Experiment 1, suggesting that 
compatibility effects with opening and closing hand movements are driven by configural 
action compatibility rather than orthogonal spatial compatibility. Experiment 2 replicated 
the findings o f Experiment 1 that compatibility effects are identical regardless o f  stimulus 
movement direction; responses (e.g. opening the hand) were faster when they were 
compatible with the stimulus action type (opening) than when they were incompatible 
(closing), regardless o f stimulus movement direction (leftward or rightward). It provides 
more convincing evidence than Experiment 1 that movement direction does not 
contribute to compatibility effects because stimuli which moved in opposite directions 
when opening and closing had identical configural properties. Experiment 2 also did not 
detect any variations in compatibility effects in left and right hemispaces which may have 
been predicted if effects were mediated by orthogonal spatial compatibility.
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2.3 General discussion
The experiments reported in this chapter addressed whether the compatibility effects 
observed with hand opening and closing movements result from configural action 
compatibility or orthogonal spatial compatibility. They have provided evidence to 
suggest that such compatibility effects result from configural action compatibility. 
Responses (e.g. hand opening) were faster when they were compatible with the stimulus 
configural action type (opening) rather than incompatible (closing), regardless o f stimulus 
movement direction when opening and closing (fingers moving to the left or right).
The finding in Experiments 1 and 2 that the compatibility effects generated with opening 
and closing hand movements are driven by configural action compatibility is o f 
importance for two reasons. First, these findings indicate that configural spatial codes 
contribute towards action compatibility, which is in line with findings o f Brass et al. 
(2001). This procedure has made one improvement over and above that o f Brass et al. 
(2001); this procedure has removed any influences o f simple egocentric spatial 
compatibility, rather than arranging simple egocentric spatial compatibility in opposition 
to configural compatibility. This can potentially increase the sensitivity o f the paradigm 
to configural compatibility and also, variations in compatibility effects can be attributed 
to variations in configural compatibility rather than simple egocentric compatibility.
The finding that configural compatibility contributes towards effects is consistent with 
neurological research which suggests that observed actions are encoded configurally in 
STS (e.g. Jellema & Perrett, 2006; Thompson et al., 2005; Jellema et al., 2000; Oram & 
Perrett, 1996; Perrett et al., 1991; Perrett et al., 1989; Perrett et al., 1985), and that
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cortical areas which are candidate neurological mechanisms o f imitation encode actions 
configurally (Johansen-Berg et al., 2002; Schluter et al., 2001; Schluter et a l, 1998; 
Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). If  actions can be represented configurally in 
mechanisms mediating imitation, this may explain our ability to imitate actions when we 
are not aligned with the subject we are imitating.
Second, finding that these effects reflect configural action compatibility rather than 
orthogonal spatial compatibility indicates that the paradigm is appropriate for 
investigating imitation mechanisms in this thesis.
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Chapter 3: Top-down and bottom-up contributions to the human 
imitative bias
Experiments reported in Chapter 2 have indicated that compatibility effects resulting 
from observing and executing hand opening and closing movements, where stimulus and 
response hands are in orthogonal dimensions, are driven by action compatibility. This 
chapter will therefore use these movements and the stimulus-response compatibility 
paradigm used in Experiments 1 and 2 to investigate whether the human imitative bias 
(Buccino et al., 2004; Tai et al., 2004; Castiello, 2003; Kilner et al., 2003; Castiello et al., 
2002; Stevens et al., 2000; Abravanel & DeYong, 1991; Legerstee, 1991) emerges 
through top-down modulation o f imitation mechanisms on the basis o f  knowledge about 
whether stimuli are human, or through perceptual properties o f stimuli.
Imitation mechanisms have been implicated in a variety o f higher sociocognitive 
functions, such as action understanding (lacoboni et al., 2005; Rizzolatti, 2005), empathy 
(Carr, lacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziota, & Lenzi, 2003; Gallese, 2003), theory o f mind 
(Gallese & Goldman, 1998) and language (Aziz-Zadeh, lacoboni, Zaidel, Wilson, & 
Mazziota, 2004; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). For example, it has been proposed that we 
could understand an observed action by translating it into a motor representation which is 
active when we perform that action. Through activation o f this motor representation, the 
intentions o f an observed party could be inferred on the basis o f what our intentions 
would have been if performing that action; we know when we execute the motor 
command to smile that a possible intention could be to convey happiness or appreciation. 
This theory o f mental state understanding has led some to hypothesise that deficient 
imitation mechanisms underlie the reduced capacity for these aspects o f social cognition
66
in developmental disorders such as autism (Williams et al., 2006; Williams, Whiten, 
Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001).
These higher sociocognitive functions may depend, not only on the transmission o f 
information from imitation mechanisms to higher level sociocognitive mechanisms, but 
also on top-down modulation o f imitation mechanisms from  these higher level 
mechanisms (Nishitani, Avikainen, & Hari, 2004). It would be ineffective to make 
higher-level social inferences from most non-human stimuli (excluding other animals) 
because it is generally assumed that these non-human systems do not have mental states. 
Therefore, on the basis o f knowledge about whether social inferences can be made from a 
stimulus, higher-level mechanisms may gate operation o f imitation mechanisms. This 
may be achieved if, as suggested by Castielli, Frith, Happe, & Frith (2002), the temporal 
pole and/or medial prefrontal cortex modulate activity in the STS (Allison, Puce, & 
McCarthy, 2000) on the basis o f whether stimuli are or are not social. This process could 
influence the operation o f imitation mechanisms through the many connections between 
STS and premotor cortex via the rostral part o f the inferior parietal lobule (Rizzolatti, 
2005).
There is no evidence to date that the human imitative bias is due to top-down modulation 
o f imitation mechanisms on the basis o f knowledge about stimulus identity. However, 
Grezes et al. (1998) have found another top-down influence on imitation mechanisms. 
They found greater activation in premotor cortex and superior parietal lobule when 
participants observed an action in order to imitate it later than when they observed an 
action without any specific purpose. Therefore, the operation o f imitation mechanisms
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may not depend only on the specific stimuli presented, but also on knowledge o f possible 
future tasks to be performed in relation to those stimuli.
Alternatively or additionally, the human imitative bias may be driven by perceptual 
properties o f the stimuli. Regardless o f  beliefs about stimulus identity, a human stimulus 
may be more readily imitated than a non-human stimulus. The human imitative bias may 
be driven directly by features o f the stimulus movement such as shape or colour, or by the 
spatiotemporal dynamics o f the movement (e.g. Bonda, Petrides, Ostry, & Evans, 1996).
To investigate the top-down and bottom-up contributions to the human imitative bias in 
automatic imitation, Experiments 3 and 4 assessed the impact o f stimulus variables and of 
beliefs on automatic imitation o f human and robotic hand movements. Like Experiments 
1 and 2, participants were required to make a pre-specified response (open or close their 
hand) whenever they detected an observed stimulus hand start to move (open or close). 
In Experiment 3, the moving parts o f  the human and robotic stimuli were identical 
(human), while participants’ instructions about their identity (human or robotic) were 
varied. Silhouette stimuli were used to make it more likely that participants would 
believe in one condition that stimuli were robotic; there were no fine aesthetic details of 
skin or shading which might appear difficult to manufacture. In Experiment 4, one group 
o f participants observed genuinely human movements like those used in Experiment 3, 
and the other group observed more angular and symmetrical movements o f a non-human 
hand. Like Experiment 3, instructions about identity (human or robotic) were varied. In 
Experiments 3 and 4, an effect o f instruction would indicate top-down influence, and in 
Experiment 4, an effect o f genuine stimulus type would indicate bottom-up influence.
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3.1 Experiment 3
All participants in Experiment 3 participated in two sessions o f testing; prior to one 
session they were instructed that the stimuli were human, and prior to the other that they 
were robotic. In reality, the moving parts o f all stimuli were human silhouette stimuli. 
Silhouettes were a bright blue colour to ensure high contrast with the black background, 
making movements easily detectable.
If the human imitative bias is mediated by top-down influence on imitation mechanisms 
on the basis o f  belief about stimulus identity, stimuli which participants were instructed 
were human should evoke greater automatic imitation than stimuli which participants 
were instructed were robotic. However, if beliefs about identity do not contribute 
towards the human imitative bias, one would expect automatic imitation o f the stimuli to 
be identical under the two instruction conditions.
3.1.1 Method
Participants
Thirteen consenting, healthy volunteers with an average age o f 22.9 years, five male, 
participated in Experiment 3, and were paid a small honorarium for their participation. 
The data from one participant was removed from the analysis because less than 90% o f 
their data was remaining following employment o f the various exclusion criteria.
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Stimuli
Stimuli were presented using the same apparatus as in Experiments 1 and 2. The stimuli 
were two movements (opening and closing) made by a blue silhouette of a human right 
hand, with either a human naturalistic wrist (‘human’ stimuli) or a wrist made from steel 
rods and wire (‘robotic’ stimuli). Wrists which distinguished the identity o f the stimuli 
were thought to increase the likelihood that participants would remember the information 
about stimulus identity supplied by the experimenter at the beginning o f the experiment. 
The two stimulus types (‘human’ and ‘robotic’) are shown in Figure 6. Both human 
movements were filmed from the angle at which one normally views ones own hands, 
and began with the fingers closed and pointing upwards in parallel with the thumb 
(warning stimulus). The warning stimulus occupied approximately 10.7° o f visual angle 
horizontally and 16.4° vertically. In the opening movement, the fingers and thumb 
splayed, and, in the closing movement, they rolled into a fist. The final open posture
Open Close Open Close
A ‘Human’ hand B ‘Robotic’ hand
Figure 6: The stimuli used in Experiment 3, A ‘Human’ hand, B ‘Robotic’ hand. Within each 
stimulus type, the top image is the warning stimulus and the two images below are the last frame 
of the hand opening video (left) and the last frame of the hand closing video (right).
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occupied approximately 20.2° o f visual angle horizontally and 16.7° vertically, whereas 
the final close posture occupied approximately 10.6° horizontally and 15.1° vertically. 
Each movement consisted o f 12 frames and had a duration o f 480ms. The hands 
appeared approximately life-sized.
Data recording and analysis were performed using the same method as in Experiments 1 
and 2.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as that o f Experiments 1 and 2 except as follows. Each 
participant completed two sessions o f testing. Participants were instructed that the 
stimuli were human prior to one session o f testing, and robotic prior to the other. The 
instructions were not elaborate; it was simply stated ‘you will observe a human / robotic 
hand making opening and closing movements’, according to the stimulus type which the 
participant would be viewing on that day. As in Experiment 1, participants only 
responded with their right hand, therefore within each session there were two blocks in 
which closing was the required response and two in which opening was the required 
response. There were ten stimulus trials of each type in each block, defined by 
combination o f the stimulus (opening and closing) and SOA (800, 1600, and 2400ms) 
variables.
Following the completion o f the simple RT task in each session, participants were given a 
14-item questionnaire assessing their beliefs about the animacy o f the stimulus observed 
(see Figure 7). The first nine questions assessed beliefs about animacy directly. For
71
example, ‘Did the movement seem to be active or passive?’ Questions 10-14 assessed 
beliefs indirectly by asking how participants would feel about interacting with the 
stimulus. For example, ‘How would you feel about the hand assisting in surgery on your 
body?’. Each question was presented on a separate response screen, and was answered 
before viewing the next question. Responses were registered by movement o f a vertical 
scroll-bar located below each question. The lower end o f each scroll-bar was labelled 
with a minimally animate response to that question, for example, the lower end in 
question 3 was labelled ‘passive’. The higher end o f each scroll-bar was labelled with a 
maximally animate response to that question, for example, the higher end in question 3 
was labelled ‘active’. A score out o f 50 was derived from the answer to each question, 
with a response at the maximally lower end o f the scroll-bar scoring 0 and a response at 
the maximally higher end o f the scroll-bar scoring 50.
1. How purposeful and goal-directed did the movement appear?
2. Did the image appear to be moving by itself or did it seem to be driven by something else ?
3. Did the movement seem to be active or passive?
4. How natural were the movements?
5. How human did the movement appear?
6. How male do you think this movement was?
7. How female do you think this movement was?
8. How vigorous do you feel the movement was?
9. If the hand was cut would it feel pain?
10. How w ould you have felt if  this hand had reached out and grasped your hand?
11. How would you have felt if  this hand had waved at you?
12. How would you feel about the hand combing your hair?
13. How would you feel about the hand touching your eyelids?
14. How' would you feel about the hand assisting in surgery on your body?
Figure 7: Questionnaire questions in Experiment 3.
Participants returned for the second session o f testing, not less than one day later and not 
more than one week later. For each participant, the order o f responses to be made 
(opening their hand or closing their hand first) was constant across the first and second
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days o f testing. The order in which responses were tested (open first or close first), and 
the order o f belief manipulation (instructed that the stimulus hand was human or robotic 
first) were counterbalanced.
3.1.2 Results and discussion
ANOVA was applied to the questionnaire data in which instruction about stimulus type 
(human and robotic) was a within-subject variable. This analysis indicated that animacy 
ratings (an average o f questions 1-14) were higher for stimuli which participants were 
instructed were human (M = 28.3/50, SEM = 1.9) than for stimuli which they were 
instructed were robotic (M = 23.5/50, SEM = 1.5) (F (l,11) = 12.1, p < 0.01), and this 
effect did not interact with any o f the counterbalancing variables. This suggests that the 
instructions were effective in influencing participants’ beliefs about the objects depicted 
in the stimulus images. The effect o f  instruction on animacy ratings was small, but 
highly reliable. It is likely that the effect was small because participants were reluctant to 
use the extremes o f the rating scale.
Participants initiated movement in 10.1% o f catch trials. These data were not analysed 
further. Practice trials and all RTs smaller than 100ms and greater than 1000ms (0.24%) 
were excluded from the analysis. There were no incorrect response types or response 
omissions. The RT data are shown in Figure 8 and were subjected to ANOVA in which 
compatibility (compatible and incompatible) and instruction about stimulus type (human 
and robotic) were within-subject variables. This analysis revealed a main effect o f 
compatibility (F (l,l 1) = 32.0, p < 0.001). On average, responding was 20ms faster when
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the stimulus was response-compatible (M = 361.8ms, SEM = 11.1ms) than when it was 
response-incompatible (M = 382.5ms, SEM = 13.4ms). This RT difference was not
420
! □ Compatible 
| ■ Incompatible16ms 26ms
Instruction about Human Robotic
stimulus identity
Figure 8: Experiment 3. Mean RT on compatible (open bars) and incompatible (shaded bars) 
trials for stimuli which participants were instructed were human and stimuli which participants 
were instructed were robotic. Vertical bars indicate the standard error o f the mean and numbers 
indicate the magnitude of the compatibility effect.
greater for stimuli which participants were instructed were human. In fact, as Figure 8 
indicates, the RT difference was numerically greater for stimuli which participants were 
instructed were robotic, but this difference was not reliable (F (l,l 1) = 1.8, p = 0.2), nor 
did it interact with any o f the counterbalancing variables. Figure 8 also indicates faster 
responding to stimuli which participants were instructed were robotic than to stimuli 
which participants were instructed were human, but this difference was only marginally 
significant (F( 1,11) = 4.7, p = 0.05). No other effects or interactions were significant.
Therefore, Experiment 3 did not detect any top-down influence o f beliefs about stimulus 
identity on automatic imitation. Despite questionnaire responses indicating that the 
instructions successfully manipulated the participants’ beliefs about stimulus identity,
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automatic imitation o f stimuli which participants were instructed were human was not 
greater than automatic imitation o f stimuli which participants were instructed were 
robotic.
3.2 Experiment 4
Although Experiment 3 found no influence o f instruction about stimulus identity on 
automatic imitation, the instruction manipulation in Experiment 3 was confounded with a 
minor perceptual variable. The stimuli which participants were instructed were human 
had a human naturalistic wrist, and the stimuli which participants were instructed were 
robotic had a wrist made from steel rods and wires. This perceptual modulation was 
employed because it was thought to increase the probability that participants would 
remember their instructions about stimulus identity during the experiment. However, this 
perceptual modulation may have masked an effect o f instruction on automatic imitation. 
For example, there was a trend for participants to respond more slowly to stimuli which 
they had been instructed were human, and also for these stimuli to elicit less automatic 
imitation. Slower responses to human stimuli may have resulted if the human wrists 
captured greater attention than the robotic wrists, therefore resulting in less attention 
towards the moving parts o f the stimulus. Given that these experiments employ a simple 
RT procedure, participants may have responded to slight movement observable near the 
wrist, rather than the entire movement which would have been processed if  focussing 
attention further upwards. If this perceptual difference had not been present, greater 
automatic imitation o f stimuli which participants were instructed were human may have 
been observed. Experiment 4 therefore provided a further test o f the top-down
75
hypothesis, where the stimuli which participants were instructed were human were 
identical to the stimuli which participants were instructed were robotic.
In addition to providing a further test o f the top-down hypothesis, Experiment 4 
investigated any bottom-up contribution to the human imitative bias. Genuine stimulus 
identity was manipulated in addition to beliefs about stimulus identity. One group of 
participants always observed human movements, and prior to one session they were 
instructed that the movements were human and prior to the other session that they were 
robotic. These genuinely human stimuli were the same as those presented in Experiment 
3, but were now identical irrespective o f  whether participants were instructed that they 
were human or robotic, that is, they did not have discriminating wrists. The other group 
observed more angular and symmetrical movements o f a non-human hand, and prior to 
one session they were instructed that the movements were generated by a human agent 
and prior to the other session that they were generated by a robotic agent. These 
genuinely non-human movements were created by approximately matching each frame of 
the opening and closing movements to each frame o f the opening and closing human 
movements in surface area, luminance, horizontal and vertical visual angles, and aperture 
between closest effectors. These genuinely non-human movements were created to 
appear robotic by making them angular and symmetric, in contrast to the human 
movements which were asymmetric with rounded contours. Although these movements 
were not in fact generated by a mechanically-driven device, they will be termed 
‘genuinely robotic’ in this chapter, in order to distinguish them from the stimuli which 
were genuinely human.
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If there are bottom-up contributions to the human imitative bias, then genuinely human 
movements should evoke a larger automatic imitation effect than genuinely robotic 
movements. If there are top-down contributions, then stimuli believed to be human 
should evoke a larger automatic imitation effect than stimuli believed to be robotic.
3.2.1 Method
Participants
Twenty-five new, consenting, healthy volunteers with an average age o f 25.2 years, seven 
male, participated in Experiment 4, and were paid a small honorarium for their 
participation. The data from one participant was removed from the analysis because less 
than 90% of their data was remaining following employment o f the various exclusion 
criteria. The remaining 24 participants were randomly assigned in equal numbers to 
groups which viewed a genuinely human stimulus, or a genuinely robotic stimulus, across 
both days o f testing.
Stimuli
The two stimulus types (human and robotic) are shown in Figure 9. The group observing 
genuinely human movements in both sessions o f testing received the same instructions 
about identity as the participants in Experiment 3; the participants were simply instructed 
that the movements were either human or robotic. The participants presented with the 
genuinely robotic stimuli were instructed that the movements were generated by either 
human or robotic movement, through taking important points o f motion and mapping
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these onto a stimulus “in a similar way to that in which they make characters move in 
films like Shrek©”. It was thought that these instructions were more believable than 
instructing participants that the angular form of the stimuli was human.
All other aspects of the method were the same as in Experiment 3.
Open Close Open Close
A Human hand B Robotic hand
Figure 9: The stimuli used in Experiment 4. A Human hand. B Robotic hand. Within each 
stimulus type, the image on the left is the last frame of the hand opening video and the image on 
the right is the last frame of the hand closing video.
3.2.2 Results and discussion
ANOVA was applied to the questionnaire data in which instruction about stimulus type 
(human and robotic) was a within-subject variable and genuine stimulus type (human and 
robotic) was a between-subject variable. This ANOVA indicated that animacy ratings 
(an average o f questions 1-14) were higher for stimuli which participants had been 
instructed were human (M = 24.1/50, SEM = 1.0) than for stimuli which they had been 
instructed were robotic (M = 21.2/50, SEM = 0.9) (F(l,22) = 17.0, p < 0.001), and this 
effect did not interact with any o f the counterbalancing variables. This suggests that, as
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in Experiment 3, the instructions were effective in manipulating participants’ beliefs 
about stimulus type. The ratings for genuinely human stimuli (M = 23.9/50, SEM = 1.4) 
and genuinely robotic stimuli (M = 21.3/50, SEM = 1.0) did not reliably differ (F(l,22) = 
2.3, p = 0.1), which is perhaps surprising. This similarity in ratings for genuinely human 
and robotic stimuli may indicate that the instructions regarding stimulus origin were so 
effective that they blocked any effects o f stimulus properties on beliefs.
Participants initiated movement in 4.8% o f catch trials. These data were not analysed 
further. Practice trials, incorrect response types (0.11%), response omissions (0.05%) 
and all RTs smaller than 100ms and greater than 1000ms (0.03%) were excluded from the 
analysis. The RT data, shown in Figure 10, were subjected to ANOVA in which 
compatibility (compatible and incompatible) and instruction about stimulus type (human









Instruction H um an R o b o t ic  H um an R o b o tic
Genuine Human Robotic
stimulus type
Figure 10: Experiment 4. Mean RT on compatible (open bars) and incompatible (shaded bars) 
trials for genuine human (left) and robotic (right) stimuli, both when instructed to be human and 
when instructed to be robotic. Vertical bars indicate the standard error o f the mean and numbers 
indicate the magnitude of the compatibility effect.
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and robotic) were within-subject variables and genuine stimulus type (human and robotic) 
was a between-subject variable. There was a main effect o f compatibility (F(l,22) = 
20.7, p < 0.001), and a genuine stimulus type x compatibility interaction (F(l,22) = 4.5, p 
< 0.05). On average, responding was 10ms faster when the stimulus movement was 
response-compatible (M = 283.5ms, SEM = 8.8ms) than when it was response- 
incompatible (M = 293.1ms, SEM = 9.8ms), and this difference was greater for 
participants who responded to genuinely human stimuli (14.2ms) than for participants 
who responded to genuinely robotic stimuli (5.2ms). Simple effects analyses indicated 
that the difference in RT between compatible and incompatible trials was significant, not 
only for genuinely human stimuli (F (l, 11) = 13.7, p < 0.005), but also for genuinely 
robotic stimuli (F (l,11) = 8.0, p < 0.02). As in Experiment 3, the instruction x 
compatibility interaction was not significant (F < 1), and this did not interact with any o f 
the counterbalancing variables.
There was also a main effect o f genuine stimulus type (F(l,22) = 4.8, p < 0.05), 
indicating that, on average, participants observing genuinely human stimuli were faster to 
respond (M = 268.1ms, SEM = 12.4ms) than participants observing genuinely robotic 
stimuli (M = 308.5ms, SEM = 13.7ms). This suggests that it may have taken participants 
longer to process movement features o f the robotic stimuli than movement features o f the 
human stimuli. Some supplementary analyses were performed to investigate whether the 
main effect o f genuine stimulus type could have created the genuine stimulus type x 
compatibility interaction. Investigations o f simple spatial compatibility have indicated 
that faster responses are associated with larger compatibility effects (Eimer, Hommel, & 
Prinz, 1995; De Jong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994; Hommel, 1993), and this finding is thought 
to reflect decay in the representation o f the visual stimulus over time, after its initial
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activation following presentation. If  this is the case with the stimuli used in Experiment 
4, the main effect o f genuine stimulus type could have created the genuine stimulus type 
x compatibility interaction; by the time the participants respond to the genuinely robotic 
stimulus, the representation o f the visual stimulus will have decayed relative to the time 
at which participants respond to the genuinely human stimulus.
The RT distribution for each participant within Experiment 4 was therefore divided into 
quintiles (Ratcliff, 1979). Compatibility effects could therefore be compared for five 
levels o f  response speed; quintile 1 indicating the fastest trials o f  each type and quintile 5 
indicating the slowest. An ANOVA was performed on these data in which compatibility 
(compatible and incompatible), belief about stimulus type (human and robotic) and 
response speed (quintiles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) were within-subject variables and genuine 
stimulus type (human and robotic) was a between-subject variable. This analysis 
demonstrated that compatibility effects increased as RT increased, although this effect 
was not quite reliable (F(4,88) = 3.6, p = 0.06, Greenhouse Geisser corrected). This 
effect did not differ as a function o f genuine stimulus type (F(4,88) = 2.0, p = 0.2). This 
finding is in line with previous investigations o f configural action compatibility, where 
compatibility effects have been found to increase with increasing RT (Bird, 2003; Brass 
et al., 2001). This may be because configural spatial features o f action take longer to 
process than simple spatial features and therefore become more active over time.
This analysis indicates that larger compatibility effects should be expected, in principle, 
at slower RTs, therefore the main effect o f genuine stimulus type is unlikely to have 
created the genuine stimulus type x compatibility interaction. However, these analyses 
were performed within-subject. An additional analysis was performed to note whether
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these effects were also present between-subject. All participants from Experiments 1 -  4 
were included in this analysis. There was a reliable correlation between mean RT and 
mean compatibility effect (Pearson’s r = 0.66, p < 0.001); as mean RT increased, so did 
mean compatibility effect. This analysis provides further evidence to suggest that it is 
unlikely that the main effect o f genuine stimulus type has created the genuine stimulus 
type x compatibility interaction, and that it is more likely that the main effect diluted the 
interaction such that a larger interaction would have been observed in its absence.
Like those o f Experiment 3, the results o f Experiment 4 therefore provide no support for 
the hypothesis that beliefs about stimulus identity play a significant role in mediating the 
human imitative bias. There were no perceptual differences between stimuli which 
participants were instructed were human and those which they were instructed were 
robotic. This eliminates the possibility that perceptual differences were masking 
influences o f belief. In contrast, the results o f  Experiment 4 indicate that stimulus 
properties can contribute to the human imitative bias.
3.3 General discussion
To investigate bottom-up and top-down contributions to the human imitative bias, 
Experiments 3 and 4 assessed the impact o f stimulus variables and o f instructions about 
stimulus identity on automatic imitation o f human and robotic hand movements. In 
Experiment 3, the moving parts o f the stimuli were human, but participants were 
instructed prior to one session that the stimuli were human and prior to another session 
that the stimuli were robotic. Experiment 3 found no evidence that beliefs about stimulus 
identity exert a top-down influence on automatic imitation; there was not a larger
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automatic imitation effect elicited by the human movements when participants were 
instructed that they were human than when they were instructed that they were robotic. 
Experiment 4 replicated this finding and also indicated that, rather than beliefs about 
stimulus identity, properties o f the movement stimuli influence automatic imitation. In a 
factorial design, participants were presented with stimuli which were genuinely human or 
genuinely robotic, and were instructed prior to one session that the stimuli were human 
and prior to another session that the stimuli were robotic. This experiment found that 
automatic imitation o f genuinely human stimuli was greater than automatic imitation of 
genuinely robotic stimuli, but did not find evidence that this difference was modulated by 
beliefs about the human or robotic origin o f the stimuli.
As discussed in Chapter 1, previous behavioural studies have shown that observation o f 
human movements elicits more automatic imitation than observation o f robotic 
movements (e.g. Oztop et al., 2004; Kilner et al., 2003). Neurological studies have also 
suggested a human visuo motor priming advantage, by showing that observation o f human 
movements gives rise to more activity in premotor cortex than observation o f robotic 
movements (Tai et al., 2004). However, as far as I am aware, no previous study has 
attempted to isolate and distinguish top-down and bottom-up contributions to the human 
imitative bias.
It has been suggested that imitation mechanisms influence higher sociocognitive 
functions via connections with higher level mechanisms involved in drawing inferences 
about mental states (Rizzolatti, 2005; Kilner et al., 2003; Gallese & Goldman, 1998). 
The finding that the human imitative bias depends on stimulus properties rather than 
beliefs about stimulus origin is not inconsistent with this suggestion. It is generally
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assumed that humans and other animals have mental states whereas robotic systems do 
not. Therefore, it would be adaptive for inputs from biological stimuli to have privileged 
access to processes which generate inferences about mental states. Although the present 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that imitation mechanisms provide input to 
higher-level sociocognitive functions, they provide no support for the converse 
hypothesis, that higher-level functions modulate processing in imitation mechanisms.
The observation that the human imitative bias is driven by stimulus properties rather than 
beliefs about stimulus origin is consistent with both AIM and ASL theories o f  imitation. 
The AIM model proposes that imitation mechanisms evolved through natural selection, 
and Meltzoff & Decety (p.491, 2003) suggest that imitation may have evolved to support 
social understanding: ‘nature endows humans with the tools to solve the ‘other minds’ 
problem by providing newborns with an imitative brain’. Other authors have made 
similar suggestions that imitation evolved for such social understanding (Kilner et al., 
2003; Gallese & Goldman, 1998). This hypothesis may predict that imitation 
mechanisms therefore allow privileged access to human stimuli. The ASL theory o f 
imitation is also consistent with a human imitative bias mediated by stimulus properties. 
Our environment provides us with many opportunities to form associations between 
visual representations of human movements and matching motor representations. For 
example, automatic imitation o f hand movements may depend on links established during 
visual observation o f ones own hand whilst performing movements. In comparison, there 
would be relatively little opportunity to form similar associations between visual 
representations o f robotic movements and motor representations o f our own movements.
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It might be argued that beliefs about stimulus origin do exert a top-down influence on 
imitation mechanisms, and that Experiments 3 and 4 did not detect such an influence 
because they did not effectively manipulate participants’ beliefs about stimulus identity. 
A questionnaire was used to assess participants’ beliefs about stimulus identity in 
Experiments 3 and 4 and questionnaire responses are susceptible to demand effects. In 
principle, participants may have responded in accordance, not with their beliefs about the 
objects depicted in the stimulus images, but with inferences about the experimenter’s 
expectations. However, it is unlikely that our questionnaire measure was contaminated 
by demand effects for two reasons. First, the experimenter conspicuously did not observe 
participants when they were completing the questionnaire, and they were assured that all 
data would be stored anonymously. Second, questionnaire responses were made using a 
scroll-bar which was not marked with numbers. Therefore, it would have been difficult 
for participants to remember when completing the questionnaire after their second session 
(e.g. robot instructions) how they had responded after their first (e.g. human instructions), 
at least 24 hours earlier.
The results o f Experiment 4 provide some information about the perceptual properties 
which can mediate the human imitative bias. Genuinely human and robotic stimuli 
differed only in shape; according to the terminology established in Chapter 2, the 
configural spatial properties differed. The stimuli did not differ in colour, texture, 
shading or overall size. This provides further support for the hypothesis that action 
compatibility is, at least partly, determined by compatibility between stimuli and 
responses on spatial coordinates (see Chapter 2). This is not to suggest that other features 
o f stimuli do not influence automatic imitation. The ASL model would suggest that any
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perceptible feature o f a stimulus can become associated with a response. This issue is 
discussed further in Chapters 4 and 6.
Experiment 4 indicated that, although less effective than human stimuli, robotic stimuli 
do elicit automatic imitation. This finding is in contrast to those o f previous studies 
which have found no evidence o f imitation o f robotic stimuli (Castiello, 2003; Kilner et 
al., 2003; Castiello et al., 2002; Abravanel & DeYong, 1991; Legerstee, 1991) and no 
activation in motor circuits during observation o f robotic movement (Tai et al., 2004). 
There are at least two possible reasons why the present study found evidence o f imitation 
o f robotic stimuli whereas previous studies did not (cf. Oztop et al., 2004). First, the 
robotic movement stimuli in Experiment 4 may have been more similar in appearance to 
human movement stimuli. Greater similarity o f robotic and human stimuli may have 
elicited greater automatic imitation o f  robotic stimuli through stimulus generalisation 
from human stimuli (e.g. Pearce, 1987), that is, according to the ASL model, those 
features which are common to human and robotic movement will be associated with 
matching responses through learning with human stimuli. Experiment 4 certainly sought 
to achieve similarity between the human and robotic stimuli by matching the robotic to 
the human stimuli on several dimensions (e.g. surface area, horizontal and vertical visual 
angles, aperture between closest effectors), but without more detailed information about 
the stimuli used in previous experiments it is difficult to make the relevant cross- 
experimental comparisons. Second, in comparison with the behavioural and 
neuro physio logical measures used in previous studies, the automatic imitation 
compatibility paradigm with hand opening and closing movements may be especially 
sensitive to imitation, and therefore able to detect even small tendencies to imitate robotic 
stimuli.
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Conclusion: The experiments reported in this chapter provide no evidence that the human 
imitative bias is modulated by beliefs about whether observed stimuli are human or 
robotic. In contrast, the present findings indicate that the greater potency o f human 
stimuli in eliciting imitation depends on visual properties o f the stimuli; that the human 
imitative bias is predominantly a bottom-up, rather than a top-down, effect.
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Chapter 4: The role of experience in imitation of non-human stimuli
The experiments reported in Chapter 3 suggest that the human imitative bias is driven by 
perceptual properties o f the stimuli. This is consistent with both AIM and ASL models o f 
imitation. However, the AIM and ASL models make different predictions concerning 
whether imitation o f stimuli can be modulated by training and hence, whether the bias 
can be modulated by training. The ASL model predicts that a stimulus-driven human 
imitative bias results from greater opportunity for associative learning connecting visual 
representations o f human movement with matching motor representations, relative to 
similar opportunities with non-human visual representations o f movement. Therefore, 
training where participants are required to perform responses which are compatible with 
the movements o f non-human stimuli (compatible training) should lead to greater 
imitation o f those stimuli, relative to training where participants are required to perform 
responses which are incompatible with the movements o f non-human stimuli 
(incompatible training). This hypothesis therefore predicts that the human imitative bias 
can be modified. In contrast, the AIM model assumes that a stimulus-driven human 
imitative bias is mediated by innate structures, and therefore predicts that training with 
non-human stimuli should have little influence on imitation o f these stimuli and that the 
human imitative bias cannot be modified.
The experiments reported in this chapter aimed to distinguish AIM and ASL theories o f a 
human imitative bias by testing for effects o f compatible and incompatible training with 
robotic stimuli on automatic imitation o f those stimuli, and hence, the human imitative 
bias. The purpose o f Experiment 5 was to establish a human imitative bias with human 
and robotic stimuli which were more suitable for use in training paradigms than the
88
stimuli used in Experiment 4. Experiments 6 and 7 addressed whether compatible 
training with robotic stimuli would result in greater automatic imitation o f those stimuli 
relative to incompatible training. In both training groups, automatic imitation with 
robotic stimuli was established at pre-test sessions, and compared against automatic 
imitation at post-test sessions. Comparisons between compatible and incompatible 
training groups enabled isolation o f those effects o f associative learning, relative to those 
o f perceptual learning with robotic stimuli (e.g. Chamizo & Mackintosh, 1989; Gibson, 
1969) and response practice. Imitation o f robotic stimuli was compared against imitation 
o f human stimuli to establish whether training modulated the human imitative bias. The 
AIM model would predict that training should have no systematic influence on imitation 
o f robotic stimuli, and hence, that the human imitative bias should not be modified. In 
contrast, the ASL model would predict that automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli should 
be greater following compatible training with those stimuli relative to incompatible 
training. This hypothesis therefore predicts that the human imitative bias will decrease 
from pre- to post-test with compatible training, relative to incompatible training.
Experiment 6 employed a training procedure where participants were explicitly instructed 
to execute responses which were compatible or incompatible with observed stimulus 
movements. Experiment 7 employed a training paradigm which was similar to 
Experiment 6, but removed any reference to the stimulus-response relationship from 
instructions given prior to training. This was to investigate whether any influences o f 
training observed in Experiment 6 reflected formation o f long-term associations, 
established through practice and postulated by the ASL model to mediate imitation, or 




Experiment 5 was designed to establish a human imitative bias with stimuli which were 
more suitable for use in training paradigms than the stimuli used in Experiment 4. To test 
for effects o f training on automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli and the human imitative 
bias, it was important to demonstrate that robotic stimuli elicited less automatic imitation 
than their human counterparts.
Experiment 5 implemented three changes relative to Experiment 4. First, Experiment 4 
used moving stimuli to investigate automatic imitation, but Experiment 5 used terminal 
postures. Several authors have found that terminal postures are as effective, if not more 
effective, than movements in eliciting automatic imitation (Vogt et al., 2003; Craighero et 
al., 2002; Sturmer et al., 2000). Sturmer et al. (2000) reasoned that posture stimuli may 
have evoked larger automatic imitation effects because all participants responded to a 
fully-opened or fully-closed hand. With moving stimuli, fast participants will respond to 
stimuli which are not fully opened or closed. This reasoning means that in addition to 
larger average automatic imitation effects, posture stimuli may lead to a reduction in 
between-subject variability because all participants will respond to the same action 
stimuli. Because Experiments 6 and 7 were designed to compare effects o f training 
between participants receiving different types o f training (compatible and incompatible), 
these between-subject comparisons were likely to be clearer if there was less variation in 
initial levels o f  automatic imitation.
Second, the SOA between presentation o f  the warning stimulus and the imperative 
stimulus posture was made shorter, on average, and more variable than in Experiment 4.
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Previous investigations have indicated that larger automatic imitation effects may be 
obtained with shorter average SOAs (Bird, 2003; Vogt et al., 2003; Sturmer et al., 2000), 
which may be driven by longer RTs at shorter SOAs (Niemi & Naatanen, 1981). More 
variable SOAs have also been found to increase RT (Niemi & Naatanen, 1981) which 
may also lead to larger automatic imitation effects. Increase in the magnitude o f the 
automatic imitation effects detectable in these experiments may increase the probability 
o f detecting a training effect (Howell, 1997).
Third, the experiments reported in this chapter did not require manipulation o f beliefs 
about identity, and therefore it was possible to use stimuli which differed on a greater 
number o f  perceptual dimensions than the stimuli in Experiment 4, specifically, colour, 
texture and shading. To increase the generality o f any findings, a human imitative bias 
was explored with two stimulus sets. The first set, ‘schematic’ stimuli, were bright blue 
silhouettes similar to those used in Experiment 4, therefore the human and robotic stimuli 
did not differ in colour, texture and shading. The human stimuli were silhouettes o f a 
human hand, and the robotic stimuli were created by approximately matching each 
stimulus to the corresponding human stimulus in surface area, luminance, horizontal and 
vertical visual angles, and aperture between closest effectors. As in Experiment 4, 
stimuli were made to appear robotic by making them angular and symmetric. The second 
set, ‘naturalistic’ stimuli, differed on a greater number o f perceptual dimensions. Human 
naturalistic stimuli were photographs o f a human hand; these stimuli were therefore flesh 
colour with shading defining the smoothly rounded effector parts. Robotic naturalistic 
stimuli were photographs of a mechanical claw; these stimuli were therefore metallic in 
colour, with shading defining the angular parts.
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Thus, Experiment 5 established levels o f  automatic imitation with human naturalistic, 
human schematic, robotic naturalistic and robotic schematic posture stimuli. It was 
expected that human stimuli would elicit larger automatic imitation effects than robotic 
stimuli, as in Experiment 4, and that these stimuli could be used in Experiments 6 and 7 
to investigate the effects o f  training with robotic stimuli on automatic imitation o f robotic 
stimuli and the human imitative bias.
4.1.1 Method
Participants
Seventeen consenting, healthy volunteers with an average age o f 25.6 years, seven male, 
participated in Experiment 5, and were paid a small honorarium for their participation. 
The data from one participant was removed from the analysis because less than 90% o f 
their data was remaining following employment o f the various exclusion criteria.
Stimuli
Stimuli were presented using the same apparatus as in Experiments 1 -  4. Each 
imperative stimulus was a naturalistic or a schematic representation o f  a human or a 
robotic hand in an opened or a closed posture. The four stimulus formats (human 
naturalistic, robotic naturalistic, human schematic, robotic schematic) are shown in 
Figure 11. Each imperative stimulus posture was preceded by a warning stimulus 
representing a neutral posture o f the same hand type (human or robotic) in the same style
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A Human naturalistic B Robotic naturalistic
C Human schematic D Robotic schematic
Figure 11: The stimuli used in Experiment 5, A Human naturalistic, B Robotic naturalistic, C 
Human schematic, D Robotic schematic. Within each stimulus type, the top image is the 

















Human Naturalistic Opened 20.2 16.7 75 154
Neutral 10.7 16.4 75 109
Closed 10.6 13.6 68 94
Robotic Naturalistic Opened 20.2 16.4 93 67
Neutral 10.4 18.5 96 67
Closed 9.7 12.5 89 66
Human Schematic Opened 15.7 15.7 127 103
and Neutral 7.5 17.0 127 77
robotic Closed 7.5 12.0 127 68
Table 1: Experiment 5. Visual angle, luminance and surface area values for each posture o f each 
stimulus type and style. Relative luminance was measured on a scale between 0 (completely 
black) and 255 (completely white).
(naturalistic or schematic).
Details o f  the size (width and height), luminance and surface area o f the stimuli are given 
in Table 1. The schematic human and robotic stimuli differed in shape but were 
controlled for colour (all were blue), size, luminance and surface area. The naturalistic 
human and robotic stimuli differed in shape, colour palette (flesh vs. metallic tones), 
luminance and surface area. The human stimuli were slightly brighter, and occupied a 
larger area o f  the screen. Although not identical, the sizes o f  the naturalistic human and 
robotic stimuli were similar. The human hands appeared approximately life-size.
Data recording and analysis were performed using the same methods as in Experiments 1 
- 4 .
Procedure
The procedure was the same as that o f Experiments 1 -  4 except as follows. In each 
block o f  the simple RT task, participants were now required to make a pre-specified 
response (to open or to close their right hand) as soon as an imperative stimulus posture 
(opened or closed) appeared on the screen. They were instructed to refrain from moving 
their hand in catch trials, when the imperative stimulus postures were not presented. 
Human naturalistic, robotic naturalistic, human schematic and robotic schematic stimuli 
were presented in separate blocks. Participants completed four blocks with each o f these 
four stimulus formats, two in which closing was the required response and two in which 
opening was the required response. Testing was conducted over two days, with one open 
response and one close response block o f  each stimulus type completed each day.
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The warning stimulus was presented for 800-1500ms before presentation o f the 
imperative stimulus. SOA varied randomly between 800 and 1500ms in 50ms steps. In 
catch trials, the warning stimulus remained on the screen for 1980ms. Each block 
presented, in random order, 15 trials in which the imperative stimulus was an opened 
posture, 15 trials in which the imperative stimulus was a closed posture, and six catch 
trials. Before testing commenced in each block, participants completed five practice 
trials (two open stimulus, two close stimulus and one catch trial) with the response, and 
the stimuli, to be used in that block.
Within each day, blocks requiring the same response were completed consecutively, and 
those involving the same stimulus type (human or robotic) were also completed in 
immediate succession. For each participant, the order o f stimulus formats (human 
naturalistic, robotic naturalistic, human schematic and robotic schematic) was the same 
for blocks in which they were making open and close responses, and constant across the 
first and second days o f testing. The order in which responses were tested (open first or 
close first), and the order o f  blocks distinguished by stimulus type (human first or robotic 
first) and stimulus style (schematic first or naturalistic first) were counterbalanced.
4.1.2 Results and discussion
Participants initiated movement in 3.0% o f catch trials. These data were not analysed 
further. Practice trials, incorrect responses (0.02%) and response omissions (0.04%) were 
excluded from the analysis, as were all RTs smaller than 100ms and greater than 1000ms 
(0.05%). The RT data, shown in Figure 12, were subjected to ANOVA in which 
stimulus-response compatibility (compatible and incompatible), stimulus type (human
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□  C o m p a tib le  
■  In co m p a tib le
Human Robotic
27ms 14ms
N a tu ra listic  S c h e m a tic  N a tu ra lis tic  S c h e m a tic
Figure 12: Experiment 5. Mean RT on compatible (open bars) and incompatible (shaded bars) 
trials for the human naturalistic, human schematic, robotic naturalistic and robotic schematic 
stimuli. Vertical bars indicate the standard error o f the mean and numbers indicate the 
magnitude o f  the compatibility effect.
and robotic) and stimulus style (naturalistic or schematic) were within-subject variables. 
This analysis revealed a main effect of compatibility (F(l,15) = 21.4, p < 0.001), and a 
stimulus type x compatibility interaction (F(l,15) = 25.1, p < 0.001). On average, 
responding was 18ms faster on compatible trials (M = 279.2ms, SEM = 13.7ms) than on 
incompatible trials (M = 297.5ms, SEM = 15.9ms), and the compatibility effect was 
greater when participants were responding to human stimuli (27.9ms) than when they 
were responding to robotic stimuli (8.8ms). No other effects or interactions were 
significant.
The three-way compatibility x stimulus type x stimulus style interaction was not 
significant (F( 1,15) = 3.0, p = 0.1). However, as indicated in Figure 12, it appeared that 
the compatibility x stimulus type interaction was greater for schematic than for 
naturalistic stimuli. Given that this experiment was investigating whether both stimulus
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sets were appropriate for use in Experiments 6 and 7, data from each stimulus style were 
analysed separately to check whether the human imitative bias was present with both 
naturalistic and schematic stimulus styles. Each o f  these analyses revealed a significant 
compatibility x stimulus type interaction, confirming that, both when the stimuli were 
naturalistic (F( 1,15) = 8.8, p = 0.01), and when they were schematic (F(l,15) = 29.8, p < 
0.001), the tendency to respond faster on compatible than on incompatible trials was 
greater when the stimulus hand was human than when it was robotic. Both naturalistic 
and schematic stimuli could therefore be used in Experiments 6 and 7.
The ASL model (and maybe the AIM model) might predict that there should have been a 
larger human imitative bias with naturalistic than schematic stimuli. Relative to human 
schematic stimuli, human naturalistic stimuli look more similar to those stimuli which are 
encountered often during life. Given that the ASL model assumes that any perceptible 
features o f a stimulus can become associated with a response, not only spatial features 
which were represented in schematic stimuli, human naturalistic stimuli may therefore 
have been expected to elicit larger automatic imitation effects than human schematic 
stimuli. Therefore, the naturalistic stimuli may have been expected to evoke a larger 
human imitative bias. However, the observation that naturalistic stimuli do not elicit a 
larger human imitative bias than schematic stimuli is not problematic for the ASL model 
because Experiment 5 was not designed to investigate effects o f stimulus style. For this 
reason, spatial features o f naturalistic and schematic stimuli were not matched. In 
addition, luminance was not matched such that schematic stimuli may have been more 
salient. It is therefore not possible to draw many inferences from this comparison.
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Therefore, the results o f  Experiment 5 confirm that human stimuli are more effective in 
eliciting automatic imitation than robotic stimuli, and that this human imitative bias can 
be detected using terminal postures as well as explicit movement stimuli.
4.2 Experiment 6
Experiment 6 investigated whether automatic imitation o f  robotic stimuli, and hence, the 
human imitative bias, could be modulated through training. Training paradigms have 
been used in several studies to modulate simple spatial compatibility effects, which 
suggest that spatial compatibility effects are mediated by stimulus-response associations 
established through experience. Tagliabue, Zorzi, Umilta, & Bassignani (2000) 
compared the effects o f spatially compatible and incompatible training on performance in 
a spatial Simon task (Simon, Hinrichs, & Craft, 1970). Compatible training consisted o f 
a choice RT task, where participants were required to press a right response key when an 
outline square stimulus was presented to the right o f  body midline, and a left response 
key when it was presented to the left. Incompatible training consisted o f pressing a left 
response key when the outline square stimulus was presented to the right o f body midline, 
and a right response key when it was presented to the left. Five minutes, 24 hours and 
one week later, participants were required to press the right and left keys in response to 
outline and solid square stimuli presented on the left or the right o f the screen. Thus, in 
the test session, the type o f square was the response-relevant dimension, and screen 
location was the response-irrelevant dimension. In this Simon task, responses in the 
compatible training group were faster when the square requiring a right response 
appeared on the right, rather than the left, side of the screen, and when the square 
requiring a left response appeared on the left, rather than the right, side o f the screen. In
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contrast, the group who had received incompatible training showed no such spatial 
compatibility effects on test. This finding that spatially compatible and incompatible 
training can modulate spatial compatibility effects has been replicated by others (Vu, 
Proctor, & Urcuioli, 2003; Tagliabue, Zorzi, & Umilta, 2002).
As discussed in Chapter 1, one experiment has used a training paradigm to assess the 
effects o f  experience on automatic imitation. During training, Heyes et al. (2005) 
required a compatible training group to open their hand whenever a human stimulus hand 
opened, and to close their hand whenever it closed. In contrast, participants in an 
incompatible training group were required to open their hand whenever a human stimulus 
hand closed, and close their hand whenever it opened. The group given compatible 
training subsequently showed an automatic imitation effect; when required to perform a 
pre-specified response (e.g. open their hand) upon movement o f  a stimulus hand, they 
were faster to execute this response when it was compatible (opening) with the stimulus 
movement rather than incompatible (closing). The incompatible training group did not 
show an automatic imitation effect.
Experiment 6 employed a training paradigm similar to that used by Heyes et al. (2005), 
but training involved only robotic stimuli, and the effects o f training on automatic 
imitation o f  robotic stimuli were compared with the effects o f  training on imitation o f 
human stimuli which were not presented during training. Participants first completed a 
pre-test session with both human and robotic stimuli to assess automatic imitation with 
these two stimulus types. Twenty-four hours later, they completed a training session with 
only robotic stimuli, and 24 hours after this they completed a post-test session with both 
human and robotic stimuli to further assess automatic imitation o f  these two stimulus
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types. During training, the compatible training group (group CT) were instructed to open 
their hand whenever they detected an opened stimulus hand and close their hand 
whenever they detected a closed stimulus hand. The incompatible training group (group 
IT) were instructed to open their hand whenever they detected a closed stimulus hand and 
close their hand whenever they detected an opened stimulus hand.
The AIM model would predict that automatic imitation o f  robotic stimuli and the human 
imitative bias should not be modulated by training with robotic stimuli, therefore 
automatic imitation o f  robotic stimuli should not change systematically between groups 
CT and IT from pre- to post-test. In contrast, the ASL model would predict that 
automatic imitation o f  robotic stimuli should increase from pre- to post-test in group CT, 
relative to group IT. The human imitative bias should therefore decrease from pre- to 
post in group CT, relative to group IT.
4.2.1 Method
Participants
Twenty new, consenting, healthy volunteers with an average age o f 24.4 years, eight 
male, participated in Experiment 6, and were paid a small honorarium for their 
participation. Four participants were excluded from training and post-test sessions 
because they did not demonstrate numerically larger automatic imitation effects with 
human stimuli than robotic stimuli at pre-test. This experiment investigated modulation 
o f the human imitative bias, and therefore it was important that all participants
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undergoing training displayed this initial bias. The remaining 16 participants were 
randomly assigned in equal numbers to groups CT and IT.
The stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 5. Data recording and analysis 
were performed using the same methods as in Experiment 5.
Procedure
Each participant completed three sessions, with 24 hours separating each session. In the 
first session, the pre-test session, and the third session, the post-test session, they 
completed the procedure described in Experiment 5. In the second session, the training 
session, participants received one o f two types o f  training with the robotic stimuli. In a 
choice RT task, group CT were instructed to respond to an opened stimulus by opening 
their hand, and to a closed stimulus by closing their hand. Group IT were instructed to 
respond to an opened stimulus by closing their hand and to a closed stimulus by opening 
their hand. Robotic naturalistic and robotic schematic stimuli were presented in separate 
blocks. Participants completed six blocks with each o f  these two stimulus formats. 
Blocks involving naturalistic and schematic stimuli were alternated. Training lasted 
approximately 45 minutes in total, including a short rest between blocks.
During training, as during test, all trials began with presentation o f the warning stimulus. 
This was replaced 1000ms later by an imperative stimulus (opened or closed robotic 
hand) which was o f  480ms duration. After presentation o f the imperative stimulus, the 
screen went black for 3000ms before the warning stimulus for the next trial appeared.
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Each block presented, in random order, 18 trials in which the imperative stimulus was an 
opened posture and 18 trials in which the imperative stimulus was a closed posture.
Before testing commenced in the first training block with each stimulus style (naturalistic 
or schematic), participants completed six practice trials (three open stimulus, three close 
stimulus) with the stimuli and responses to be used in that block. The order o f blocks 
distinguished by stimulus style (schematic first or naturalistic first) was counter-balanced.
4.2.2 Results
Training
Practice trials, incorrect responses (1.59%) and response omissions (0.09%) were 
excluded from the analysis, as were all RTs smaller than 100ms and greater than 1000ms 
(0.09%). Figure 13 shows, for each o f the two groups, mean RT in each training block. 
These data were subjected to ANOVA in which block (1-6) was a within-subject variable 
and training type (CT and IT) was a between-subject variable. The analysis revealed 
significant main effects o f block (F(5,70) = 6.9, p < 0.001, Greenhouse Geisser corrected) 
and training type (F( 1,14) = 12.6, p < 0.005). The block x training type interaction was 
not significant (F < 1). A supplementary linear trend analysis confirmed that the effect o f 
block was created by a downward trend in RT over block (F( 1,14) = 14.6, p = 0.002). 
Thus, as can be seen in Figure 13, responding was faster in later blocks, when 
participants had greater experience with the stimuli and task than in earlier blocks, 
providing evidence that training was effective. Also, as expected on the basis o f 
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Figure 13: Experiment 6. Mean RT for each training block. Squares represent RTs for those 
receiving compatible training (group CT) and triangles represent RTs for those receiving 
incompatible training (group IT). Vertical bars indicate the standard error o f the mean.
Pre- and post-test
During the test sessions, participants initiated movement in 3.8% o f catch trials. These 
data were not analysed further. Practice trials, incorrect responses (0.09%) and response 
omissions (0.14%) were excluded from the analysis, as were all RTs smaller than 100ms 
and greater than 1000ms (0.01%).
Pre-test
All 20 participants were included in the preliminary analysis o f pre-test data, including 
the four who did not demonstrate a human imitative bias and therefore did not 
subsequently participate in training and post-test sessions. This analysis was performed 
to confirm whether Experiment 6 replicated Experiment 5 and found a human imitative
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bias with these stimuli before any training. These data were subjected to ANOVA in 
which stimulus-response compatibility (compatible and incompatible), stimulus type 
(human and robotic) and stimulus style (naturalistic or schematic) were within-subject 
variables. This analysis revealed a main effect o f  compatibility (F( 1,19) = 58.5, p < 
0.001), and a stimulus type x compatibility interaction (F( 1,19) = 11.5, p < 0.005). On 
average, responding was 26ms faster on compatible trials (M = 275.4ms, SEM = 10.8ms) 
than on incompatible trials (M = 300.9ms, SEM = 11.7ms), and the compatibility effect 
was greater when participants were responding to human stimuli (32ms) than when they 
were responding to robotic stimuli (19ms). No other effects or interactions were 
significant. These findings therefore replicate those in Experiment 5 o f  a human 
imitative bias present before any training.
Pre- vs. post-test
The RT data can be seen in Figure 14, where the height o f the bars indicates mean RT, 
and Figure 15, where the height o f the bars indicates the magnitude o f the compatibility 
effect, calculated by subtracting RT on compatible trials from RT on incompatible trials. 
Only the 16 participants who participated in all three sessions were included in this 
analysis. Examination o f Figures 14 and 15 suggests that, in group CT automatic 
imitation o f robotic stimuli increased from pre- to post- test, relative to group IT, 
indicating an influence o f training type on automatic imitation. In comparison, automatic 
imitation o f  human stimuli decreased from pre- to post-test in group CT and group IT. 
This decrease may be smaller in group CT compared to group IT, but the influence o f 
training type on automatic imitation o f  human stimuli appears smaller than the influence 



















15ms 23ms 24ms 5ms 36ms 24ms 39ms 22ms
Post-Post-
Group CT Group IT Group CT Group IT
Figure 14: Experiment 6. Mean RT on compatible (open bars) and incompatible (shaded bars) 
trials, pre- and post-test in group CT and group IT for robotic and human stimuli. Vertical bars 




Robotic ■ Post-test Human
Group CT Group IT GroupCT Group IT
Figure 15: Experiment 6. Mean RT on incompatible trials minus mean RT on compatible trials 
pre- (open bars) and post-test (shaded bars) in group CT and group IT for robotic and human 
stimuli. Vertical bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
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influence o f training type on automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli resulted in a reduction 
in the human imitative bias from pre- to post- test in group CT, relative to group IT.
These observations were supported by ANOVA in which stimulus-response compatibility 
(compatible and incompatible), stimulus type (human and robotic) and test session (pre­
test and post-test) were within-subject variables. Training type (CT or IT) was a 
between-subject variable. There was a four-way session x compatibility x stimulus type 
x training type interaction (F( 1,14) = 15.7, p = 0.001). Separate analyses o f RTs to 
robotic and human stimuli indicated a session x compatibility x training type interaction 
with robotic stimuli (F( 1,14) = 10.1, p < 0.01) but not with human stimuli (F < 1). There 
was a compatibility x stimulus type x training type interaction at post-test (F( 1,14) = 9.4, 
p < 0.01) but there was no evidence of such an interaction at pre-test (F( 1,14) = 1.4, p = 
0.3).
4.2.3 Discussion
The results o f  Experiment 6 provide evidence that automatic imitation effects with 
robotic stimuli are larger following compatible training with those stimuli, relative to 
incompatible training. This resulted in a reduction in the human imitative bias following 
compatible training, relative to incompatible training. This pattern o f results is consistent 
with the ASL model o f imitation which predicts that the human imitative bias results 
from greater opportunities for associative learning between human stimuli and matching 
responses. This pattern o f results is inconsistent with the AIM model o f  imitation which 
predicts that training should have no systematic influence on automatic imitation 
potentials and hence, the human imitative bias, because imitation mechanisms are innate.
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4.3 Experiment 7
Experiment 6 found evidence that automatic imitation o f  robotic stimuli is greater 
following compatible training with those stimuli, relative to incompatible training. 
However, caution is necessary in interpreting the effects o f  training. A distinction has 
been drawn in the literature on cognitive control between long-term associations, 
established on the basis o f  practice and postulated by the ASL model to mediate 
imitation, and short-term associations, established on the basis o f  task instructions (e.g. 
Tagliabue et al., 2000; Barber & O'Leary, 1997; De Jong, 1995; McClelland, 
McNaughton, & O'Reilly, 1995; Shaffer, 1965). When given task instructions, short-term 
associations are thought to operate via executive functions which map task-appropriate 
responses to stimuli. These associations are therefore thought to rely on a ffonto-parietal 
network including left fronto-lateral cortex, pre-supplementary motor area and bilateral 
intraparietal sulcus (e.g. Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000; 
Pollmann, Dove, von Cramon, & Wiggins, 2000). In contrast, long-term associations are 
not established on the basis o f instructions, but on the basis o f practice, when the 
conditions are presented for associative learning. In addition, long-term associations do 
not operate via executive functions but are direct associations between stimulus and 
response representations (see also Redding & Wallace, 2006a; Redding & Wallace, 
2006b; Redding, Rossetti, & Wallace, 2005).
Evidence o f the formation o f  short-term associations was provided by De Houwer, 
Beckers, Vandorpe, & Custers (2005). Participants were informed that they should 
respond to the words ‘left’ and Tight’ with vocal responses ‘bee’ and ‘boo’ respectively, 
and also to blue and green squares with vocal responses ‘bee’ and ‘boo’ respectively.
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Despite the fact that left and right stimuli were never actually presented, participants were 
faster to respond ‘bee’ to blue squares presented on the left, rather than the right, o f  the 
screen, and ‘boo’ to green squares presented on the right, rather than the left, o f  the 
screen. These effects cannot result from formation o f  long-term associations because 
participants did not actually perform ‘bee’ responses to left stimuli and ‘boo’ responses to 
right stimuli. However, the task set established on the basis o f  instructions appears to 
have created a spatial compatibility effect.
In contrast to the findings o f  De Houwer et al. (2005), findings o f Kunde (2004) are 
likely to depend on modulation o f long-term associations. In a training phase, Kunde 
(2004) required participants to press left and right response keys. Left key presses 
resulted in presentation o f  upward-pointing arrows, and right key presses resulted in 
presentation o f downward-pointing arrows. In a subsequent test phase, participants were 
faster to execute key presses (e.g. left) in response to stimuli which had followed them in 
training phases (upward-pointing arrows), than in response to stimuli which had not 
followed them (downward-pointing arrows). Eisner & Hommel (2001; 2004) have 
reported similar effects o f  k response-out come’ learning when associating left and right 
key presses with high and low tones during training. These effects are unlikely to reflect 
formation o f  short-term associations, because there is no reference to the stimulus- 
response relationship in the instructions given prior to training. These effects are 
therefore more likely to reflect formation o f long-term associations, established on the 
basis o f  task practice.
Although the results o f  Experiment 6 are consistent with influences o f  training on long­
term associations, they are also consistent with influences o f  training on short-term
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associations, because task set switching is associated with an RT cost (e.g. Allport, 
Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Biederman, 1972; Jersild, 1927). Participants in group CT would 
have established a task set during training to perform movements which were compatible 
with those o f  a robotic hand. When these participants were required to perform responses 
which were incompatible with movements o f robotic stimuli at post-test, the task was 
different to training and RTs may therefore have been slowed. This task-switching RT 
cost may have resulted in larger compatibility effects at post-test, relative to pre-test. In 
contrast, participants in group IT would have established a task set during training to 
perform movements which were incompatible with those o f  a robotic hand. When these 
participants were required to perform responses which were compatible with movements 
o f robotic stimuli at post-test, RTs may therefore have been slowed, hence resulting in 
smaller compatibility effects at post-test, relative to pre-test.
It is important to investigate whether the effects o f  training observed in Experiment 6 
reflect formation o f short-term associations established on the basis o f  task instructions or 
long-term associations developed through practice. If the effects o f  training reflect task 
instructions and not practice, this result would not provide support for the ASL model o f 
imitation and the human imitative bias, and would also be consistent with the AIM model 
o f imitation. Although the AIM model is inconsistent with modulation o f long-term 
associations between stimuli and responses, it does not appear inconsistent with 
influences o f  task set on response speed.
Experiment 7 therefore employed a training paradigm similar to that used in Experiment 
6 but there was no reference to the stimulus-response relationship in the instructions 
given prior to training. In Experiment 7, pre- and post-test sessions were identical to
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those in Experiment 6. However, during training sessions, a ‘1 ’ or ‘2’ presented on the 
warning stimulus instructed participants which response they should prepare to execute. 
Participants were instructed to prepare to open their hand when a 1 was presented, and to 
prepare to close their hand when a 2 was presented, but to refrain from executing the 
response until the imperative stimulus posture was presented. In group CT, this 
imperative stimulus posture was compatible with the required response, and in group IT, 
this posture was incompatible with the required response. For example, when a ‘ 1 ’ was 
presented (requiring an opening response), this was followed in group CT by an opened 
robotic hand and in group IT by a closed robotic hand.
If the effects o f training observed in Experiment 6 are at least partially due to formation 
o f  long-term associations established on the basis o f practice during training, automatic 
imitation effects with robotic stimuli should increase from pre- to post-test in group CT, 
relative to group IT. This finding would be consistent with the ASL model o f imitation 
and inconsistent with the AIM model. However, if the effects o f training observed in 
Experiment 6 reflect only formation o f  short-term associations established on the basis o f  
task instructions given prior to training, Experiment 7 should find no influence o f training 
on automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli. This outcome would be consistent with the 




Twenty-eight new, consenting, healthy volunteers with an average age o f  22.0 years, nine 
male, participated in Experiment 7, and were paid a small honorarium for their 
participation. Four participants were excluded from training and post-test because they 
did not demonstrate larger imitation effects with human stimuli than robotic stimuli at 
pre-test. The remaining 24 participants were randomly assigned in equal numbers to 
groups CT and IT.
Stimuli
The stimuli used in pre- and post-test sessions were identical to those used in 
Experiments 5 and 6. The stimuli used in training sessions were the same as those used 
in Experiments 5 and 6 except as follows. On the warning stimulus, a 1 or 2 was inserted 
between the two ‘fingers’ o f  the hand (see Figure 16). On catch trials, the imperative 
stimulus was an inverted neutral hand.
Data recording and analysis were performed using the same methods as in Experiments 5 
and 6.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as that o f  Experiment 6 except as follows. The training
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Open Catch Close Catch
A Open response trials in group CT B Close response trials in group CT
Figure 16: The stimuli used in training sessions in Experiment 7, A Open response trials in 
group CT, B Close response trials in group CT. Within each stimulus type, the image at the top 
is the warning stimulus, the image on the left is the imperative stimulus posture presented on 
90°o o f trials and the image on the right is the catch imperative stimulus posture presented on 
10% o f trials.
session consisted o f  a choice RT task in which both training groups were required to 
prepare to execute an opening response whenever a ‘1* was presented on the warning 
stimulus, and to prepare to execute a closing response whenever a 42 ’ was presented on  
the warning stimulus. Participants were required to execute this prepared response when 
the imperative stimulus posture was presented. In group CT, on 90% o f  trials the 
imperative stimulus represented the movement type which was the same as that which  
participants were required to perform. Thus, a 1 was followed by an open posture, and a 
2 was followed by a closed posture. In group IT, on 90% o f  trials the imperative stimulus 
represented the m ovem ent type which was opposite to that which participants were 
required to perform. The other 10% o f  trials were catch trials, in which the imperative 
stimulus was an inverted neutral hand, and participants were still required to select their 
response on the basis o f  the number presented on the warning stimulus. The occurrence 
o f  these catch trials ensured that participants could not wait until the imperative stimulus
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was presented before selecting their response, thereby establishing their own task set 
based on the imperative stimulus-response relationship.
Given that participants now knew which response to perform on the basis o f  the warning 
stimulus, the SOA between presentation o f the warning stimulus and the imperative 
stimulus now varied randomly between 800 and 1500ms, in 50ms steps. Each block 
presented, in random order, 18 trials in which the imperative stimulus was an opened 
posture, 18 trials in which the imperative stimulus was a closed posture, and four catch 
trials in which the imperative stimulus was an inverted neutral posture.
4.3.2 Results
Training
Participants performed correct responses on all catch trials. Practice trials, incorrect 
responses (1.10%) and response omissions (0.57%) were excluded from the analysis, as 
were all RTs smaller than 100ms and greater than 1000ms (2.03%). Figure 17 shows, for 
groups CT and IT, mean RT in each training block. These data were subjected to 
ANOVA in which block (1-6) was a within-subject variable and training type (CT and 
IT) was a between-subject variable. The analysis revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions. The main effect o f block was not reliable (F(5,110) = 1.6, p = 0.2, 
Greenhouse Geisser corrected) and neither was the main effect o f training type (F(l,22) 
= 2.7, p = 0.1). As a further test for any effects o f decrease in RT over block, a 
supplementary linear trend analysis was performed on the data. Similar to the standard 
ANOVA, this analysis did not find a reliable effect o f block (F(l,22) = 3.3, p = 0.08).
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Figure 17: Experiment 7. Mean RT for each training block. Squares represent RTs for those 
receiving compatible training (group CT) and triangles represent RTs for those receiving 
incompatible training (group IT). Vertical bars indicate the standard error o f the mean.
It may seem surprising that the effect o f training type was not reliable, given that an 
effect would have indicated automatic imitation, and that this effect was observed in 
Experiment 6. However, as can be seen in Figure 17, mean RT in Experiment 7 during 
training was much shorter (M = 273.1ms, SEM = 23.3ms) than mean RT in Experiment 6 
(M = 355.7ms, SEM = 12.4ms) (F(l,36) = 7.1, p < 0.02). This difference suggests that, 
as instructed, participants were selecting their response on the basis o f  the number 
presented on the warning stimulus in Experiment 7, leading to more complete preparation 
o f the response when the imperative stimulus posture was presented relative to 
Experiment 6. This change in task appears to have resulted in a smaller effect o f  training 
type. When this smaller effect o f training type is coupled with the fact that the 
comparison was made between-subject (cf. most other automatic imitation effects 
reported in this thesis), it is less surprising that the effect was not reliable.
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To confirm that participants were selecting their response on the basis o f the 1 or 2 
presented on the warning stimulus, rather than on the basis o f  the imperative stimulus 
posture, the RT training data were analysed with reference to SOA. If participants were 
selecting their response on the basis of the 1 or 2 presented on the warning stimulus, then 
they should have been faster to execute this response when there was longer to prepare it, 
that is, following a longer SOA (Niemi & Naatanen, 1981). However, if participants 
were selecting their response on the basis o f the imperative stimulus posture, there should 
have been no such influence o f  SOA on RT. The data were divided into three bins o f 
SOA (800-1000ms, 1050- 1250ms, and 1300-1500ms), and subjected to ANOVA in 
which block (1-6) and SOA (800-1000ms, 1050- 1250ms, and 1300-1500ms) were 
within-subject variables and training type (CT and IT) was a between-subject variable. 
The analysis indicated that participants were selecting their response on the basis o f  the 
number; responses following an SOA o f 1300-1500ms were fastest (M = 262.5ms, SEM 
= 24.1ms), followed by responses following an SOA o f  1050-1250ms (M = 269.9ms, 
SEM = 24.1ms), and responses following an SOA o f  800-1000ms were slowest (M -  
287.7ms, SEM = 23.6ms) (F(2,44) = 31.2, p < 0.001, Greenhouse Geisser corrected). 
Further confirmation that participants were selecting their response on the basis o f  the 
number is provided by the observation that participants performed correct responses on 
all catch trials, where the posture stimulus did not provide information concerning which 
response was correct.
Pre- and post-test
On test, participants initiated movement in 2.1% of catch trials. These data were not 
analysed further. Practice trials, incorrect responses (0.51%) and response omissions
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(0.21%) were excluded from the analysis, as were all RTs smaller than 100ms and greater 
than 1000ms (0.08%).
Pre-test
All 28 participants were included in the analysis o f  pre-test data, including those four 
who did not demonstrate a human imitative bias and did not subsequently participate in 
training and post-test sessions. These data were subjected to ANOVA in which stimulus- 
response compatibility (compatible and incompatible), stimulus type (human and robotic) 
and stimulus style (naturalistic or schematic) were within-subject variables. This analysis 
revealed a main effect o f compatibility (F(l,27) = 60.6, p < 0.001), and a stimulus type x 
compatibility interaction (F(l,27) = 14.7, p = 0.001). On average, responding was 29ms 
faster on compatible trials (M = 299.7ms, SEM = 15.1ms) than on incompatible trials (M 
= 329.1ms, SEM = 16.9ms), and the compatibility effect was greater when participants 
were responding to human stimuli (41ms) than when they were responding to robotic 
stimuli (18ms). These findings replicate those o f Experiments 5 and 6, indicating that the 
current procedure reliably detects a human imitative bias present before any training. No 
other effects or interactions were significant.
Pre- vs. post-test
The RT data are shown in Figure 18, where the height o f the bars indicates mean RT, and 
in Figure 19, where the height o f  the bars indicates the size o f  the compatibility effect 
(RT on incompatible trials minus RT on compatible trials). Only the 24 participants who 

























Group CT Group IT Group CT Group IT
Figure 18: Experiment 7. Mean RT on compatible (open bars) and incompatible (shaded bars) 
trials for robotic and human stimuli, pre- and post-test, in group CT and group IT. Vertical bars 








Group IT Groif)CT Group IT
Figure 19: Experiment 7. Mean RT on incompatible trials minus mean RT on compatible trials 
for human (open bars) and robotic (shaded bars) stimuli, pre- and post-test, in group CT and 
group IT. Vertical bars indicate the standard error o f the mean.
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and 19 suggests that, as in Experiment 6, automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli increased 
from pre- to post-test in group CT, relative to group IT, indicating an influence o f training 
type on automatic imitation. In comparison, automatic imitation o f human stimuli 
decreased from pre- to post-test in group CT and group IT, but this decrease appears 
greater in group IT than in group CT. The influence o f  training type on automatic 
imitation o f human stimuli appears as strong as the influence o f training type on 
automatic imitation effects with robotic stimuli.
These observations were supported by ANOVA in which stimulus-response compatibility 
(compatible and incompatible), stimulus type (human and robotic) and session o f  testing 
(pre-test and post-test) were within-subject variables. Training type (CT or IT) was a 
between-subject variable. There was no evidence o f a four-way session x compatibility x 
training type x stimulus type interaction (F < 1), or a compatibility x training type x 
stimulus type interaction either at pre-test (F < 1) or at post-test (F(l,22) = 2.0, p = 0.2). 
However, there was a three-way session x compatibility x training type interaction 
(F(l,22) = 7.6, p < 0.02). Separate analyses with robotic and human stimuli indicated a 
session x compatibility x training type interaction with both robotic (F(l,22) = 4.7, p < 
0.05) and human stimuli (F(l,22) = 4.5, p < 0.05).
4.3.3 Discussion
Experiment 7 investigated whether the effects o f  training observed in Experiment 6 
reflected formation o f  short-term associations established on the basis o f  task 
instructions, or long-term associations established on the basis o f  practice. Experiment 7 
therefore employed a training paradigm which was similar to that used in Experiment 6,
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but instructions given prior to training did not refer to the stimulus-response relationship. 
If the effects o f training observed in Experiment 6 reflected only formation o f short-term 
associations, Experiment 7 should not have observed an influence o f training. In 
contrast, if the effects o f  training observed in Experiment 6 at least partially reflected 
formation o f long-term associations, Experiment 7 should have observed a similar 
influence o f training. Like those o f Experiment 6, the results o f  Experiment 7 indicated 
that automatic imitation o f  robotic stimuli increased following compatible training with 
those stimuli, relative to incompatible training. However, training also had an influence 
on automatic imitation o f  human stimuli; automatic imitation o f human stimuli decreased 
from pre- to post-test to a greater extent in group IT than in group CT.
Notably, the effect o f  training type on compatibility with the human stimuli was different 
to the effect with the robotic stimuli, despite the similarity o f  the statistical interaction. 
Automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli increased from pre- to post-test in group CT and 
decreased from pre- to post-test in group IT. In contrast, automatic imitation o f human 
stimuli decreased from pre- to post-test in both training groups, but decreased by more in 
group IT. Two factors will now be outlined which may have contributed to the specific 
effects observable with each stimulus type. First, the decrease in automatic imitation 
from pre- to post-test which was observed with human stimuli in both training groups is 
likely to be driven by the faster responses at post-test, when participants have more 
experience with the stimuli and task. This interpretation would be consistent with the 
finding in previous studies that automatic imitation effects are larger with slower 
responses (e.g. Experiment 4 o f this thesis, Bird, 2003; Brass et al., 2001). Second, the 
fact that this decrease was less dramatic with robotic stimuli may be driven by perceptual 
learning with robotic stimuli during training sessions. With exposure to robotic stimuli
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between pre- and post-test sessions, participants can learn to better discriminate opened 
and closed stimuli (e.g. Chamizo & Mackintosh, 1989; Gibson, 1969). This perceptual 
learning may lead to larger automatic imitation effects because features which distinguish 
the two movement types may be processed to a greater extent. Therefore, despite the 
apparent differences in effects o f training on automatic imitation o f human and robotic 
stimuli, there is no reason to assume that the influences o f  associative learning differ.
The influences o f training on automatic imitation o f human stimuli are therefore likely to 
result from generalisation o f  the training with robotic stimuli. Finding that experience 
will generalise to other stimuli is consistent with the ASL model o f imitation; stimulus 
generalisation is a ubiquitous feature o f associative learning (Pearce, 1987). The 
especially high levels o f  stimulus generalisation observed in Experiment 7 may be driven 
by two factors. First, ‘acquired equivalence’ (Hall, 1991) refers to the finding that one 
can learn an association between two events, through their common association with a 
third event (see Chapter 1). According to the ASL model, compatible responses are 
associated with human stimuli before training. During compatible training, robotic 
stimuli will become associated with these same responses. This common association 
with compatible responses may mean that human and robotic stimuli become associated. 
Therefore, when a robotic opened stimulus is presented during training, the visual 
representation o f a human opened stimulus may also be activated. When the participant 
subsequently opens their hand, the association between an opened human stimulus and an 
opening response can strengthen, in addition to the association between an opened robotic 
stimulus and an opening response.
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However, acquired equivalence may be expected to influence behaviour equally in 
Experiments 6 and 7. A second factor which may explain especially high generalisation 
in Experiment 7 is that the stimulus posture during training acted as an imperative 
stimulus and not a discriminative stimulus. Participants were only required to detect 
movement o f some description on the screen, and may have paid less attention to the 
posture stimuli than in Experiment 6. This lack o f  attention could plausibly have resulted 
in participants processing only global features o f the stimulus, such as approximate form 
(e.g. whether the fingers moved inwards or outwards), and these features are similar in 
human and robotic stimuli. Given that these features are similar in human and robotic 
stimuli, the stimulus may have been perceived as human in some trials and robotic in 
other trials, given that ambiguous stimuli tend to be perceived as one thing or another 
rather than ambiguous (e.g. Necker cube, Necker, 1832). Therefore, this provides a 
further explanation why training may have modified associations between human stimuli 
and responses as well as associations between robotic stimuli and responses.
The hypothesis that participants were processing only simple features o f the stimuli in 
Experiment 7, compared with participants in Experiment 6, is consistent with the RT 
training data. In Experiment 6, RTs during training were fairly slow, and decreased in 
the course o f the training session. This pattern suggests that stimuli were processed 
thoroughly before a response was selected, and, as the training session progressed, that 
participants became faster to identify stimulus features which discriminated opened and 
closed stimuli. In contrast, RTs during training in Experiment 7 were fast, and did not 
decrease during the training session, which suggests that participants could perform the 




The experiments reported in this chapter investigated whether automatic imitation o f  non­
human stimuli (robotic) increased following compatible training with those stimuli, 
relative to incompatible training, and therefore whether the human imitative bias could be 
modulated through training. Experiment 5 established a human imitative bias with 
stimuli which could be used in training paradigms in Experiments 6 and 7. Experiment 6 
indicated that automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli increased from pre- to post-test in a 
compatible training group, relative to an incompatible training group. Therefore, the 
human imitative bias decreased from pre- to post-test in the compatible training group, 
relative to the incompatible training group. Due to the possibility that influences o f 
training observed in Experiment 6 reflected formation o f  short-term associations 
established during training on the basis o f  task instructions, Experiment 7 investigated 
influences o f  training where instructions given prior to training did not refer to the 
stimulus-response relationship. Experiment 7 indicated, similarly to Experiment 6, that 
automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli increased from pre- to post-test in the compatible 
training group, relative to the incompatible training group. These results are difficult to 
interpret in terms o f formation o f short-term associations, and are more likely to reflect 
formation o f long-term associations, established on the basis o f  practice. However, 
unlike Experiment 6, Experiment 7 also observed an influence o f  training on automatic 
imitation o f human stimuli. This resulted in no observation o f modulation o f the human 
imitative bias through training.
The finding in Experiments 6 and 7 that automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli can be 
modulated through training, and that these effects are likely to reflect modulations o f
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long-term associations, are consistent with the ASL model o f imitation which claims that 
imitative capabilities arise through associative learning connecting the visual 
representations o f action with matching responses. The findings in Experiments 6 and 7 
are inconsistent with the AIM model o f imitation. The AIM model posits that imitation is 
mediated by innate mechanisms, so training is unlikely to have a systematic effect on 
imitation o f either human or non-human stimuli. In the face o f any evidence o f training 
effects, nativist accounts may try to defend themselves with reference to task sets, but it is 
difficult to interpret the findings o f Experiment 7 in such a way.
The ASL model predicts that a human imitative bias arises through greater opportunities 
for associative learning with human stimuli than non-human stimuli. Therefore 
presenting compatible training with non-human stimuli should increase automatic 
imitation o f those stimuli from pre- to post-test, relative to incompatible training, and the 
human imitative bias should decrease in a compatible training group from pre- to post­
test, relative to an incompatible training group. However, the generalisation o f training to 
human stimuli resulted in Experiment 7 detecting no influence o f training on the human 
imitative bias. It might therefore be suggested that Experiment 7 provides no support for 
the ASL hypothesis o f the human imitative bias, despite providing support for the ASL 
hypothesis o f  imitation. If there is substantial generalisation between all learning with 
human and robotic stimuli, then differences in associative learning cannot explain the 
human imitative bias.
However, the combination o f findings in Experiments 6 and 7 provide good support for 
the ASL model o f the human imitative bias as well as the ASL model o f imitation, and it 
is difficult to reconcile these findings with a different hypothesis. The theoretical
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difference between Experiments 6 and 7 concerns whether it is possible to explain the 
influences o f training with formation o f short-term associations; it is possible to explain 
the influences o f training in Experiment 6 in such a way but not the influences o f training 
in Experiment 7. The empirical difference between Experiments 6 and 7 concerns 
whether training also influenced automatic imitation o f human stimuli; Experiment 7 
observed such an influence, but Experiment 6 did not. To suggest that the combination o f 
results in Experiments 6 and 7 do not support the ASL hypothesis o f  the human imitative 
bias would require suggesting that the difference between Experiments 6 and 7, namely 
the lack o f modulation o f  automatic imitation o f  human stimuli in Experiment 6, is due to 
formation o f short-term associations. This argument is not very persuasive. It is 
therefore likely that the influences o f training observed in Experiment 6 reflect formation 
o f long-term associations in the same way as the influences o f training observed in 
Experiment 7, and the substantial generalisation o f training to human stimuli in 
Experiment 7 reflects acquired equivalence and the specific training paradigm employed 
(as discussed in section 4.3.3). These findings in combination are therefore more 
consistent with the ASL predictions o f the human imitative bias than the AIM 
predictions.
Conclusion: The experiments reported within this chapter have suggested that automatic 
imitation o f robotic stimuli increases following compatible training with those stimuli, 
relative to incompatible training, and that these effects are more likely to reflect 
formation o f long-term associations established on the basis o f  practice during training, 
than short-term associations established on the basis o f  instructions given prior to 
training. The experiments have also suggested that this training can modulate the human 
imitative bias, such that compatible training will reduce the human imitative bias, relative
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to incompatible training. These findings are consistent with the ASL model o f  imitation, 
and not the AIM model.
125
Chapter 5: The role of experience in visuotactile integration
The experiments reported in Chapter 4 provided evidence that opportunities for 
associative learning can modulate imitation o f non-human stimuli. The experiment 
reported here in Chapter 5 investigates whether opportunities for associative learning may 
similarly modulate visuotactile integration, that is, integration o f visual and tactile 
representations o f events. It also investigates whether any modulations are influenced by 
the identity o f the stimulus, namely whether the visual stimulus is or is not human.
Two important parallels can be drawn between visuotactile integration and imitation. 
First, like imitation, visuotactile integration poses a correspondence problem. Patterns o f 
stimulation on the retina and receptors on the skin would appear to be in 
incommensurable codes, and these codes must be integrated. Second, as in imitation, 
human stimuli appear to be especially potent in relation to visuotactile integration; human 
stimuli evoke greater visuotactile integration than non-human stimuli (Thomas, Press, & 
Haggard, 2006; Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005; Fiorio & Haggard, 2005; 
Press, Taylor-Clarke, Kennett, & Haggard, 2004; Taylor-Clarke, Kennett, & Haggard, 
2004; Taylor-Clarke, Kennett, & Haggard, 2002; Kennett, Taylor-Clarke, & Haggard, 
2001; Graziano, Cooke, & Taylor, 2000; Pavani, Spence, & Driver, 2000). For example, 
Taylor-Clarke et al. (2004) found that participants were better able to determine the 
orientation o f gratings presented to their fingertip when concurrently observing their 
hand, rather than a neutral object reflected into the same spatial location. Therefore, the 
necessity that imitation mechanisms and visuotactile integration mechanisms must both 
resolve the correspondence problem, and the fact that human stimuli appear especially
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potent with respect to operation o f both mechanisms, may mean that similar theories can 
be used to understand visuotactile integration and imitation.
There is much evidence, both behavioural and neurological, that visual and tactile 
representations o f events are integrated. At the behavioural level, visual stimuli 
presented near tactile targets increase the speed and accuracy with which those targets are 
detected (e.g. Ladavas, Fame, Zeloni, & di Pellegrino, 2000; Driver & Spence, 1998; 
Ladavas & di Pellegrino, 1998; Spence, Nicholls, Gillespie, & Driver, 1998). These 
behavioural effects may be mediated by integration o f  visual and tactile modalities in the 
premotor and parietal cortex. Cells have been found in the premotor cortex and parietal 
lobule o f  the macaque monkey which are activated not only when a monkey is touched 
on the arm, but also when a visual stimulus is presented near the arm (e.g. Obayashi, 
Tanaka, & Iriki, 2000; Graziano, Yap, & Gross, 1994). Imaging studies have indicated 
that premotor and parietal cortices are also activated by both visual and tactile stimuli in 
humans (e.g. Saito, Okada, Morita, Yonekura, & Sadato, 2003; Banati, Goerres, Tjoa, 
Aggleton, & Grasby, 2000).
In addition, there is evidence that processing o f visual stimuli in visual cortices is 
enhanced by the concurrent presence o f  touch (e.g. Kennett, Eimer, Spence, & Driver, 
2001), and processing o f tactile stimuli in somatosensory cortices is enhanced by the 
concurrent presence o f  visual stimuli (Fiorio & Haggard, 2005; Forster & Eimer, 2005; 
Taylor-Clarke et al., 2002). For example, Kennett et al. (2001) observed that occipital N1 
components were larger in response to visual stimuli if tactile stimuli had preceded these 
visual stimuli on the same side, rather than the opposite side, o f  space.
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Keysers et al. (2004) propose that the integration o f vision and touch may arise through 
Hebbian learning. They state (p.341) ‘when we observe ourselves being touched, the 
activation o f somatosensory neurons will overlap in time with the activation o f visual 
neurons that represent the visual stimulus o f the touching event. Hebbian learning rules 
predict that this correlation in time should lead to strengthening o f  the synapses between 
these neurons.’ The authors therefore propose that bimodal visuotactile cells are not 
bimodal at birth, but rather become bimodal through Hebbian learning. This hypothesis 
is consistent with evidence that somatosensory cells in the monkey will fire in response to 
visual stimuli only if these stimuli were previously paired with tactile information (Zhou 
& Fuster, 1997; 2000).
As far as I am aware, no one has explicitly suggested that visuotactile integration 
mechanisms are innate. However, this possibility was raised by the philosopher Locke, 
under the influence o f his friend Molyneux (Locke, 1690). Molyneux’s famous question 
asked whether a person bom blind and able to discriminate cubes from spheres haptically, 
would be able to discriminate these shapes visually if  their sight were suddenly restored. 
Several patient studies have attempted to answer this question (e.g. Ackroyd, Humphrey, 
& Warrington, 1974; Gregory & Wallace, 1963), and have found conflicting results. 
Upon finding some evidence to suggest that such a patient was able to discriminate 
shapes visually, Gregory & Wallace (1963) advanced an apparently nativist view: ‘the 
fact that our patient was able, certainly with a minimum o f training - and perhaps with 
none at all - to recognise by vision upper case letters which he had learned by 
touch.. .provides strong evidence for (non-leamed) crossmodal transfer’ (p.40).
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Several studies have investigated the influence o f training on visuotactile integration. 
These studies have investigated an interesting consequence o f visuotactile integration, 
namely that when participants observe stimulation on a rubber hand while feeling 
stimulation on their own hand, they start to feel as if the rubber hand is their own hand 
(measured through self-report, Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). This ‘rubber hand illusion’ (RHI) is 
absent when seen and felt stimulation is out o f phase (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Botvinick & 
Cohen, 1998) or when felt stimulation is presented randomly with respect to seen 
stimulation (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003). Converging evidence that the RHI results 
from visuotactile integration is provided by the finding that when participants are 
experiencing this illusion, they exhibit greater activation in the areas o f premotor cortex 
where bimodal visuotactile cells have been found in primates (Ehrsson et al., 2004). 
Schaefer and colleagues (Schaefer, Noennig, Heinze, & Rotte, 2006) have also found that 
visuotactile integration processes which may give rise to the illusion can influence early 
sensory processing. The authors required participants to observe stimulation on a thumb 
while feeling stimulation on their own little finger. Using neuromagnetic source imaging, 
they found that synchronous stimulation o f this kind resulted in a change in the location 
o f the representation o f the little finger in primary somatosensory cortex (SI). This was 
not the case when visual and tactile events were presented out o f phase.
These studies therefore provide evidence o f an influence o f experience on visuotactile 
integration. Further studies suggest that influences o f training on visuotactile integration 
depend on the type o f visual stimulus presented, and specifically on whether the visual 
stimulus is or is not human. Tsakiris & Haggard (2005) measured the RHI with 
proprioceptive drift towards the observed stimulus. They found that, following
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synchronous stimulation o f  the participants’ own left hand and a left rubber hand, 
participants perceived their own hand as closer to the rubber hand, relative to conditions 
where visual and tactile stimulation was asynchronous. In contrast, there was no 
difference in proprioceptive drift following synchronous and asynchronous stimulation o f 
the participants’ own hand and a wooden stick.
However, Armel & Ramachandran (2003) have not found an influence o f visual stimulus 
type on the RHI. They stroked a rubber hand or the table top synchronously with the 
participant’s own unseen hand, and subsequently measured skin conductance response 
when a finger was pulled back on the rubber hand or a plaster was pulled off the table 
top. They compared synchronous stimulation conditions where the participants could not 
see their own hand against control conditions where stimulation was still synchronous but 
participants could see their own hand; a condition which the authors felt would not give 
rise to the RHI. The authors found greater evidence o f the RHI when participants viewed 
a rubber hand or a table top being stimulated synchronously with their own unseen hand, 
compared with control conditions, and this difference between test and control conditions 
was equal with the two visual stimulus types.
Therefore, previous research provides some support for the hypothesis that visual and 
tactile inputs can become integrated through associative learning. However, whether 
influences o f training are dependent on whether the visual stimulus is or is not human is 
still a matter o f debate. Tsakiris & Haggard (2005) suggest that differences as a function 
o f visual stimulus identity are driven by the role o f pre-existing body representations, and 
therefore that opportunities for learning cannot sufficiently explain integration effects. 
However, it is also possible that pre-existing body representations could be formed
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through previous associative learning experiences. It is likely that there are more 
opportunities for associative learning with human stimuli, relative to non-human stimuli. 
There will be plenty o f  opportunities provided during life to observe a body part whilst 
also feeling touch on that body part. For example, touch on a body part will often make 
one look towards that body part. In addition, in order to coordinate movement one will 
observe a moving body part and will often receive tactile stimulation on that body part by 
virtue o f the movement, for example, when picking up a cup. One will look less 
frequently towards non-human stimuli when receiving tactile stimulation, providing 
fewer opportunities for associative learning between non-human visual stimuli and tactile 
representations o f the body.
The purpose o f Experiment 8 was not to investigate whether the differences observed by 
Tsakiris & Haggard (2005) with human and non-human stimuli result from previous 
associative learning experiences, but rather to further test whether influences o f training 
on visuotactile integration depend in any way on whether visual stimuli are human or 
non-human. Such investigations can elucidate whether theories o f visuotactile integration 
are required to explain the influence o f  the identity o f visual stimuli on the effect o f 
visuotactile training. Experiment 8 therefore used event-related brain potentials (ERPs) 
to investigate the influence o f synchronous and uncorrelated visuotactile training with 
human and non-human visual stimuli on somatosensory processing. Greater visuotactile 
integration was expected to be reflected by enhanced somatosensory ERP components in 
response to tactile stimuli. In addition, any effects on later post-perceptual processes 
were investigated by analysing longer-latency ERP modulations.
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During training phases, participants observed a left or right rubber hand (View Hand 
group) or a lateralised neutral object (View Object group) being tapped synchronously or 
randomly with respect to one o f their own unseen hands. Participants were always 
stimulated on the hand which was compatible with that which they observed (or a 
spatially matched object). Thus, if they observed stimulation o f a left stimulus, they were 
stimulated on their left hand, and if they observed stimulation o f  a right stimulus, they 
were stimulated on their right hand. ERPs elicited in response to mechanical vibratory 
tactile stimuli presented to both left and right hands were subsequently recorded (test 
phase). Therefore, in the test phase, ERPs triggered by tactile stimuli which were 
compatible with the viewed stimulus (compatible hand) could be compared with ERPs 
triggered by tactile stimuli which were incompatible with the viewed stimulus 
(incompatible hand). To ensure that participants paid attention to the stimulus display, 
they were required to observe and monitor an LED on the hand or object stimulus (see 
methods).
This procedure allowed investigation o f any influences o f the relationship between visual 
and tactile stimuli during the training phase on processing o f  tactile stimuli during the test 
phase, by comparing somatosensory processing following blocks where visuotactile 
stimulation had been synchronous and uncorrelated. It also allowed investigation o f 
whether the type o f visual stimulus (human or non-human) mediated influences o f 
training. If visuotactile integration depends solely on innate mechanisms, somatosensory 
processing should be equal following synchronous and uncorrelated stimulation in both 
View Hand and View Object groups. In contrast, if visuotactile integration depends on 
learned mechanisms, somatosensory processing should be enhanced following 
synchronous, relative to uncorrelated, stimulation conditions. I f  there is an additional
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influence o f whether the visual stimulus is or is not human, the influence o f training on 




Thirty-five consenting, healthy volunteers with an average age o f 27.0 years, 16 male, 
participated in Experiment 8, and were paid a small honorarium for their participation. 
Two participants were excluded due to insufficient eye movement control (see below), 
and one other participant was excluded due to excessive alpha activity. The remaining 32 
participants were randomly assigned in equal numbers to the View Hand and View 
Object groups.
Stimuli
Experimental blocks consisted o f  sequential training and test phases. Throughout all 
blocks, participants viewed one o f  the four visual stimulus arrays depicted in Figure 20. 
The visual stimulus in the View Hand group consisted o f either a left or right stuffed 
yellow rubber glove (extreme point length = 31.0°, extreme point width = 22.6°, sleeve o f 
15.9° width and 16.7° length), with an LED (target stimulus) wrapped around its index 
finger on the ‘proximal’ segment. The visual stimulus in the View Object group 
consisted o f a symmetrical stuffed yellow rubber block, which was matched to the hand 
stimulus in extreme point dimensions, surface area and luminance, with LED location
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spatially matched to the position on the hand stimuli. The LED diameter was 2.30° and 
the luminance, measured with a SpectraScan PR650 luminance meter (Micron 
Techniques Ltd.) at a distance of 25 cm from the LED was 84 cd/m2. Non-target LED 
flashes were o f 200ms duration with no gap. Target LED flashes were o f the same 
duration, but had a 30ms gap in the middle i.e. on for 85ms, off for 30ms, then on again 
for 85ms. All visual stimulus displays also contained a red wooden stick (6.9° long) 
which tapped the hand or object stimulus for 50ms during training phases on the middle 
segment o f the index finger on the hand stimulus or on the spatially matched location on 
the object stimulus.
A Left hand B Right hand
C Left object D Right object
Figure 20: The stimuli used in Experiment 8. A Left hand. B Right hand, C Lett object, D Right 
object.
Tactile stimuli were presented using 12V solenoids, driving a metal rod with a blunt 
conical tip, making contact with the fingers or the rubber stimuli whenever a current was 
passed through the solenoid. During the training phases, single taps of 50ms duration
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were presented to the outer side o f the middle segment o f the index finger o f the hand 
corresponding to the viewed rubber stimulus (i.e. left hand stimulation with left rubber 
hand or object; right hand stimulation with right rubber hand or object). During the test 
phase, vibratory stimuli were delivered to the distal pad o f the left or right index fingers. 
These stimuli had a frequency o f 50Hz and were o f 102ms duration (created by switching 
solenoids on for 2ms and off for 18ms six times).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a dimly lit room. Participants’ right and left 
hands were placed palm-side down on a tabletop 17.5cm to the right and left o f  the body 
midline (see Figure 21). The rubber stimulus was positioned such that the LED was 
aligned with the body midline. The participants’ index fingers were resting in plastic 
casing, within which the tactile stimuli to be presented during test phases were embodied. 
A black frame (Width = 85cm, Height = 11.5cm, Length = 40cm) was placed on the 
tabletop so that participants could not see their hands and the tactile stimulators. A 57.0° 
x 22.8° hole in the top o f this frame allowed participants to see the stimulus display. A 
black cloth was attached to the frame and tied around the participants’ necks such that 
they could not see the location o f their arms. White noise (78 dB SPL) was continuously 
presented via a loudspeaker located at body midline and directly behind the black frame 
to mask any sound produced by the tactile stimulators.
Each block consisted o f three rotations o f training and test phases (training phase 
followed by test phase). During training phases, viewed taps on the rubber stimulus and 
felt taps on the spatially corresponding hand were presented either synchronously or in an
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Tleft Trigl
Figure 21: Experiments. Experimental set-up. The left hand stimulus for participants in the 
View Hand group is represented within the white square. The participants’ own hands were out 
of sight for the duration o f the experiment. In training phases, the participant received taps to the 
side o f  the middle segment o f  their index finger that was congruent with the viewed stimulus 
(Tleft or Tright). In test phases, the participant received vibrations to both fingertips (Vleft or 
Vright).
uncorrelated fashion. Each ‘trial’ in training phases consisted o f presentation o f  both 
visual and tactile stimuli and lasted for 1300ms. In synchronous blocks, visual and tactile 
stimuli were presented simultaneously, at one o f 13 possible time points between 0ms to 
1200ms after training trial onset in 100ms steps (0ms, 100ms, 200ms, to 1200ms). In 
uncorrelated blocks, visual and tactile stimuli were also presented at one o f these time 
points, but the point at which the tactile stimulus was presented was random with respect 
to the point at which the visual stimulus was presented.
Test phases following synchronous and uncorrelated training were identical; vibratory 
stimuli were presented with equal probability to the left and right hands, in a random
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order, with an inter-trial interval varying between 1000ms and 1400ms (mean = 1200ms). 
There was no stimulation o f the seen rubber stimulus during these phases. The different 
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Table 2: Experiment 8. A table o f conditions, according to the combination of within-subject 
variables o f viewed stimulus type in training and test phases, stimulated hand and stimulation 
type in training phases and stimulated hand in test phases. Those participants in the View Hand 
and View Object groups all undertook these conditions with either a Hand or Object stimulus, 
respectively.
During both training and test phases, the participants’ task was to watch the LED located 
on the rubber stimulus and to say ‘yes’ whenever they detected an LED flash with a gap. 
They were instructed to refrain from responding when they detected an LED flash 
without a gap, or when any other stimuli were presented. Participants wore a head- 
mounted microphone to detect vocal responses. LED trials were placed with equal 
frequency in training and test phases, and consisted of a target or non-target LED flash, 
followed by a 1000 - 1400ms (mean = 1200ms) interval to allow participants to respond 
(or not). No additional visual and tactile stimuli were presented during LED trials.
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Each training phase presented, in random order, 26 visual/tactile trials, two LED target 
trials and two LED non-target trials. Each test phase presented, in random order, 13 left 
vibration stimuli, 13 right vibration stimuli, two LED target trials and two LED non­
target trials.
There were three blocks o f  each type, defined by combination o f rubber stimulus 
lateralisation (left and right) and training type (synchronous and uncorrelated), and these 
were completed in immediate succession. Those blocks o f the same training type were 
completed consecutively, and rubber stimulus lateralisation was ordered in an ABBA 
fashion. The order o f blocks distinguished by rubber stimulus lateralisation and training 
type was counterbalanced. Before testing commenced in each new condition, participants 
completed one training block o f 60 trials that consisted o f one training phase followed by 
one test phase.
EEG recording and data analyses
EEG was recorded with Ag-AgCl electrodes and linked-earlobe reference from FPz, F7, F3, 
Fz, F4, F8, FC5, FC6, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, CP5, CP6, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, and Oz (according 
to the 10-20 system), and from OL and OR (located halfway between Ol and P7, and 02  
and P8, respectively). Horizontal electro-oculogram (HEOG) was recorded bipolarly from 
the outer canthi o f both eyes. Electrode impedance was kept below 5kO, and the 
impedances o f the earlobe electrodes were kept as equal as possible. Amplifier bandpass 
was 0.1 to 40 Hz. EEG and EOG were sampled with a digitization rate o f 200 Hz and stored 
on disk.
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EEG and EOG for test phase trials were epoched off-line into 600 ms periods, starting 
100ms prior to tactile stimulus onset and ending 500 ms after onset. Trials immediately 
following those where a target LED was presented were excluded to avoid contamination 
by vocal responses. Trials with vocal responses to tactile stimuli were also excluded from 
EEG analysis, as were non-target trials with eyeblinks (FPz exceeding ±60 pV), small 
horizontal eye movements (HEOG exceeding ±30 pV), or other artifacts (a voltage 
exceeding ±80 pV at any electrode) in the interval between tactile stimulus onset and 500 
ms after. Averaged HEOG waveforms obtained for each participant and task condition in 
this interval in response to left versus right hand stimuli were scored for systematic 
deviations o f eye position, which indicate residual tendencies to move the eyes towards 
the stimuli. Two participants were excluded because residual HEOG deviations exceeded 
±3pV.
The EEG obtained in the 500ms interval following tactile stimulus onset for each 
participant in the View Hand and View Object groups was averaged relative to a 100ms 
pre-stimulus baseline for all combinations o f stimulated hand (left and right), training 
type (synchronous and uncorrelated) and visuotactile compatibility (compatible and 
incompatible, where compatible = left hand stimulation when viewing a left rubber 
stimulus and right hand stimulation when viewing a right rubber stimulus, and 
incompatible = left and left, right and right, and incompatible = left hand stimulation 
when viewing a right rubber stimulus and right hand stimulation when viewing a left 
rubber stimulus). ERP mean amplitudes were computed within measurement windows 
centered on the latency o f  somatosensory P50 (30-65 ms), N80 (65-90 ms), PI 00 (90-115 
ms) and N140 (120-160 ms) components, as well as within a longer-latency time window 
(200-450 ms post-stimulus). Analyses o f  ERP data were conducted for lateral recording
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sites where the amplitudes o f early somatosensory components are maximal (F3/4, 
FC5/6, C3/4, and CP5/6), as well as for midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, and Pz).
5.1.2 Results
Behavioural performance
The RT and error data (failure to respond) for visual targets were subjected to ANOVA in 
which training type (synchronous and uncorrelated) and phase o f experiment (training 
and test) were within-subject variables. Stimulus type (View Hand and View Object) 
was a between-subject variable. There were no significant main effects or interactions in 
either o f these analyses. Participants in the View Hand group had similar mean RTs and 
error rates (592ms, 4.5%) to participants in the View Object group (582.2ms, 4.5%). 
Mean RTs and error rates were also similar in synchronous (588.1ms, 4.8%) and 
uncorrelated stimulation conditions (582.1ms, 4.2%). This suggests that participants 
were equally attentive in all conditions and in both groups. Participants made vocal 
responses in 1.3% o f visual non-target trials. These data were not analysed further.
ERPs to vibratory tactile stimuli presented in the test phase
Figure 22 represents ERPs elicited at midline electrode Cz and at electrodes C3/C4 
ipsilateral and contralateral to the stimulated hand, collapsed across visuotactile 
compatible and incompatible trials. There is a notable enhancement o f the amplitude of 
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Figure 22: Experiment 8. Grand-averaged ERPs elicited in response to tactile stimuli delivered 
in test phases in the 500 ms interval after tactile stimulus onset at midline electrode Cz, and at 
central electrodes C3 and C4 ipsilateral (C34I) and contralateral (C34C) to the stimulated hand. 
ERPs are shown separately for the View Hand group (top panel) and the View Object group 
(bottom panel), and for blocks with synchronous visuotactile training (solid lines), and blocks 
with uncorrelated training (dashed lines).
relative to blocks where training had been uncorrelated, and this modulation was no 
different in the View Hand and View Object groups. These observations were 
substantiated by statistical analysis. The data were subjected to two sets o f ANOVAs, 
one for lateral electrodes and one for midline electrodes, within measurement windows 
centered on P50, N80, P I00 and N140 components, as well as within a longer-latency 
time window (200-450 ms post-stimulus). The lateral analyses contained within-subject 
variables o f laterality (contralateral and ipsilateral) and electrode (F3/4, FC5/6, C3/4 and 
CP5/6), and a between-subject variable o f  stimulus type (View Hand and View Object). 
The midline analysis contained no laterality variable, and the electrode variable had only
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three levels (Fz, Cz and Pz). In the N 140 time window (120- 160ms after stimulus onset), 
there was a main effect o f  training type, which was reliable both in the lateral (F(l,30) = 
6.8, p < 0.02), and the midline analyses (F(l,30) = 7.7, p < 0.01). This main effect was 
independent o f whether the seen visual stimulus was a rubber hand or object in both 
lateral and midline analyses (F < 1 in both cases). The analyses indicated no reliable 
effects o f  training in the P50, N80 or PI 00 time ranges, or 200-450 ms post-stimulus.
Figure 23 represents ERPs elicited at midline electrode Cz and at electrodes C3 and C4, 
ipsilateral and contralateral to the stimulated hand, in response to tactile stimuli delivered 
in test phases where tactile stimuli were compatible or incompatible with the visual 
stimulus. There are observable differences in the 200-450ms interval. There is an 
observable enhanced negativity in response to tactile stimuli which were presented to the 
hand which was compatible with the rubber stimulus, compared with stimuli which were 
presented to the incompatible hand. This was the case with both synchronous and 
uncorrelated training types in the View Object group, but only with synchronous training 
the View Hand group. These observations were supported by statistical analysis. Within 
the time interval 200-450ms after stimulus onset, there was first, a significant main effect 
o f  visuotactile compatibility (lateral: F(1,30) = 13.3, p < 0.002, midline: F(l,30) = 11.0, p
< 0.005), and second, a significant visuotactile compatibility x training type x stimulus 
type interaction (lateral: F(l,30) = 6.3, p < 0.02, midline: F(l,30) = 5.5, p < 0.03). There 
was no evidence o f a main effect o f visuotactile compatibility in the View Hand group 
(lateral: F( 1,15) = 1.9, p = 0.2, midline: F( 1,15) = 1.2, p = 0.3), but there was a two-way 
interaction between visuotactile compatibility and training type (lateral: F(1,15) = 6.2, p
< 0.03, midline: F( 1,15) = 9.7, p < 0.01). This two-way interaction was generated by an 
effect o f  visuotactile compatibility with synchronous training (lateral: F(1,15) = 8.4, p <
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Figure 23: Experiment 8. Grand-averaged ERPs elicited in response to tactile stimuli delivered 
in test phases in the 500 ms interval after tactile stimulus onset at midline electrode Cz, and at 
central electrodes C3 and C4 ipsilateral (C34I) and contralateral (C34C) to the stimulated hand. 
ERPs are shown separately for the View Hand and View Object groups, and for blocks with 
synchronous and uncorrelated training. ERPs on trials where the stimulated hand was compatible 
with the seen rubber object (solid lines) are compared to ERPs on trials where tactile stimuli 
were presented to the incompatible hand (dashed lines).
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0.02, midline: F(l,15) = 11.1, p = 0.005), but not with uncorrelated training (F < 1 in both 
cases). In contrast, the View Object group displayed a main effect o f visuotactile 
compatibility (lateral: F( 1,15) = 16.3, p < 0.002, midline: F(1,15) = 17.9, p = 0.001), but 
no evidence o f a two-way interaction between visuotactile compatibility and training type 
(lateral: F( 1,15) = 1.4, p = 0.3, midline: F < 1). There were no main effects or 
interactions involving visuotactile compatibility in the P50, N80, P I00 and N140 
timeranges.
5.1.3 Discussion
Experiment 8 explored the role o f experience and stimulus identity in visuotactile 
integration, assessing first, whether visuotactile integration can be modulated through 
training, and second, whether these modulations are dependent on the identity o f  the 
visual stimulus (human or non-human). A procedure was employed whereby participants 
observed a rubber hand (View Hand group) or neutral object (View Object group) being 
stimulated synchronously or randomly with respect to their own unseen hand. 
Subsequent to these training phases, somatosensory ERPs were measured in response to 
tactile stimuli, and greater visuotactile integration was expected to be reflected by 
enhanced somatosensory processing o f these tactile stimuli.
The results indicated that the N140 component o f somatosensory processing is enhanced 
following synchronous stimulation o f a hand or object stimulus and the participant’s own 
hand, relative to uncorrelated stimulation conditions. There was no influence on the 
N140 component o f whether the visual stimulus was a hand or object. There was also no 
interaction between training type and visuotactile compatibility, indicating that
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somatosensory processing o f stimuli presented to the hand which was incompatible with 
the visual stimulus was also influenced by training. This finding is consistent with the 
known bilaterality o f  secondary somatosensory cortex (SII, Hari et al., 1984), where the 
N 140 component is thought to be generated (Allison, McCarthy, & Wood, 1992).
These findings suggest that tactile processing in SII can be modulated by visuotactile 
associative learning. The finding that, specifically, processing in somatosensory cortex 
can be modulated by training is consistent with previous findings (Schaefer et al., 2006), 
although previous studies have found modulations in SI rather than SII. This pattern o f 
results is inconsistent with the hypothesis that visuotactile integration is mediated by 
innate mechanisms, which would have predicted no modulation o f ERPs as a function o f 
whether stimulation was synchronous or uncorrelated.
If one assumes that the modulations observable on the N 140 component in Experiment 8 
reflect operation o f  the same visuotactile integration mechanisms as those which generate 
the RHI, the finding that these modulations are independent o f the identity o f  visual 
stimuli is consistent with the findings o f Armel & Ramachandran (2003) that the RHI is 
independent o f the identity o f  visual stimuli. This finding is less consistent with those of 
Tsakiris & Haggard (2005), which indicate that the RHI is generated with rubber hands 
but not neutral objects.
However, the findings o f Tsakiris & Haggard (2005) may be interpretable in the light o f 
the modulations observed 200-450ms post-stimulus. In this time interval, there was an 
enhanced negativity for stimuli presented to the hand which was compatible with the 
visual stimulus, compared with stimuli presented to the hand which was incompatible.
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This effect was present in both synchronous and uncorrelated training conditions in the 
View Object group, but only in the synchronous training condition in the View Hand 
group.
A sustained negativity in somatosensory ERPs beyond 200ms post-stimulus is usually 
interpreted as evidence o f enhanced attention towards those stimuli, such that those 
stimuli are processed at greater depth (e.g. Eimer & Forster, 2003; Michie, 1984). Thus, 
the presence o f such a sustained negativity on compatible compared with incompatible 
trials may indicate that vision o f a left or right rubber stimulus resulted in an attentional 
bias towards the hand compatible with this stimulus. Such a bias is likely to result from 
the association o f the lateralised features o f the rubber stimulus with the side o f tactile 
stimulation during training (e.g. viewing a left rubber stimulus is associated with tactile 
stimulation o f the participant’s left hand). The observation that no such enhanced 
negativity for compatible trials was observed in the View Hand group following 
uncorrelated training suggests that there was no attentional bias towards the compatible 
hand in this condition, and might be explained with reference to pre-existing body 
representations involving hand stimuli. These pre-existing representations may result in 
strong expectations o f correlated visual and tactile events. The View Hand group may 
therefore learn very rapidly in the uncorrelated stimulation condition that these 
expectations have not been met, because surprise leads to rapid learning (Schultz & 
Dickinson, 2000). If  participants learn very quickly in this condition, this may prevent 
any subsequent attentional bias towards the compatible side because participants will not 
continue to establish the relationship between visual and tactile events in this condition.
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According to this post-hoc account, the identity o f the visual stimulus may indeed have 
interacted with the influence o f  training on visuotactile integration. This may provide an 
explanation o f the observation by Tsakiris & Haggard (2005) that the RHI is dependent 
on the identity o f the visual stimuli in two ways. First, Tsakiris & Haggard (2005) only 
presented four minutes o f  training in each condition, and it was suggested, on the basis o f 
the late attentional modulation, that participants learn faster in the hand asynchronous 
condition relative to other conditions because o f high surprise. Therefore, given that very 
little training was presented, the influence o f training may only have been observed in 
hand stimulation conditions. If more training had been presented, influences may also 
have been observed in object stimulation conditions. Second, it was hypothesised that 
participants learnt faster in the hand asynchronous condition because there was not the 
same attentional bias towards the tactile stimuli involved in training which was 
observable in the other conditions. If  participants were not paying attention to the same 
point in space in the hand asynchronous condition, relative to the other conditions, 
participants may have given different estimates o f the location o f  their hand. It is likely 
that estimates o f the location o f ones hand are influenced by the attentional focus o f 
participants in addition to visuotactile integration.
Conclusion: Experiment 8 has suggested that visuotactile experience can modulate SII 
processing o f tactile events independently o f whether visual stimuli are human or non­
human. However, ERP modulations observed beyond 200ms post-stimulus, which 
suggest attentional biases induced by visuotactile training, were influenced by whether 
the visual stimulus was human or non-human. It therefore appears that training can 
influence visuotactile integration, but there are some differences in influences o f training 
with human and non-human visual stimuli. These differences may emerge through pre-
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existing body representations which exist with human stimuli and not non-human stimuli.
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This chapter will summarise the findings from Experiments 1 - 8  with reference to the 
theoretical questions which they investigated. The findings from experiments in each 
chapter will be outlined, along with likely interpretations o f  the findings. Following these 
summaries, the limitations o f  the experiments will be discussed, along with the questions 
which still need to be addressed. Section 6.2 will review Experiments 1 and 2 (Chapter 
2), which assessed whether compatibility effects generated with hand opening and 
closing movements are likely to reflect configural action compatibility or orthogonal 
spatial compatibility. Section 6.3 will review Experiments 3 and 4 (Chapter 3) which 
addressed whether a human imitative bias may be mediated by top-down processes, 
operating on the basis o f  knowledge about stimulus identity, or bottom-up processes, 
operating on the basis o f  perceptual properties of the stimuli. Section 6.4 will review 
Experiments 5 - 7  (Chapter 4) which investigated whether automatic imitation o f  non­
human stimuli and hence the human imitative bias could be modulated through 
experience. This section will be the most substantial because these experiments were o f 
greatest theoretical interest. Section 6.5 will review Experiment 8 (Chapter 5) which 
explored whether visuotactile integration could be modulated through experience, and the 
dependency o f any influences on whether the visual stimuli were human or non-human. 
Finally, section 6.6 presents likely conclusions from the experiments reported in this 
thesis.
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6.2 Configural action compatibility or orthogonal spatial compatibility?
6.2.1 Summary and interpretation
Experiments 1 and 2 investigated whether compatibility effects observed with opening 
and closing hand actions, where stimulus and response hands are in orthogonal 
dimensions, are driven by configural action compatibility or orthogonal spatial 
compatibility. If the effects are driven by configural action compatibility they should be 
determined by whether the stimulus and response hands are opening (configurally, the 
fingers move outwards) or closing (configurally, the fingers move inwards). If the effects 
are driven by orthogonal spatial compatibility they should be determined by whether the 
response fingers move up or down in response to stimulus fingers moving to the left or 
right.
Experiment 1 distinguished these hypotheses by investigating whether compatibility 
effects remained the same or reversed when stimulus movement direction reversed, by 
presenting participants with right stimulus hands viewed from the front (thumb on the left 
when fingers point upwards) and viewed from the rear (thumb on the right when fingers 
point upwards). Compatibility effects were found to remain the same when stimulus 
movement direction reversed. Experiment 2 similarly investigated whether compatibility 
effects remained the same or reversed when stimulus movement direction reversed, but 
compared compatibility effects between stimuli where configural action compatibility 
and orthogonal spatial compatibility were varied on entirely independent dimensions. 
This was achieved by taking one set of stimuli and flipping them in a vertical axis to 
create stimuli with opposite movement directions. In addition, this experiment 
investigated whether there were different spatial preferences in right and left hemispace,
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because orthogonal spatial compatibility effects have been found to differ in the two 
hemispaces. Similarly to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 found that compatibility effects 
remained the same regardless o f stimulus movement direction. In addition, it found that 
compatibility effects did not demonstrate the interactions with response hemispace which 
have been found with some previous investigations o f orthogonal spatial compatibility.
The findings within these experiments therefore suggest that compatibility effects 
observed with opening and closing hand actions are driven by configural action 
compatibility rather than orthogonal spatial compatibility. These findings suggest that 
actions can be represented configurally in imitation mechanisms. These experiments also 
indicate that these movements and this paradigm are appropriate for investigation o f 
imitation mechanisms in this thesis.
6.2.2 Limitations and outstanding questions
By addressing which spatial codes may mediate action compatibility, interesting issues 
are raised concerning what constitutes an imitative response. It may be suggested that a 
perfect imitative response is only achieved if ones own body is aligned with that o f  an 
observed party; when the observed party lifts their left leg to their left side and we also 
lift our left leg to our left side, both legs will move in the same direction in space, defined 
in simple egocentric codes. However, it was noted in Chapter 2 that an action can still be 
considered an imitative response if  ones own body is oriented differently to that o f  the 
observed party, and this may be considered just as perfect an imitative response as if 
bodies are oriented similarly. Concepts o f match may depend only on some spatial codes 
and not others. Some behavioural and neurological research suggests that body
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orientation does not influence automatic imitation (e.g. Iacoboni, 2003), but other 
research suggests an influence (e.g. Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2002). Further research in this 
area may help clarify which spatial codes are important for automatic imitation. In 
addition, research into intentional imitation may inform understanding by investigating 
which rotations will make action more difficult to imitate and which rotations will result 
in rating an action as less imitative o f another.
Experiments 1 and 2 have addressed the spatial codes which may drive action 
compatibility. However, it has already been noted in Chapters 3 and 4 that compatibility 
on other codes may also drive action compatibility. Compatibility o f observed and 
executed actions on other perceptual features like skin folds and shading may also be 
important. In addition, temporal features o f movement may drive action compatibility. 
This thesis has referred to the temporal features o f movement in very general terms, for 
example, whether something moves up, down, left or right over time. However, more 
specific temporal features o f  observed and executed movement may also be encoded, and 
some have suggested that temporal features o f both observed and executed movement are 
encoded in similar ways (e.g. Ivry & Hazeltine, 1995; Treisman, Faulkner, & Naish, 
1992; Keele, Pokomy, Corcos, & Ivry, 1985). Therefore, it is possible that, in addition to 
compatibility on spatial codes, action compatibility is also driven by compatibility 
between observed and executed movement speeds. Future research could address this 
possibility.
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6.3 Top-down and bottom-up contributions to the human imitative bias
6.3.1 Summary and interpretation
Experiments 3 and 4 investigated whether the human imitative bias is mediated by 
knowledge about stimulus identity (top-down influence) or properties o f the stimuli 
(bottom-up influence). Experiment 3 presented participants with human stimuli and 
informed participants prior to one session o f testing that stimuli were human, and prior to 
the other that they were robotic. Despite questionnaire responses indicating that the 
belief manipulation was successful, Experiment 3 did not detect a difference in automatic 
imitation o f stimuli which participants had been instructed were human and stimuli which 
participants had been instructed were robotic. In a factorial design, Experiment 4 
performed a further test o f  the top-down hypothesis, but also investigated bottom-up 
influences. Different participants were presented with genuinely human or genuinely 
robotic stimuli, and informed prior to one session that stimuli were human and prior to 
the other, that they were robotic. Similarly to Experiment 3, questionnaire responses 
indicated that the belief manipulation was successful, but an influence o f belief on 
automatic imitation was not detected. However, an influence o f perceptual properties 
was observed; the genuinely human stimuli evoked greater automatic imitation than the 
genuinely robotic stimuli.
The results o f  Experiments 3 and 4 therefore indicate that, in the case o f opening and 
closing hand stimuli, the human imitative bias is driven by properties o f  the stimuli rather 
than beliefs about stimulus identity. This is consistent with hypotheses that processing 
within imitation mechanisms influences processing within higher level mechanisms 
involved in drawing mental state inferences (e.g. Kilner et al., 2003; Gallese & Goldman,
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1998), because humans have mental states and robots do not. However, it is inconsistent 
with the converse hypothesis; that these higher level mechanisms modulate processing in 
imitation mechanisms, thereby producing a human imitative bias.
The interpretation that the human imitative bias is governed more by properties o f the 
stimuli is consistent with both AIM and ASL models o f imitation. The AIM model 
would predict that stimuli with human properties are allowed privileged access to an 
imitation module, and the ASL model would predict that stimuli with human properties 
are associated with matching responses more than stimuli with robotic properties.
6.3.2 Limitations and outstanding questions
In Experiments 3 and 4 the participants were simply instructed that the observed stimuli 
were human or robotic, and a questionnaire was used to assess whether the instruction 
manipulation was effective. As discussed in Chapter 3, questionnaire responses are 
susceptible to demand effects. However, two reasons were discussed why it is unlikely 
that the questionnaire measure used in these experiments was contaminated by demand 
effects. Despite these reasons, it remains a possibility that no top-down influence was 
observed on automatic imitation because participants’ beliefs about stimulus identity did 
not actually differ as a function o f  instruction. It may therefore be informative to conduct 
an experiment which is similar to Experiment 4, but which has a measure o f  belief 
manipulation which is less susceptible to demand effects. For example, any measures o f 
belief which do not require asking participants about their beliefs would be useful, but I 
have no suggestions at present concerning what these could be.
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If the questionnaire measure in Experiments 3 and 4 accurately reflected participants’ 
beliefs about stimulus identity, and therefore there is no top-down modulation o f 
imitation on the basis o f  knowledge about stimulus identity with these movements and 
this task, these results do not exclude the possibility that there is top-down modulation on 
the basis o f  beliefs about identity in contrasting conditions. In Experiments 3 and 4, the 
movement stimuli were in full view, presentation o f the human and robotic stimuli was 
blocked, and participants were not explicitly encouraged to think about the meaning o f 
the observed movements or the intentions o f  the actor. These conditions resemble those 
in which a human imitative bias has been found previously and are not unusual in 
everyday life. However, knowledge about stimulus identity may have a larger influence 
on imitation if task requirements specify that participants should explicitly draw 
inferences about mental states underlying observed stimulus movements. In addition, 
knowledge about stimulus identity may have a larger influence on automatic imitation o f 
other actions. For example, some actions, like facial expressions, may be especially 
important for higher sociocognitive functions. Therefore, there may be top-down 
influence o f belief about identity on imitation o f these actions.
As noted, the finding that the human imitative bias is driven by stimulus properties is 
consistent with hypotheses that processing within imitation mechanisms influences 
processing within higher level mechanisms involved in drawing mental state inferences. 
Several authors have suggested the involvement of imitation mechanisms in such higher 
level functions (e.g. Rizzolatti, 2005; Kilner et al., 2003; Gallese & Goldman, 1998). 
Although I have described such hypotheses as invoking imitation mechanisms which feed 
into higher level mechanisms, Gallese & Goldman (1998) and Rizzolatti (2005) in fact 
appear to posit that mental state inferences are drawn within imitation mechanisms
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themselves. For example, Rizzolatti (2005) suggests that actions which produce imitation 
without being understood rely on different mechanisms to those which produce imitation 
whilst being understood. This may reflect nothing more than a difference in terminology; 
Rizzolatti may view higher level mechanisms which receive input from imitation 
mechanisms as higher level imitation mechanisms. This is possible, although the specific 
relevance o f  these higher level mechanisms to imitation would require some clarification. 
Further investigation o f  influences which these higher-level mechanisms may have on 
imitation mechanisms would at least elucidate whether there is any relevance o f  these 
mechanisms to imitation, even if  they are not directly implicated in solving the 
correspondence problem.
6.4 The role of experience in imitation of non-human stimuli
6.4.1 Summary and interpretation
Using a training paradigm with robotic stimuli, Experiments 5 - 7  aimed to distinguish 
AIM and ASL theories o f  a human imitative bias. Experiment 5 initially established a 
human imitative bias with stimuli which were suitable for use in a training paradigm. 
Experiment 6 investigated whether automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli was greater 
following compatible training with these stimuli, relative to incompatible training. 
During training, one group o f  participants was instructed to perform movements which 
were compatible with those o f a robotic stimulus and the other group was instructed to 
perform movements which were incompatible. This experiment found an influence o f 
experience on automatic imitation o f  robotic stimuli; automatic imitation o f  robotic 
stimuli was greater following compatible training with the stimuli relative to
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incompatible training. The human imitative bias was therefore reduced with compatible 
training, relative to incompatible training.
Experiment 7 employed a similar training paradigm to Experiment 6, but did not refer to 
the stimulus-response relationship in the instructions given prior to training. This 
allowed investigation o f  whether the effects o f training observed in Experiment 6 
reflected formation o f  long-term associations, established on the basis o f practice and 
postulated by the ASL model to mediate imitation, or formation o f short-term 
associations, established on the basis o f instructions given prior to training. In 
Experiment 7, participants were required to select their response on the basis o f  a number 
presented on the warning stimulus and to execute this response when an imperative 
stimulus posture was presented. In the compatible training group, this posture was the 
same as the required response, and in the incompatible training group, this posture was 
different to the required response. Despite no reference to the stimulus-response 
relationship in the task instructions given prior to training, automatic imitation o f robotic 
stimuli was greater following compatible training with those stimuli, relative to 
incompatible training. Automatic imitation o f  human stimuli was also influenced by the 
training with robotic stimuli.
These findings indicate that automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli is modulated by 
training, and that these modulations are more likely to reflect formation o f long-term 
associations established on the basis o f  practice than short-term associations established 
on the basis o f  task instructions. These findings are consistent with the ASL model o f 
imitation, which posits that imitation mechanisms are created through associative 
learning connecting visual and motor representations o f action. The finding that
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automatic imitation o f  robotic stimuli can be modulated through experience, and that this 
modulation is likely to reflect formation o f long-term associations, is inconsistent with 
the AIM model o f  imitation which proposes that imitation is mediated by innate 
mechanisms.
The ASL model predicts that the human imitative bias emerges through greater 
opportunities for associative learning connecting human movement stimuli and responses 
than non-human movement stimuli and responses. Providing opportunities for 
associative learning with non-human movement stimuli is therefore predicted to modulate 
the human imitative bias in addition to automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli. Evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis was observed in Experiment 6, but not in Experiment 7. 
This was because training in Experiment 7 also influenced imitation o f human stimuli, 
with which participants had not been trained. However, the combination o f results in 
Experiments 6 and 7 are more consistent with the ASL predictions o f the origin o f  a 
human bias, relative to the AIM predictions.
6.4.2 Limitations and outstanding questions
Experiment 7 observed the influence o f  training on automatic imitation o f robotic stimuli 
which the ASL model would predict, but it did not observe the predicted influence o f 
training on the human imitative bias because training also influenced imitation o f  human 
stimuli. Although the combination o f  results o f Experiments 6 and 7 are difficult to 
reconcile with any hypotheses o f  the human imitative bias other than that o f the ASL 
model, further work can be done to dissociate short- and long-term association 
hypotheses, and AIM and ASL hypotheses, o f  the influences o f training on imitation. A
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farther way in which short- and long-term association hypotheses could be dissociated 
would be to provide opportunities for formation o f  short-term associations, but to remove 
opportunities for formation o f  long-term associations. Participants could be given the 
instructions to perform responses which are compatible or incompatible with movements 
o f  robotic stimuli, but trials on which this behaviour is required could be omitted. If 
effects o f  training are still observed, this would suggest formation o f short-term 
associations, rather than long-term associations. This hypothesis would not be 
inconsistent with either the AIM or the ASL model o f  imitation, because neither 
hypothesis denies an influence o f task sets on behaviour. However, if effects o f  training 
are no longer observed, this may suggest that effects o f training observed when 
participants have actually executed actions in response to stimuli, reflect formation o f 
long-term associations. This outcome would be consistent with the ASL model o f 
imitation, and not the AIM model.
An alternative or additional way in which short- and long-term association hypotheses, 
and therefore AIM and ASL hypotheses, can be distinguished would be to use a similar 
paradigm to Experiment 7 but to train participants with human stimuli rather than robotic 
stimuli. One o f the possible explanations why training with robotic stimuli also 
influenced imitation o f  human stimuli in Experiment 7 is that human stimuli are already 
associated with compatible responses before training. When robotic stimuli are paired 
with compatible responses during training, this could strengthen compatible associations 
between human stimuli and responses in addition to associations between robotic stimuli 
and responses (‘acquired equivalence’). Training with human stimuli could overcome 
this problem, because robotic stimuli are unlikely to be associated with compatible 
responses before training. Therefore, this procedure may mean that substantial
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generalisation o f training is not observed and that the human imitative bias is modulated 
through training.
Short-term and long-term hypotheses may be dissociable on more dimensions than the 
conditions in which they are formed (practice or instructions). For example, short-term 
associations have been hypothesised to operate via frontal control mechanisms (e.g. Dove 
et al., 2000; Pollmann et al., 2000), whereas long-term associations have been 
hypothesised to be direct. Therefore, these hypotheses could be distinguished 
neurologically. Following training, participants could observe actions. If training has 
notable influences on cortical areas involved in frontal control, the short-term hypothesis 
may be correct. In contrast, if training has only notable influences on premotor areas, 
where motor representations o f action are thought to be located, the long-term hypothesis 
may be correct. Second, Barber & O ’Leary (1997) have suggested that short-term 
associations do not remain active after the task is complete, whereas long-term 
associations can have durable influences on behaviour. In this case, these hypotheses 
could be distinguished by noting whether training has observable influences on imitation 
following a longer period o f time than 24 hours, for example, one week.
Third, short-term associations may operate only to inhibit incorrect responses, rather than 
to facilitate correct responses. When the frontal areas thought to mediate short-term 
associations were disrupted in rodents, the rodents performed more incorrect responses 
but the number o f  correct responses performed remained unchanged (de Wit, Kosaki, 
Balleine, & Dickinson, 2006). In contrast, long-term associations are thought to be both 
excitatory and inhibitory (e.g. Mackintosh, 1974). A short-term hypothesis may therefore 
suggest that differences between compatible and incompatible training groups are driven
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only by incompatible training, and that this influence is driven by facilitation o f  RTs on 
incompatible trials at post-test relative to pre-test. In contrast, a long-term hypothesis o f  
influences o f  training would suggest that both compatible and incompatible training can 
influence behaviour. It may therefore be possible to distinguish these hypotheses by 
designing a training experiment where effects o f compatible training can be dissociated 
from effects o f  response practice and perceptual learning, but without comparing effects 
with those o f  incompatible training. For example, participants could practise responses 
and observe stimuli to the same extent as a compatible training group, but these tasks 
could be performed in separate blocks. I f  there is an observable influence o f compatible 
training, this may provide evidence in support o f the long-term hypothesis.
Experiments 6 and 7 investigated whether automatic imitation o f  robotic stimuli could be 
modulated through training in order to contrast AIM and ASL theories o f imitation and 
the human imitative bias. However, a defender o f AIM might argue that automatic 
imitation cannot be used as a test bed for this theory because AIM relates, not to 
unintentional imitation (sometimes called ‘mimicry’) but to an active, intentional form o f 
imitation. This is certainly what the initial version o f the AIM model proposed (Meltzoff 
& Moore, 1997).
There are at least two potential answers to this objection. First, although M eltzoff s 
earlier work made a firm distinction between automatic and intentional imitation, his 
more recent work suggests that this distinction may no longer be drawn and that AIM 
may now be understood to encompass automatic imitation. For example, in 2003 
M eltzoff and Decety described the primary motor cortex, which is automatically
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activated when observing action (e.g. Fadiga et al., 1995), as a candidate neural substrate 
o f  imitation (p. 493).
Second, it can be argued that, whether or not it is recognised by Meltzoff, a theory o f  
imitation which wishes to explain the correspondence problem is obliged to encompass 
automatic as well as intentional imitation. This is because both sets o f phenomena pose 
the problem. For example, whether the sight o f a model touching their ear (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999) makes me touch my ear automatically, or whether it does so via an intention 
to copy the model, it remains to be explained how my brain identifies the motor 
programme which will make my action look like that o f the model from a third party 
perspective. There is no logical reason to implement two separate mechanisms which 
solve the same problem. In addition, there is some evidence that both intentional and 
automatic imitation rely on similar cortical areas, and therefore are likely to implement 
the same neurological mechanism in addition to the same psychological mechanism. 
That is, similar cortical areas are activated when observing and executing action and 
when intentionally imitating (Rumiati et al., 2005; Iacoboni et al., 1999), and no 
additional regions are activated in imitation tasks which are not activated in simple action 
observation or execution tasks.
If the ability to imitate is learned through associative learning, this would imply that 
mechanisms mediating imitation in adults are not present in neonates. Despite several 
studies providing support for the claim that neonates do imitate (Heimann, 1989; 
Heimann et al., 1989; Meltzoff & Moore, 1989; Kaitz et al., 1988; Reissland, 1988; 
Vinter, 1986; Kugiumutzakis, 1985; Field et al., 1983; Meltzoff & Moore, 1983; Field et 
al., 1982; M eltzoff & Moore, 1977), other studies have only found good evidence for
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neonatal imitation o f  tongue protrusion (Anisfeld et al., 2001; Ullstadius, 1998; Anisfeld, 
1996; Anisfeld, 1991) and this may result from simple arousal (Jones, 1996; 2006). This 
suggests that the imitation which neonates are able to produce is mediated by innate 
reflexes which are replaced in later life by different mechanisms resulting in similar 
behaviour. This possibility is supported by the finding that any imitation which can be 
demonstrated with neonates, disappears at around three months o f age (Heimann et al., 
1989).
6.5 The role of experience in visuotactile integration
6.5.1 Summary and interpretation
Experiment 8 explored the role o f experience and visual stimulus identity in visuotactile 
integration, assessing whether visuotactile integration can be modulated through training, 
and the dependency o f  any modulations on whether visual stimuli are human or non­
human. Participants observed a rubber hand (View Hand group) or neutral object (View 
Object group) being stimulated synchronously or randomly with respect to their own 
unseen hand. Subsequent to these training phases, somatosensory ERPs were measured 
in response to tactile stimuli, and greater visuotactile integration was expected to be 
reflected by enhanced somatosensory processing o f these tactile stimuli.
The results indicated that the N140 component o f somatosensory processing is enhanced 
following synchronous stimulation o f a hand or object stimulus and the participant’s own 
hand, relative to uncorrelated stimulation conditions. This N140 modulation was 
independent o f whether visual stimuli were human or non-human. These findings 
suggest that tactile processing in SII can be modulated by visuotactile associative
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learning. This pattern o f results is inconsistent with any hypothesis which would suggest 
that visuotactile integration is mediated by innate mechanisms.
In addition, 200-450ms post-stimulus there was an enhanced negativity for stimuli 
presented to the hand which was compatible with the visual stimulus, compared with 
stimuli presented to the hand which was incompatible. This effect, which is thought to 
reflect an attentional bias towards the hand which received tactile stimulation during 
training, was present in every condition except the uncorrelated training condition in the 
View Hand group. This may be explained with reference to pre-existing body 
representations involving hand stimuli.
6.5.2 Limitations and outstanding questions
The influence o f training on visuotactile integration in Experiment 8 has been interpreted 
as evidence o f  associative learning. An empiricist theory o f a somewhat different nature 
is proposed by Armel & Ramachandran (2003) to account for modulations o f visuotactile 
integration as a result o f  training, namely, Bayesian learning. Bayesian learning refers to 
a mathematical principle whereby the state o f the world is estimated by combining 
sensory inputs which are weighted on the basis o f the accuracy o f each input. On the 
basis o f  statistical correlation between sensory inputs, Armel & Ramachandran (2003) 
propose that visual and tactile inputs become ‘bound’ (see also Ernst & Banks, 2002).
Armel & Ramachandran (2003) suggest that a Bayesian account o f visuotactile 
integration can be contrasted with an associative learning account. They argue that an 
associative hypothesis would predict that delayed but correlated visuotactile inputs
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should result in visuotactile integration which is equal to that observed with synchronous 
inputs, but that their Bayesian model would predict greater integration with synchronous 
inputs. However, as already discussed in Chapter 1, associative learning is known to be 
sensitive, not only to contingency, but also to the temporal relationship between events 
(e.g. Mahoney & Ayres, 1976). Therefore, the results o f previous experiments which 
find greater integration following synchronous stimulation conditions, relative to out-of- 
phase stimulation conditions, do not as Armel & Ramachandran (2003) suggest, favour a 
Bayesian account over an associative explanation; they are equally supportive o f  both. 
However, future theoretical work can further establish whether there are any necessary 
differences between Bayesian and associative learning, and, if so, what these may be.
The nature and origin o f  pre-existing body representations which may have led to 
observed differences in processing o f  human and non-human stimuli in Experiment 8 
needs further investigation. If  pre-existing body representations simply constitute pre­
existing visuotactile links, then the results o f  Experiment 8 suggest that these are created 
through previous associative learning experiences with human stimuli. That is, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, those things which are modifiable are more likely to be learned 
than innate. To test the hypothesis that pre-existing visuotactile links could lead to a 
difference in processing o f human and non-human stimuli, future research must establish 
that learning does not completely generalise between human and non-human stimuli.
However, if pre-existing body representations constitute something other than pre­
existing visuotactile links, Experiment 8 cannot help elucidate the origin o f  these 
representations. The hypothesis that pre-existing body representations constitute 
something other than pre-existing visuotactile links is implied by Tsakiris & Haggard
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(2005). The authors suggest that influences o f stimulation type will only be observed if 
the visual stimulus fits with pre-existing body representations. If pre-existing body 
representations are simply pre-existing visuotactile links, then there is no reason to 
assume that these links with human stimuli can inhibit learning with non-human stimuli. 
The authors must therefore be implying that pre-existing body representations are 
something other than pre-existing visuotactile links with human stimuli, but they do not 
indicate specifically what these might be.
If the differences in processing o f  human and non-human stimuli observed in Experiment 
8 reflect only previously learned associations between human visual stimuli and tactile 
stimuli, then human visuotactile integrative biases (greater integration with human 
stimuli, Thomas et al., 2006; Blakemore et al., 2005; Fiorio & Haggard, 2005; Press et 
al., 2004; Taylor-Clarke et al., 2004; Taylor-Clarke et al., 2002; Kennett et al., 2001; 
Graziano et al., 2000; Pavani et al., 2000) are likely to be modifiable through visuotactile 
training with non-human stimuli, in the same way as human imitative biases can be 
(Experiment 6). However, if pre-existing body representations which lead to differences 
in processing o f human and non-human stimuli reflect something other than previously 
learned visuotactile associations with human stimuli, these modulations should not be 
observable. An experiment could assess this possibility in the following way. In a 
similar way to the test phases in Experiment 8, initial processing o f tactile stimuli in 
somatosensory cortex could be assessed when simultaneously observing human or non­
human stimuli. Subsequently, participants could be presented with either synchronous or 
uncorrelated visuotactile training with either human or non-human stimuli, and 
processing o f tactile stimuli again assessed.
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6.6 Conclusions
This thesis explored why human body movements are especially effective in eliciting 
imitative responses and what this suggests about the mechanisms mediating imitation. It 
was found that a human imitative bias is likely to be driven by perceptual properties o f 
stimuli rather than knowledge about whether stimuli are or are not human. It was also 
found that imitation o f  non-human stimuli and the human imitative bias could be 
modulated through training. Stimuli with human perceptual properties may therefore 
elicit greater imitative responses than non-human stimuli because o f greater opportunities 
for associative learning connecting human stimuli and matching responses. These 
findings are consistent with the Associative Sequence Learning model o f  imitation.
It was also found that training could modulate visuotactile integration; some modulations 
were independent o f whether the visual stimulus was human or non-human, but other 
modulations showed dependence. Associative learning may therefore also explain 
integration o f visual and tactile representations o f  events, but future research must 
establish why training can have different influences on visuotactile integration with 
human and non-human stimuli.
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